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I. INTRODUCTION
"An easement is commonly defined as a nonposessory interest in land
of another." 1 "Easements frequently are created to endure forever. These 'perpetual' or 'permanent' servitudes are so called because they are without durational limitations and, hence, may theoretically last in perpetuity." 2 This right to
use the land of another, which continues to bind the owners of the respective
estates long after the ownership of those who owned the land at the time the
easement was created, provides fertile grounds for disputes and disagreements.
Add to this the fact that easements can be created not only by an "express"
agreement between the parties, but also by the application of principles of law to
the particular facts, it should come as no surprise that disagreements and disputes are not uncommon. However, unlike a marriage in which the parties can
divorce and part company with each other when the disputes and disagreements
reach an intolerable level, in easement situations, the relationship will usually
continue.
As might be expected, there are a significant number of easement cases
in West Virginia. By their very nature, easement cases are fact specific and are
often per curiam decisions in which the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals applies the general principles of "easement law" to resolve the specific
dispute. However, when the various decisions are taken together, a body of
easement law is fairly well articulated by our court.
As is so often true in issues of property law, an understanding of the
law's origin in the common law of England is helpful in studying the law's evolution in this country. This article, therefore, begins with a brief review of the
jurisprudential concepts of easement law in feudal England followed by definitions of the applicable terminology.

I

JON

W.

BRUCE

&

JAMES

E.

ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND § 1.1,

at 1-2 (citations omitted). In Kelly v. Rainelle Coal Co., 64 S.E.2d 606, 613 (W. Va. 1951), overruled by Kimball v. Walden, 301 S.E.2d 210 (W. Va. 1983), the court distinguishes easements.
profit a prendre, and "bare license."
2
BRUCE & ELY, supra note 1, § 10.1, at 10-2 to 10-3 (citations omitted).
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The majority of the Article involves a discussion of the various methods
by which easements may be created and their respective elements. These discussions begin with express easements. As easements are an interest in land, the
Statute of Frauds and the Recording Acts are applicable to express easements,
with much of the litigation of express easements involving the construction of
the language used in their creation.
The other methods by which easements are created include by the application of principles or elements of law to a particular set of facts. These "implied" easements include prescriptive easements, the easement equivalent of
adverse possession; ways of necessities, which rest upon a presumption that
parties would not intend to "landlock" conveyed or retained property; easements
implied from quasi-easements, which arise from the fact that a person does not
have an easement across, or through, his or her own property; and easements by
estoppel, which involve applying the equitable principle of estoppel to easement
situations. The elements of each will be discussed as gleaned from the case law
in West Virginia. Appropriately, the Article ends with a brief discussion of how
easements may terminate.3
This Article does not address the issue of when a roadway becomes a "public" road or the
subject area of roads or streets that are platted on a subdivision plat which is recorded. However,
a recent opinion by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, Fordv. Dickerson, 662 S.E.2d
503, 504-05 (W. Va. 2008), summarizes the ways in which roads become "public" and the recording of subdivision plats as follows:
4. "Generally there are but three methods by which the public may acquire a
valid right to use land owned by another as and for a public road or highway:
(1) By condemnation proceeding, with compensation to the property owner
for the damage resulting from such forceful taking; (2) by continuous and adverse user by the public during the statutory period, accompanied by some
official recognition thereof as a public road by the county court, as by work
done on it by a supervisor acting by appointment of that tribunal; (3) by the
owner's dedication of the land to the public use, or by his consent to such use
given in writing, and acceptance of the dedication by the proper authorities."
Syllabus Point 4, Ryan v. Monongalia County Court. 86 W. Va. 40, 102 S.E.
731 (1920).
5. "Inorder to acquire title to the streets and alleys shown upon a plat by
which it is proposed to dedicate them to the public, the municipality or other
proper public authority must accept the same." Syllabus Point 1, City of Point
Pleasantv.Caldwell, 87 W. Va. 277, 104 S.E. 610 (1920).
6. "This acceptance may be by some order or resolution of the proper municipal authorities, or it may be implied from their acts in connection with the
streets so proposed to be dedicated, such as making improvements thereon.
taking charge thereof, and assuming control thereover." Syllabus Point 2, City
ofPointPleasant v. Caldwell, 87 W. Va. 277, 104 S.E. 610 (1920).
7. "Where the owner of a tract of land lays the same off into lots, streets, and
alleys. and makes a plat thereof, and offers to dedicate the streets and alleys
shown upon such plat to the public, the public authorities may accept such dedication in whole or in part. If an acceptance by implication is relied upon,
the acts which it is contended work such implied acceptance must show a
clear intent to treat and consider the streets and alleys thus offered as public
3
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Law students are often reminded that behind the principles of law of
each case set forth in their casebook, there are the stories of the litigants. Given
the ongoing relationship between owners and successive owners of the dominant and the servient estates and human nature, the study of easement law promises to continue to be relevant and interesting in the years ahead.4
1i.
THE TERMINOLOGY OF EASEMENT LAW
The American Law Institute's "initial" treatment of servitudes was published in 1944 as the fifth and final volume of the original Restatement ofProperty.5 In 1987, work on Restatement (Third) of Property began and thirteen
years later, on May 12, 1998, the American Law Institute adopted the "new"
restatement dealing with servitudes.6 As the forward notes, "The large ideas in
this Restatement are very different from those that governed its predecessor.
Easements, profits, irrevocable licenses, real covenants, and equitable servitudes
are here treated as integral parts of a single body of law, rather than as discrete
doctrines governed by independent rules." 7 This Article will be concerned with
that area of the law of servitudes that is traditionally classified as "easements."
The recent West Virginia case of Newman v. Michel' provides a concise
summary of several aspects of easement law. In that case, the court states, "an
easement may be defined as the right one person has to use the lands of another
for a specific purpose and is a distinct estate from the ownership of the soil itstreets and alleys." Syllabus Point 4, City of Point Pleasant v. Caldwell, 87
W. Va. 277, 104 S.E. 610 (1920).
8. "No dedication to public use arises upon the subdividing of land into lots,
streets and alleys as shown upon a recorded plat, until and unless the proper
public authority either expressly or by clear implication accepts the dedication
so tendered." Syllabus Point 1, Rose v. Fisher, 130 W. Va. 53. 42 S.E.2d 249
(1947).
4
The case of Sherrard v. Henry, 106 S.E. 705 (W. Va. 1921), illustrates this point. The following excerpt is from the court's Syllabus:
While the right which one acquires in a cemetery lot is rather in the nature of a
perpetual easement subject to be controlled by the state in the exercise of its
police power, it is such a valuable right as a court of equity will protect, and
the same character of adverse possession that will confer title to real estate
will suffice to confer such right.
One who buries the body of his dead relative upon a burial lot which another
has the exclusive right to use for such purpose, will be required by mandatory
injunction to disinter and remove the same.
Id. at 705, Syl. Pts. 3. 5.
5
Lance Liebman, Forewardto, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. ix (2000).
6

Id.

7

Id.
688 S.E.2d 610 (W. Va. 2009).

8
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self."9 The court quotes the Restatement's (Third) of Property definition that
"[a]n easement creates a nonpossessing right to enter and use land in the possession of another and obligates the possessor not to interfere with the uses authorized by the easement."1 As discussed in this Article, "easement" includes: (1)
those created by express terms of grant or reservation," (2) easements by implication,' 2 (3) ways of necessity,' 3 (4) easements by prescription, 4 and (5) estop15
pel.
9

Id.at 615 (quoting Kelly v. Rainelle Coal Co., 64 S.E.2d 606, 613 (W. Va. 1951)).

10

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 1.2(1).
Id.at § 2.7. "The formal requirements for creation of a servitude are the same as those

11

required for creation of an estate in land of like duration." Id. at 115.
12
See generally id.at §§ 2.11-2.14.

Id.at § 2.15. "A conveyance that would otherwise deprive the land conveyed to the grantee,
or land retained by the grantor, of rights necessary to reasonable enjoyment of the land implies the
creation of a servitude granting or reserving such rights, unless the language or circumstances of
the conveyance clearly indicates that the parties intended to deprive the property of these rights."
Id. at 202.
14 See generally id. at § 2.16. Servitudes Created by Prescription: Prescriptive Use.
13

A prescriptive use of land that meets the requirements set forth in § 2.17
creates a servitude. A prescriptive use is either:
(1) a use that is adverse to the owner of the land or the interest in land against
which the servitude is claimed, or
(2) a use that is made pursuant to the terms of an intended but imperfectly
created servitude, or the enjoyment of the benefit of an intended but imperfectly created servitude.
Id. at § 2.17 Servitudes Created by Prescription Requirements. "A servitude is created
by a prescriptive use of land, as that term is defined in § 2.16, page 260, if the prescriptive use is:
(1) Open or notorious, and
(2) Continued without effective interruption for the prescriptive period.
Periods of prescriptive use may be tacked together to make up the prescriptive
period if there is a transfer between the prescriptive users of either the inchoate servitude or the estate benefited by the inchoate servitude.
Id.
I Id.at § 2.10.
If injustice can be avoided only by establishment of a servitude, the owner or
occupier of land is estopped to deny the existence of a servitude burdening the
land when:
(1)the owner or occupier permitted another to use that land under circumstances in which it was reasonable to foresee that the user would substantially
change position believing that the permission would not be revoked, and the
user did substantially change position in reasonable reliance on that belief; or
(2) the owner or occupier represented that the land was burdened by a servitude under circumstances in which it was reasonable to foresee that the person
to whom the representation was made would substantially change position on
the basis of that representation, and the person did substantially change position in reasonable reliance on that representation.
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In the discussion of easement law certain terms appear with frequency
and will therefore be defined at the outset. As the court explained in the Newman case:
The land benefitting from an easement is called the dominant
estate; the land burdened by an easement is called the servient
estate.
It is essential to the existence of an easement,
which is appurtenant to land, that there are two
distinct estates or tenements, the dominant to
which the right belongs, and the servient upon
which the obligation rests .... The term easement and the term servitude are often used indiscriminately; the one is usually applied to the
right enjoyed, the other to the burden imposed.
A right of way over the land of another is an
easement in the dominant estate and servitude
upon the servient estate. 16
The Newman case also provides a good understanding of the terms "appurtenant" and "in gross" as used in easement law.
"An easement appurtenant is a right to use a certain parcel, the
servient estate, for the benefit of another parcel, the dominant
estate. Essentially, an easement appurtenant serves the owner
of the dominant estate in a way that cannot be separated from
his rights in the land." Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 230,
76 P.3d 969, 974 (2003) (internal citation omitted). See also,
Syllabus Point I, Jones v. Island Creek Coal Co., 79 W. Va.
532, 91 S.E. 391 (1917) ("If an easement granted be in its nature an appropriate and useful adjunct of the dominant estate
conveyed, having in view the intention of the grantee as to the
use of such estate, and there is nothing to show that the parties
intended it as a mere personal right, it will be held to be an
easement appurtenant to the dominant estate.").
An easement appurtenant may therefore be thought of as the
right to use a certain parcel of land that is called a servient estate, a right that is attached-i. e., appurtenant to-the dominant estate .... The main features of an easement appurtenant are that
there must be both a dominant and servient estate; the holder of
16

Newman v. Michel, 688 S.E.2d 610, 616 (W. Va. 2009) (quoting Cottrell v. Nurnberger. 47

S.E.2d 454, 457 (1948)).
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the easement must own the dominant estate; the benefits of the
easement must be realized by the owner of the dominant estate;
and these benefits must attach to possession of the dominant estate and inhere to and pass with the transfer of the title to the
dominant estate.

An easement in gross is not appurtenant to any estate in
land or does not belong to any person by virtue of ownership of estate in other land but is mere personal interest in
or right to use land of another; it is purely personal and
usually ends with death of grantee.
Unlike an easement appurtenant, an easement in gross does not
run with the land and creates no dominant or servient estates.
See Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 1.4(2)
(2000). Other courts have stated that an easement in gross is
purely personal and usually ends with the death of the grantee.
Shingleton v. State, 260 N.C. 451, 454, 133 S.E.2d 183, 185
(1963). An easement in gross is not assignable and applies to
specific people and not to guests or assignees. Beckstead v.
Price, 146 Idaho 57, 65, 190 P.3d 876, 884 (2008).17
Easements are also classified as "affirmative" or "negative." As the
court explained in Cottrell v. Nurnberger:
Easements are sometimes classified as affirmative and negative.
An affirmative easement exists when the owner of the servient
estate must permit something to be done upon it or some use to
be made of it. A negative easement exists when the owner of
the servient estate is prohibited from doing something on his estate which but for the easement would be lawful and which affects the dominant estate.'"
111. EASEMENTS BY EXPRESS GRANT OR RESERVATION
In many situations the easement is created by an expressed grant or reservation. In such instances, the owner of a tract of land either conveys a portion
of it to another and grants an easement over the land retained to benefit the land
conveyed or reserves an easement across the land conveyed for the benefit of
17

Id. at 616-17.

18

Cottrell,47 S.E.2d at 457; see also Bennett v. Charles Corp., 226 S.E.2d 559, 563 (W. Va.

1976).
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the land retained. 19 In these situations, the easement created is a part of the deed
conveying a parcel of land. Expressed grants also include transactions in which
the sole purpose of the instrument is the creation of the easement - for example, a right of way for a public utility or a private right of way for ingress and
egress to an adjacent tract of land.
As noted above, the Newman court 20 quoted the Restatement's (Third)
ofProperty definition that "[a]n easement creates a nonpossessory right to enter
and use land in the possession of another and obligates the possessor not to interfere with the uses authorized by the easement., 21 Bruce and Ely 22 explain the
significance of being a "nonpossessing interest in land of another" as follows:
"Several aspects of the definition are noteworthy. First, an
easement is an interest in land, not merely a contract right. This
distinction is important for various purposes, including resolving questions about the applicability of The Statute of Frauds
and the availability of compensation for condemnation.
Second, the nonpossessory feature of an easement differentiates
it from an estate in land. Thus, the holder of an affirmative
easement may only use the land burdened by the easement; the
holder may not occupy and possess the realty as does an estate
owner. Third, an easement burdens land possessed by someone
other than the easement holder. This characteristic is a corollary of the nonpossessory element of an easement. It emphasiz19

In footnote six of Highway Props. v. Dollar Savings Bank, 431 S.E.2d 95, 98 99 (W. Va.

1993), the court explained,
We recognized the distinction between an "exception" and a "reservation" in
Malamphy v.Potomac Edison Co., 140 W.Va. 269, 273, 83 S.E.2d 755, 758
(1954):
"An exception is language in which * * * the grantor withdraws from
the operation of the conveyance that which is in existence, and included
under the terms of the grant.' Tate v. United Fuel Gas Co., 137 W.Va.
272, [280,] 71 S.E.2d [65, 70 (1952)]; I Devlin on Real Estate, Third Edition, § 221; 16 Am.Jur., Deeds,§ 298. 'A reservation is" 'something arising out of the thing granted, not then in esse, or some new thing created
or reserved, issuing or coming out of the thing granted, and not a part of
the thing itself, nor of anything issuing out of another thing' " '. Tate v.
United Fuel Gas Co., supra; I Devlin on Real Estate, Third Edition supra.
We went on to state in Malamphy: "Notwithstanding that the language in a
deed of conveyance may be phrased as a 'reservation', such language may be
regarded and treated as an exception if it is necessary in order to carry out the
plain purposes of the parties to the instrument." 140 W.Va. at 273, 83 S.E.2d

at 758. (Citations omitted).
20

Newman, 688 S.E.2d at 610.

21

Id. at 615.

22

BRUCE&ELY, supranote 1,at§ 1.1,
at 1-2.
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es the distinction between possession and use and highlights the
fact that a possessor and an easement
holder can simultaneously
23
utilize the same parcel of land.,
As the quote notes, the Statute of Frauds24 is applicable as an easement
is an interest in land.2 5 While one normally associates the doctrine of "part performance" with contracts involving the sale of land, the principle is also applicable to the creation of easements. In Sanford v. First City Co.,26 a covenant in
a lease to erect a building was modified by an oral agreement. The court's holding is summarized by Syllabus Point 2, which states:
Equity will enforce by specific performance a parol contract for
an easement where it appears that the party seeking to establish
the easement thereunder has performed the contract in whole or
in part to the extent that to refuse to enforce performance of it
would be tantamount to a fraud upon him.27
Also, written instruments transferring an interest in land must be recorded to be
afforded the protection provided by the recording acts. 8
The significant majority of the appellate cases in West Virginia involving granted or reserved easements fall into one of three general categories (1)
what constitutes permissible use of the easement, (2) the location or width of the
easement and (3) whether the easement is "appurtenant to" or "in gross".
A.

What Constitutes Permissible Use of an Expressed Easement
In commenting on express easements, the court in Farley v. Farley said:
Furthermore, we have held that the rule governing the construction of other writings is the same as the rule relating to the construction of grants of easements; that rule provides that the
rights of parties must be ascertained from the words of the grant

23

24
25

Id. at § 1.1, at 1-2 to 1-5 (citations omitted).
W. VA. CODE § 36-1-1 (2009).
The court in Cottrell,stated: "An easement, being an incorporated hereditament and as such

a species of real property in land, I Washburn on Real Property, Sixth Edition, 34, is subject to the
provisions of the statute governing the conveyance of lands, Section 1, Article 1, Chapter 36,
Code, 1931." 47 S.E.2d at 457. See also Bennett v. Charles Corp., 226 S.E.2d 559, 563 (W. Va.
1976).
26
192 S.E. 337 (W. Va. 1937).
27 Id.at 337, Syl. Pt. 2; see also BRUCE & ELY, supra note 1,at § 3.3, at 3-6 to 3-10 (citations
omitted).
W. VA. CODE §§ 40-1-8 to -9; see Dulin v. Ohio River R. Co., 80 S.E. 145, 145 Syl. Pt. 3

28

(W. Va. 1913) ("An unrecorded deed for a railroad right of way is void as to a subsequent purchaser of the servient land without notice thereof.").
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so long as the words are unambiguous. See, e.g., Semler v.
Hartley, 184 W. Va. 24, 399 S.E.2d 54 (1990); Jenkins v. John-

son, 181 W. Va. 281, 382 S.E.2d 334 (1989); Hoffman v. Smith,
172 W. Va. 698, 310 S.E.2d 216 (1983); Collins v. Degler, 74
W. Va. 455, 82 S.E. 265 (1914). Moreover, in Syllabus Point 1
of Cotiga Development Co. v. United Fuel Gas Co., 147 W. Va.

484, 128 S.E.2d 626 (1962), we explained that "[a] valid written
instrument which expresses the intent of the parties in plain and
unambiguous language is not subject to judicial construction or
interpretation but will be applied and enforced according to
such intent."

In Sally-Mike Properties v. Yokum, 175 W. Va.

296, 300, 332 S.E.2d 597, 601 (1985), this Court stated that the
"language of the instrument itself, and not surrounding circumstances, is the first and foremost evidence of the parties intent."'2 9
Later in the Farley opinion, the court, citing West Virginia case law,
said:
"Where one acquires an easement over the property of another
by an express grant, the use of that easement must be confined
to the terms and purposes of the grant."; Syllabus Point 2, Lowe
v. Guyan Eagle Coals, Inc., 166 W. Va. 265, 273 S.E.2d 91

(1980) ("No use may be made of a right-of-way different from
that established at the time of its creation so as to burden the
servient estate to a greater extent than was contemplated at the
time of the grant.").30
In Shock v. Holt Lumber Co.,31 the issue was whether the plaintiff was
entitled to an injunction to prevent transport of timber cut on other lands across
the plaintiff s property under the easement granted in a deed in which the plaintiff was the grantor. The general rule, as expressed by the court in Shock, is that
There can be no question that the rights of one claiming an
easement by express grant are limited within the scope of the
privilege. The extent of the servitude is determined by the
terms of the grant ....
"Where an easement exists by express
grant its use must be confined to the terms and purposes of the
grant." "When a right of way has been acquired by grant, it
29

Farley v. Farley, 600 S.E.2d 177, 180 (W. Va. 2004). In Semler v. Hartley, 399 S.E.2d 54

(W. Va. 1990), the court held it was in error to permit extrinsic evidence from the grantors of the
easement which would restrict or limit the unambiguous language in their deed granting a right of
way 30 feet in width.
30
Farley,600 S.E.2d at 181.
31
148 S.E. 73, 74 (W. Va. 1929).
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must be used according to the terms of the grant." . . . "When a
right of way has been acquired by prescription the right will be
commensurate with and measured by the use." . . . There is also
little doubt that the owner of land over which a right of way has
been granted may, ordinarily, restrain an excessive and unwarranted use of the easement. "An
unlawful or excessive use of
32
an easement may be enjoined.
In Ratcliffv. Cyrus,33 after the court concluded that an easement granted
in the deed 34 was not void for vagueness, it further held the easement was limited to the "rear property" and could not be extended to other property owned
by the plaintiff." The court cited with approval Syllabus Point 1 of Dorsey v.
Dorsey,3 6 which stated, "An easement cannot be extended as a matter
of right,
37
by the owner of the dominant estate, to other lands owned by him.
In Shepherd v. Yoho, 38 the owner of the dominant estate sought to enjoin
the owner of the servient estate from also using the right of way. The right of
way was expressly provided for in a 1918 deed.3 9 In addition to the language
relating to the right of way, a 1990 conveyance contained the following language:
"It is agreed and understood the right-of-way hereby granted is
a private right-of-way for use by the Grantees and their invitees
and is limited to use for ingress, egress and regress to said 30acre tract of the Grantees. The Grantors, their heirs or assigns
shall have 40the express right to use this right of way at any and
'
all times.
The Yohos were the owners of the servient estate. The lawsuit was precipitated by the Shepherds placing two gates across the right of way over the
32

Id. at 74 (citations omitted).

544 S.E.2d 93 (W. Va. 2001).
A "twenty-foot right-of-way running from the house trailer site in a westerly direction to
two marble markers which are set on the boundary line of the Johnson and Ratcliff land to the
lands of William Glenn Ratcliff and Thelma Ratcliff to the Adkins-Ratcliff Lane thence running
in a northerly direction to Tolisa (sic) Highway." Id. at 96-97.
35
Id. at 97.
36
153 S.E. 146 (W. Va. 1930).
37 Ratcliff 544 S.E.2d at 97; see also Lyons v. Lyons, 371 S.E.2d 640, 641, Syl. Pt. I (W. Va.
1983).
38 559 S.E.2d 905 (W. Va. 2001).
39 "'There is retained over and through this boundary of land a right-of-way on or near the
road now traveled down the run; which right-of-way is for the perpetual use of the first party and
his assigns."' Id.
at 906.
33
34

40

Id.
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protest of the Yohos. The appeal, which resulted in the reported opinion, followed a ruling by the circuit court, which granted exclusive use of the right of
way to the Shepherds and enjoined the Yohos from using it.4 1 On appeal, the
court noted that the Yohos, as the direct successors to the grantors in the 1990
deed, had "'the express right to use the right of way at any and all times.' ' 42 As
to the general principal of law the court continued:
As a general rule, "where one acquires an easement over the
property of another by an express grant, the use of that easement must be confined to the terms and purposes of the grant."
Hoffman v. Smith, 172 W.Va. 698, 700-01, 310 S.E.2d 216, 218
(1983). It is also a well-established principle of law that the
servient estate owner has all the rights and benefits of ownership consistent with the easement including the right to continue
to use the land unless there is an express reservation to the contrary. 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements and Licenses § 98 (1996); 6B
Michie's Jurisprudence Easements § 6 (1998). In this case, the
1918 deed quoted above merely created a right of way for perpetual use. The language in the deed does not establish or even
imply that the right of way is for the exclusive use of the dominant estate owner. Likewise, subsequent deeds in the chain of
title reference the right-of-way, but none contain an exclusive
reservation of the right of way.43
It should be noted that the issue in the Shepherd v. Yoho case was the
use of the right of way, not erection of the gates per se. The right to erect gates
across a right of way was at issue in Hoffman v. Smith.44 In Hoffman v. Smith,
the circuit court had granted the Smiths, the owners of the servient estate, the
right to replace the gates across the right of way with cattle guards. 45 The 1907
deed, which created the right of way across what became the Smiths' property,
contained the following statement as part of the express grant of the right of
way: "Where gates and bars are placed, they are to be maintained and kept
closed by the parties hereto, their heirs and assigns. 46 On appeal the court, on
the basis of the expressed terms in the grant, reversed the circuit's decision that
the gates could be replaced by cattle guards, stating,

41
42

Id.
Id. at 907.

43

Id.

44

310 S.E.2d 216, 217 (W. Va. 1983).
Id. at 217.
Id. at 217 18.

45
46

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol112/iss3/4

12

Fisher: A Survey of the Law of Easements in West Virginia
2010]

A SURVEY OF THE LAW OF EASEMENTS IN WEST VIRGINIA

649

We believe the law is too well settled with regard to upholding
limitations contained in a written easement to permit us to ignore the language of the easement grant setting the maintaining
of gates and the closing of the same. Furthermore, even if it
were demonstrated that cattle guards are as effective as gates in
securing livestock, there is the larger question that gates provide
a measure of privacy that inhibits casual trespassers from making free use of the right-of-way.47
The dictum in the Hoffman case is instructive. While the case was decided on the expressed terms of the grant of the right of way, the court also discussed the right to erect gates in the absence of an expressed permission. The
court said:
The general rule is that unless there is specific language in the
grant of an easement to the contrary, the grantor of a right-ofway over farm land retains the right to erect gates, provided
they do not unreasonably interfere with the use of the easement.
We stated in Collins v. Degler, 74. W.Va. 455, 461, 82 S.E.
265, 2667 (1914):
Freedom in the use of the right-of-way over
farming land is not unreasonably interfered
[sic] with or restrained by the use of gates,
when the grant of the right has no provision
forbidding them. Why? Because the very character of the land makes gates essential to the
proper and reasonable use of the way. They are,
in other phrase, the custom of the business.
See also Annot.; 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements and Licenses § 91
(1966); 28 C.J.S. Easements § 98(b) (1941), 52 A.L.R.3d 9
(1973).

47

Id. at 220. Prior to this statement reversing the circuit court, the court had explained:
With regard to the gate issue, we begin with the general rule that where one
acquires an easement over the property of another by an express grant, the use
of that easement must be confined to the terms and purposes of the grant.

It has also been recognized that where a grant of a right-of-way allows the
grantor to maintain gates across it. there is a duty imposed on the grantee to
close the gates after passing through them.
Id. at 218 (citations omitted).
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Moreover, even where a right-of-way over farm property has
been obtained by prescriptive use the servient owner has the
right to erect gates in a reasonable manner. Mitchell v. Bowman,
74 W.Va. 498, 82 S.E. 330 (1914).
Thus, under the foregoing law with regard to agricultural property, even where there are no gates when the easement was
granted and no express language in the grant permitting the servient owner to erect gates, the servient owner is still permitted
to do so. Here, the right to maintain gates and the obligation to
close them is expressly contained in the grant of the right-ofway. 48
The case of G. Corp., Inc. v.Mackie, Inc.4 involved the development of

commercial property along Corridor G, in Kanawha County. Although the case
principally involves the interpretation and application of a Declaration of Protective Covenants and Restriction, an ancillary issue involved the grant of "'a
non-conclusive 40 foot easement or right-of-way"' leading from Corridor G, to
property owned by Fletcher.50 The court, while recognizing that the Declaration
of Protective Covenants and Restriction could change the application of the
general rule, quoted Syllabus Point 6 of Sanders v. Roselawn Memorial Gar-

dens, 159 S.E.2d 784 (W. Va. 1968), as follows:
"An owner of a servient estate may legally grant successive
easements for purposes of travel in and over a certain road or
way in favor of various property owners having need for such
travel easements, to be used jointly by them; and a person having such an easement right may not be permitted to object to
any use of or change in the character of such road or way by the
owner of the servient estate or by any other owner of such an
easement right or way so long as the rights of the one complaining are not thereby impaired or 51
interfered with in an undue or
unreasonable manner or degree.,
An interesting issue involving express easements was presented in Keller v. Hartman.52 Sam Byrd owned a tract of land in Franklin, Pendleton County, which included a house, garage, and four commercial buildings. Upon his
death in 1949, the property descended to his three children, Leslie, Maurice, and
48

Id. at 219 (citations omitted).

49

51

466 S.E.2d 820 (W. Va. 1995).
See id. at 822.
Id.at 824.

52

333 S.E.2d 89 (W. Va. 1985).

50
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Wayne. Maurice purchased Leslie's interest giving him a two-thirds undivided
interest. In 1956, Maurice and Wayne partially partitioned the tract with Wayne
taking sole ownership of one of the commercial properties, Maurice taking sole
ownership of two of the commercial properties, and the balance of the tract remaining in Maurice (2/3 undivided interest) and Wayne (3 undivided interest) as
tenants in common. In 1978, the successor to Maurice's interest, his widow,
sold one of the commercial buildings to Mr. Hartman, the tenant, who had
rented the building since 1953. In addition to conveying the building to Mr.
Hartman, the grantor also granted an easement across the unpartitioned portion
53
of the original tract of land describing it as "across her undivided 2/3 interest.,
Three years after the grant of the easement, the owner of the two-thirds
(23) undivided interest conveyed her interest in the unpartitioned portion to the
owner of the one-third (13) undivided interest, her brother-in-law. The conveyance to her brother-in-law provided: "'This conveyance is made subject to
any and all rights-of-ways [sic] and easements affecting the real estate herein
conveyed.'"4
In responding to the argument "that the 1978 deed conveying the easement to the appellees was void and thus incapable of being later ratified,"55 the
court, in affirming the jury's finding that the brother-in-law had consented to or
ratified the easement, said:
This Court has held that a conveyance of land by one cotenant
without consent of the other cotenant(s) is not void as between
the grantor and grantee. Boggess v. Meredith, 16 W.Va. 1, 2729 (1879); Worthington v. Staunton, W.Va. 208, 241-2 (1880).

The general rule regarding grants of easement by cotenants is
found at 86 C.J.S., Tenancy in Common § 111: "Ordinarily a
tenant in common cannot, as against his cotenants and without
their precedent authority or subsequent ratification, impose an
easement on the common property in favor of third persons; but
the easement may be binding on the undivided interest of the
granting cotenant." [Citations omitted].

Id. at 91 92. The language in the 1978 deed provided:
The party of the first part [Elsie Byrd] also grants and conveys to the party of
the second part [Hartmans] a right-of-way thirty (30) feet in width across her
undivided two-thirds (23) interest in the real estate owned by her and located
East of and between South Branch Street, the location of said right-of-way
shall be the same entrance which the parties of the second part now use for
the purpose of ingress and egress to the real estate herein conveyed.
Id. at 92 93.
54
Id. at 93.
55
Id. at 95.
53
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We have recognized that a cotenant who did not join in the original conveyance may affirm or ratify the act of another cotenant
"in carving out a portion of the common estate." Mauzy v. Nelson, 147 W. Va. 764, 770, 131 S.E.2d 389, 393, 97 A.L.R.2d
732, 738 (1963). In syl. pts. 5 and 7 of Worthington v. Staunton, supra, this Court held:
A deed from a co-tenant of a part of the land
held in common, describing it by metes and
bounds, cannot in any way operate to the prejudice of the other tenants in common. They
have the right to have the land partitioned unaffected by such deed.
Such a deed will become operative and pass the
land to the grantee by metes and bounds, if the
other tenants in common, before partition, confirm and ratify it, and after partition, if that portion is allotted to the purchaser thereof; and in
either case such deed will be binding on both
the grantor and grantee.
Our holdings with respect to conveyances by one cotenant, and
subsequent ratification by the remaining cotenant(s), apply with
equal force to the grant of an easement. See Saulsberry v.
Saulsberry, 121 F.2d 318 (6th Cir. 1941). We conclude from
the foregoing authorities that where a tract of land is owned by
tenants in common and one tenant grants an easement to a third
party, which by the express terms of the grant, purportedly conveys only the grantor's undivided interest, such grant is effective to create an easement on the other tenants' interest, if the
other tenant(s) consent to or subsequently ratify the conveyance.
Upon review of the record we find that the evidence was sufficient to present a jury question as to whether Wayne Byrd consented to or ratified the conveyance of the easement. The jury
could reasonably infer consent or ratification from testimony
regarding Wayne Byrd's silence, his response to the conveyance of the easement by Elsie Byrd or his acceptance of the
1981 deed.56

56

Id. at 96.
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Mineral and Timber Severances

A source of litigation over what usage was permissible under an express
right-of-way grant has been the severance deeds of minerals or timber and the
associated mining or timbering rights. An illustrative case is Lowe v. Guyan
Eagle Coals, Inc.5 The 1902 severance deed gave the owner of the mineral
interest his heirs and assigns "'full rights of way to, from and over, said premises by the construction and use of roads ... or otherwise, for the purpose of...
shipping or transporting
all of said minerals ... whether contained on said pre58
mises or elsewhere.'
The issue presented to the Circuit Court of Logan County in 1979 was
whether Guyan Eagle could transport coal from a strip mine on an adjacent
tract, i.e., not a part of the land involved in the 1902 severance. The owner of
the surface interest appealed a summary judgment by the circuit court in favor
of the "mineral interest," holding that the "surface property is a servient estate to
the dominant Guyan Eagle mineral estate and that the 1902 deed created an
59
easement appurtenant to the coal estate which is not subject to termination.,
In reversing the grant of summary judgment, the Supreme Court of Appeals
explained:
[T]hese facts are akin to those in West-Virginia-PittsburghCoal
Co. v. Strong, 129 W.Va. 832, 42 S.E.2d 46 (1947), wherein the
first syllabus point is:
In order for a usage or custom to affect the meaning of a
contract in writing because within the contemplation of the
parties thereto, it must be shown that the usage or custom
was one generally followed at the time and place of the contract's execution. Id.
At Footnote 3 in Buffalo Mining Co. v. Martin, supra, 267
S.E.2d, at 724, we interpreted the West Virginia Pittsburgh
Coal Co. v. Strong, supra, decision to be based on the compatibility of a mineral owner's uses of and burdens on a surface
owner's estate, with the intention of the parties to the deed, a
genuine question of material fact that must be resolved at trial.
Summary judgment is inappropriate. Reed v. Smith Lumber
Co., W.Va. 268 S.E.2d 70 (1980), Syllabus.

57
58
59

273 S.E.2d 91 (W. Va. 1980).
Id.at 92 93.
Id.at 92.
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It is stated quite precisely, in 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements and Licenses § 77, that no use may be made of a right-of-way, different from that established at the time of its creation so as to burden the servient estate to a greater extent than was contemplated
at the time of the grant. See generally, Annotation, Extent and
Reasonableness of Use of Private Way in Exercise of Easement
Granted in General Terms, 3 A.L.R.3d 1256 (1965 and supp.).
We remand this cause to the circuit court for an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether the technology of hauling is so
different from anything contemplated in 1902 that it overburdens the surface owner's estate and is beyond the deed's reservation: whether the burden now is alien to that generally contemplated by parties to such deeds at the time and place of its
execution. If a jury determines that the present uses of the
right-of-way were within the contemplation of the parties as to
potential burdens on the surface estate, Guyan Eagle is entitled
to use the property as it is. Ifa jury finds that the burdens were
beyond those contemplated and paid for, it may assess damages
for the unauthorized use.60
An earlier decision which raised the same issue as the Lowe case was
Jones v. Island Creek Coal Co.6' The operative words in the grant were essentially the same as in Lowe.62

60
61

Id. at 93.
91 S.E. 391 (W. Va. 1917).

62

Together with the full and complete rights and privileges of every kind of

mining. manufacturing, and transporting such coal, gases. salt water, oil, and
minerals on. through. and over the said premises. and in particular the right of
exploring for, and extracting the said minerals, and also with full rights of way
to. from. and over said premises by the construction and use of roads, tram-

ways, railroads, or otherwise, for the purpose of exploring, extracting, storing,
handling, manufacturing, refining, shipping, or transporting all said materials,
whether contained on the said premises or elsewhere, and for any other purpose whatsoever, and with the full right to take and use all water, stone, and
timber except walnut, poplar, and oak over 12 inches in diameter found on
said premises required for any purposes: Provided, however, that the said parties of the first part shall have the right to take for themselves such coal as
they may need for the domestic use of their own family so long as they shall
remain on the said premises; or in case said coal cannot be taken without inconvenience to the mining operations of the party of the second part, then the
same shall be delivered by and received from said party of the second part free
of charge.
Id. at 392.
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The coal company wanted to haul timber from an adjacent tract across
the plaintiff s surface interest under the easement granted in the 1892 severance
deed claiming that the timber would be used for its mining operatives, "so far as
the same is required therefore, and that the remainder will be sold in the open
market; that it will require from one-third to one-half of all said timber for the
conduct of the mining operation. ,63 After concluding that the easement was appurtenant to the mineral estate in the 70 14 acre tract in the 1892 deed, the court
stated:
"Easements by express grant or reservation must be limited to
the matters contained in the deed. Nothing passes by implication as incident to the grant except what is reasonably necessary
to its fair enjoyment. The extent of the rights acquired must
therefore depend upon the construction placed upon the terms
of the grant, and in construing such instruments the court will
look to the circumstances attending the transaction, the situation
of the parties, and the state of the thing granted to ascertain the
intention of the parties. In cases of doubt
the grant must be tak64
en most strongly against the grantor.,
It will be noted from this quotation that nothing passes by implication as incident to the grant except what is reasonably necessary to its fair enjoyment. In this case the situation of this
land is such that it is reasonably necessary to the fair enjoyment
of the grant of the minerals that the grantee of them shall have
the right to remove minerals from other lands over the surface
of this land, and if it can be said that such is the case then the
grant of rights of way over the 70 1/4 -acre tract of land for the
purpose of removing coal from other tracts, as well as from this
tract, will be held to be an easement appurtenant to the ownership of the minerals in this tract of land and to be enjoyed by the
owner of these minerals.

Applying these conclusions to the case in hand, we find that the
defendant has the right to construct such a tramroad over the
land of the plaintiff as may be reasonably necessary for its use
in procuring timber from other lands to be sawed into lumber
for use in its mining operations upon the 70 1/4 -acre tract of

63
64

See id.
Id. at 394 (quoting Cyc. P. 1201).
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land, or upon its other lands operated or intended to be operated
in conjunction therewith.65
In construing mining rights, the court limited the implied rights in severance deeds in Buffalo Mining Co. v. Martin.66 In Buffalo Mining Co., the
issue was whether an electric transmission line could be erected on the surface
under the language of the mining rights granted in the 1890 mineral severance
deed. Syllabus Points 2 and 3 set forth the majority holding as follows:
2. Where there has been a severance of the mineral estate and
the deed gives the grantee the right to utilize the surface, such
surface use must be for purposes reasonably necessary to the
extraction of the minerals.
3. In order for a claim for an implied easement for surface
rights in connection with mining activities to be successful, it
must be demonstrated not only that the right is reasonably necessary for the extraction of the mineral, but also that the right
can be 67exercised without any substantial burden to the surface
owner.

2.

Utility Easements

While the case was before The Supreme Court of Appeals on an appeal
from the lower court's grant of a summary judgment, Larew v. Monongahela
Power Co.68 provides a concise statement of the rule of reasonableness the court
had discussed at length in Kell v. Appalachian Power Co. 69 In Larew the court
summarized its holding in Kell as follows:
In Kell . . . we discussed the property rights when a utility

easement has been granted by stating:
The fee interest in land over which a power
company has been granted an easement remains
in the party making the grant. The grantorowner of the land retains the right to make any
reasonable use of the land subject to the ease-

65

Id.

66

267 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1980).
Id. at 722, Syl. Pts. 2, 3.
487 S.E.2d 348 (W. Va. 1997).
289 S.E.2d 450 (W. Va. 1982).

67
68
69
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ment so long as that use is not inconsistent with
the rights of the grantee. (footnotes omitted).
In exercising the rights granted under an easement, a power
company must follow the rule of reasonableness. In other
words, the power company "may not inflict unnecessary damage on the land" and "may not unreasonably increase the burden
placed upon the servient tenement." Kell, 170 W. Va. at 17, 289
S.E.2d at 454. These common law principles formed the basis
for our decision in Kell holding that the indenture did "not authorize the power company to apply toxic herbicides to that
right-of-way by aerial broadcast spraying." Syllabus, in part,
Kell.
In Kell, we found that the right given by the utility indenture
was "to cut and remove trees, overhanging branches or obstructions that endanger the safety, or interfere with the use, of the
power company's lines on the right-of-way granted by the indenture." Kell, 170 W.Va. at 20, 289 S.E.2d at 457. 70
3.

Adapting to Technology

In Davis v. Jefferson County Telephone Co.,71 the issue was whether the
owner of the servient estate could prevent the owner of the dominant estate from
giving permission to the telephone company to install poles and wires in the
right of way. The language granting the easement read: "'and a right of way for
the benefit of the land hereby conveyed ..,,,72 The court stated: "The general
rule is that where a right of way is granted or reserved without limit of use it
70

71
72

Larew, 487 S.E.2d at 352 53 (citations omitted). Footnote 4 of the Larew opinion stated:
The following is a more complete excerpt of Kells's discussion of the common law principles concerning an utility easement:
A power company. however, does have the right, under a general rightof-way easement, to enter upon the land to maintain and repair its
equipment to the extent necessary to the safe and effective operation of
that equipment. A power company, however, in exercising that right of
entry. may not inflict unnecessary damage on the land. Otter Tail Power
Co.[v. Malme]. n. 13, supra. [92 N.W.2d 514 (N.D. 1958)] Similarly, it
has been held that a power company, in exercising its right to enter upon
the land to maintain or repair its equipment, may not unreasonably increase the burden placed upon the servient tenement. Martin v. Norris
Public Power Dist., 175 Neb. 815, 124 N.W2d 221 (1963). It was decided very early that this right of entry included the right to enter upon
the land to cut or trim trees or limbs which might be a danger to the power lines. (footnotes omitted).
95 S.E. 1042 (W. Va. 1918).
Id.at 1043.
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may be used for any purpose to which the land accommodated thereby may naturally and reasonably be devoted., 73 The court then added:
If then those living in a rural district with only such unlimited
private ways as that involved here are to enjoy any of the modern conveniences, such as electric light, natural gas, telephones,
and the like, they must of necessity rely upon such ways by
which to obtain them. To deny them such right would be to
stop to some extent the wheels of progress, and invention, and
finally make residence in the country more and more undesirable and less endurable. Where there has been such an unlimited
and unrestricted grant of a way we think it may be reasonably
implied that the parties intended an unlimited reasonable use
thereof, as distinguished from an unreasonable and improper
one. It is fully shown in the evidence in this case that the poles
and wires are so set and hung as to constitute no invasion of
plaintiffs right or any obstruction to the enjoyment by him of
the residue of his land.74

A recent case which follows a similar analysis is C/R TV, Inc. v. Shannondale, Inc.75 Shannondale was the owner of a development, which granted
Potomac Edison an easement to install poles and wires for electrical and telephone service within its subdivision. Potomac Edison licensed other utilities to
use its poles in Jefferson County, West Virginia, including the Shannondale
subdivision. Potomac Edison had license arrangements with both C/R TV and
Mid-Atlantic Cable, both of which were involved in providing cable television.
Shannondale, who had an exclusive agreement with Mid-Atlantic Cable to provide cable television within its development, sought to enjoin C/R TV from
stringing its television cable on Potomac Edison's poles in its subdivision. One
of Shannondale's arguments was that the easement it had granted to Potomac
Edison was not broad enough to permit Potomac Edison to license a television
cable company to use its poles. 6
The Fourth Circuit Court stated: "The question thus presented is
whether an easement to construct poles and to string electrical power and telephone wires on the poles includes the right to string television transmission
cables."

73

74

Id.at 1044.
Id.at 1044.

27 F.3d 104 (4th Cir. 1994).
76
The easement Shannondale had granted to Potomac Edison permitted "'the installation,
erection, maintenance, repair and operation of electric transmission and distribution pole lines.
and electric service lines, with telephone wires thereon."' Id. at 106.
75

77

Id.at 107.
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The Fourth Circuit also noted that in Kell,7 the West Virginia Court had
"recognized that the power company could normally 'take advantage of technology improvements in utilizing the easement."', 79 The Fourth Circuit also
noted that the West Virginia Court had defined the boundaries on a proposed
use in Buffalo Mining Co. 'oand stated the test as follows:
The test announced in Buffalo Mining thus requires us to inquire into: (1) whether the use sought to be included within an
easement grant is substantially compatible with the explicit
grant, and (2) whether itsubstantially burdens the servient estate."
Applying the principles of West Virginia case law, the Fourth Circuit
reasoned:
In the case before us, the 1955 easements gave Potomac Edison
the right to erect poles and to string electric power lines and telephone wires on them. Under the acknowledged right granted
by the easement, Potomac Edison licensed GTE to install telephone wires for distribution of telephone service to Shannondale residents. At the time of the grant, these wires consisted of
a narrow band, voice-service twisted pair of copper wires. But
with technological advances over the years, improved wires
were strung under the easements granted to Potomac Edison,
including fiber-optic cables. GTE's fiber-optic cables, which
Shannondale concedes are permitted by that doctrine which entitles a grantee to utilize technological advances, carry signals
that provide voice, computer data, telecopying, and visual
transmissions. At oral argument, counsel for Shannondale
agreed that GTE could properly transmit all forms of electronic
and fiber-optic signals. Because GTE is a telephone company,
Shannondale argues, its cable may be labeled as "telephone
wire" as used in the 1955 easements.
Shannondale's call for a strict interpretation of the easement
language against C/R TV, however, cannot be reconciled with
its common-sense interpretation and application of the easements over the years. A strict interpretation would limit the use

78

79
80
81

289 S.E.2d 450 (W. Va.
CIR T1' Inc., 27 F.3d at
267 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va.
C/R T17 Inc., 27 F.3d at

1982).
107.
1980).
108.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2010

23

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 112, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 4
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 112

of the telephone wire language of the easement to wires devoted
solely to audio transmission. 82
After addressing two other arguments advanced by Shannondale and
Mid-Atlantic Cable, the court stated:
In summary, applying the test announced in Buffalo Mining, we
conclude that (1) the use of a wire for the transmission of television signals is substantially compatible with the use given for
the transmission of telephone date and visual signals now enjoyed by GTE, and (2) the addition of a television transmission
wire, indistinguishable in appearance from other communication wires authorized under the grant, does not impose an unnecessary or even an increased burden on the servient estate. Accordingly, we hold that the 1955 easements granted by Shannondale to Potomac Edison are sufficiently broad to permit Potomac Edison, and hence C/R TV, to string television transmission wires and cables on its poles.83
B.

Location or Width of the Easement

While the issue of the location and the width of the easement is more
frequently an issue in prescriptive easements, the issue also arises where there
are express grants and reservations of easements.
A helpful starting point for the discussion of the location of an easement
is Highway Properties v. Dollar Savings Bank.84 In Highway Properties,there

were five parcels of land totaling approximately thirty-six acres adjacent to U.S.
Route 19 near Oak Hill, West Virginia. In 1983, these five parcels were conveyed by North Hills, as grantor, to Fayette Square, as grantee, in a single deed
with the five parcels specifically and separately described and numbered one
through five. The two largest parcels, adjacent to each other, became involved
in the ensuing litigation involving the easement set forth in the 1983 deed in
which North Hills conveyed the tracts to Fayette Square. 85
The only provision in the 1983 deed to Fayette Square pertaining to the
easement provided: 'It is agreed and understood that there is common parking
and right-of-ways or easements in, to and across all parcels for ingress and
egress from and to all other parcels.' ' 8 6 Following subsequent transfers of both
parcel one and parcel five, litigation ensued when the owner of parcel five con-

83

Id. at 108.
Id. at 109.

84

431 S.E.2d n95 (W. Va. 1993).

85

Id. at 97.

86

Id.

82
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taining 16.4 acres was denied access through parcel one, containing 17.4 acres.
While the circuit court ruled in favor of the owner of parcel one on the basis of
merger as a result of the 1983 conveyance, the Supreme Court of Appeals explained, "[I]ndependently of the doctrine of merger, it is our belief that there is a
more fundamental problem foreclosing Highway Properties' easement. 8 7 In the
discussion which follows, the court discusses several West Virginia cases and
then quotes with approval from a North Carolina case88 which succinctly stated
the rule as follows:
"When an easement is created by deed, either by express grant
or by reservation, the description thereof 'must either be certain
in itself or capable of being reduced to a certainty by a recurrence to something extrinsic to which is refers .... There must
be language in the deed sufficient to serve as a pointer or a
guide to the ascertainmentof the location of the land.' Thompson v. Umberger, 221 N.C. 178, 180, 19 S.E.2d 484, 485
(1942)." (citations omitted)., 9
The court then said:
[1]t is our conclusion that the easement sought to be created in
this case in the 1983 deed to Fayette Square was insufficient as
a matter of law as to its description. The language in the 1983
deed that "[i]t is agreed and understood that there is common
parking and rights-of-way or easements in, to and across all
parcels for ingress and egress from and to all other parcels" was
a totally inadequate description. In its out conveyance of Parcel
One and Parcel Five, Fayette Square could have created an
easement on Parcel One in favor of Parcel Five, but the language it used was totally inadequate.

None of the easement language identified the location or width
of the easements on the land. The descriptions contained noting
that would serve to specify in the slightest degree any means of
geographically locating the easement on the property.
It should be noted that these rules regarding the sufficiency of
the description of an easement contained in a deed apply only to
the initial conveyance. The fact the subsequent deeds may refer
87
88
89

Id. at 98.
Allen v. Duvall, 316 S.E.2d 267, 270 (N.C. 1984).
Highway Properties,431 S.E.2d at 99.
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generally to exceptions and reservations of record or may make
no such references does not diminish the validity of the original
easement if it previously was described adequately. The reason
for this rule is because a purchaser of real property is on notice
as to those matters which are contained in the chain of title to
the property. 90
The sufficiency of the description of an easement was again before the
court in Folio v. City of Clarksburg.9 1 In Folio, the court discussed the effect92of
the passage of West Virginia Code § 36-3-5a on the descriptions of easement.
As to the adoption of this code section the court said:
W. Va. Code § 36-3-5a(a) (2004) provides that a right-of-way
cannot be declared invalid because of the failure of the granting
instrument to include a metes and bound description, a centerline specification, or a drawing or plat reference. However, it is
well-established that there still must be a sufficient description
which serves as a guide to identify the land upon which the
easement is located. In that regard, this Court has held that,
90

Id. at 99-100.

91

655 S.E.2d 143 (W. Va. 2007).

92

W. VA. CODE § 36-3-5a (2009) (Easement and right-of-way; description of property; excep-

tion for certain public utility facilities and mineral leases.).
(a) Any deed or instrument that initially grants or reserves an easement or
right-of-way shall describe the easement or right-of-way by metes and

bounds, or by specification of the centerline of the easement or right-of-way,
or by station and offset, or by reference to an attached drawing or plat which
may not require a survey, or instrument based on the use of global positioning
system which may not require a survey: Provided, That oil and gas. gas storage and mineral leases shall not be required to describe the easement, but
shall describe the land on which the easement or right-of-way will be situate
by source of title or reference to a tax map and parcel, recorded deed, recorded
lease. plat or survey sufficient to reasonably identify and locate the property
on which the easement or right-of-way is situate: Provided, however, That the
easement or right-of-way is not invalid because of the failure of the easement
or right-of-way to meet the requirements of this subsection.
(b) This section does not apply to the construction of a service extension from
a main distribution system of a public utility when such service extension is
located entirely on, below, or above the property to which the utility service is
to be provided.
(c) The clerk of the county commission of any county in which an easement
or right-of-way is recorded pursuant to this section shall only accept for recordation any document that complies with this section and that otherwise complies with the requirements of article one, chapter thirty-nine of this code,
without need for a survey or certification under section twelve, article thirteen-a, chapter thirty of this code.
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"A deed granting to a railroad company land for its right of
way must contain on its face a description of the land in itself certain, so as to be identified, or if not in itself so certain, it must give such description as, with the aid of evidence outside the deed, not contradicting it, will identify
and locate the land, otherwise the deed is void for uncertainty." Syllabus Point 931, Hoard v. Railroad Co., 59 W.Va.
91, 53 S.E. 278 (1906).
As to the insufficiency of the language creating the easements in the
case before it, the court in Folio affirmed the lower court holding as follows:
The two right-of-way agreements at issue in this case were
identical except for the fact that one stated that the pedestrian
right-of-way would be five feet and the other specified a width
of ten feet. The agreements did not establish a beginning point
but, rather, indicated that the rights-of-way would "be located in
the discretion of said Grantee to Pike Street over a reasonable
route as necessary . . . ." Clearly, the language in the agreements is insufficient to serve as a guide to identify the location
of the rights-of-way. Accordingly, we do not believe that the
circuit court erred by finding the agreements
were ambiguous
94
and inadequate to convey the rights-of-way.
Even expressed easements that are not void for vagueness may still have
description problems. One of the earlier examples is Palmer v. Newman. 95 In
Palmer, the 1910 deed transferring the tract also provided "'an outlet leading
from this 41.4 acres, extending west to the public road leading to Proctor, it be96
ing the same road now leading from the public road to this tract of land.'
Originally the gate where this right of way joined the public road had an outlet
twenty feet wide and a passage-way of sixteen feet through the fence line between the two tracts.97 The ownership of the servient tract passed into the hands
of the defendant in 1916, and in 1920, friction between the owner of the dominant estate and the servient estate resulted in litigation. At issue was the width
of the plaintiff's right of way.

93
94

Folio, 655 S.E.2d at 147.
Id. at 147-48.

95

112 S.E. 194 (W. Va. 1922).

96

Id. at 195.
Id. at 196.

97
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Citing secondary authority, the court stated:
It is a well-settled law of easements that, where there is no
stated width in the instrument creating or reserving a right-ofway, a suitable and convenient way is meant which will be determined by its sufficiency to afford ingress or egress to those
entitled to use it; and such sufficiency will depend upon the
purposes of the grant or reservation, and the circumstances of
each case. 19 C.J. p. 968, § 204.
"In determining the extent of a right of way, it is proper to consider the whole scope and purpose of the deed creating it, the
manifest intent of the parties in its execution and the situation of
the property." Jones on Easements, § 385.
The servient estate cannot be burdened by the occupancy of a
greater width than is reasonably necessary for the purposes for
which the right of way was intended. 9
Applying the maxim "'Tell me what you have done under such a deed,
and I will tell you what that deed means,"' 99 the court concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled to a twenty foot wide outlet and a right of way sixteen feet
in width.' 00
The difficulty of resolving disputes between neighbors involving easements is illustrated by the case Stover v. Milam. 1 The issue involved the width
of an express easement for ingress and egress across the servient estate where
there was no precise width set forth in the deed. After the circuit court decided
the width and location of the right of way, the parties were back in court when
the owner of the servient estate claimed the owner of the dominant estate had
widened the right of way in violation of the court's order. Also involved was
the assertion that the owner of the servient estate was impeding the use of the
98

Id. at 196 97.

99
Id. at 197 (quoting Chapmen v.Bluck, 4 Bing (N.C.) 187). See also Rhodes Cemetery
Ass'n v. Miller, 7 S.E.2d 659. Syl. Pts. 2. 3 (W. Va. 1940):
2. In a deed granting a "convenient right of way" over the lands of the grantor, specifying the distance between two fixed terminals, but not definitely describing the course thereof, the practical use of a particular way and acquiescence therein by the parties fixes that as the location of the easement.
3. "Where the width of a right of way is not specified in the grant, not determinable therefrom, the scope and purpose of the deed creating it, the situation
and use of the property, and the intent of the parties will be considered, so as
to provide a reasonable, safe and convenient way for the purposes for which it
was intended." Palmer v. Newman, 91 W. Va. 13, 112 S.E. 194.
100

Palmer, 112 S.E. at 197 98.

101 557 S.E.2d 390 (W. Va. 2001).
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right of way by erecting posts, railroad ties, and other impediments restricting
traffic over the right of way. On appeal, the court found that while the circuit
court had correctly applied the principal set forth in Palmer v. Newman 112 in
determining the width and location of the easement, the lower court had erred in
limiting the owner of the servient estate from erecting boundary markers on his
property adjacent to the right of way.' 03 The court noted the constitutional right
of Mr. Stover to "use his property as he sees fit, as long as he does not impinge
upon Mr. Milam's right to use the easement ....,,O4
An example of a vague description considered sufficient is found in
Ratcliffv. Cyrus.10 5 In Ratcliff, a 1981 deed granted the easement in the following language:
102

Palmer, 112 S.E. 194.

103

Stover, 557 S.E.2d at 397 98. On appeal the court said, "While we appreciate the circuit

courts extreme frustration with the parties in this case and their persistent dispute which the court
had, on numerous occasions, attempted to fairly and equitably resolve once and for all, there simply is no authority to support the continued restriction of Mr. Stover's use of his own property." Id.
(citations omitted).
104
Id.at 398. The court said:
According to the Constitution of this State, "[n]o person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, and the judgment of his
peers." W. VA. CONST. art. III § 10. This protection is afforded to "any significant property interest," Don. S.Co., Inc. v.Roach, 168 W.Va. 605, 610, 285
S.E.2d 491, 494 (1981) (citations omitted), and includes not only the actual
physical possession of property but the right to use the same.
"Property within the meaning of our Constitution against
the taking or damaging of private property without just
compensation paid or secured to be paid comprehends not
only the thing possessed, but the right also to use and enjoy it, and every part of it, and in the case of real estate to
the full limits of the boundary thereof."
Syl. Pt. 1,Fruth v.Board of Affairs, 75 W.Va. 456, 84 S.E. 105 (1915), overruled on other grounds by Farley v. Graney, 146 W.Va. 22, 119 S.E.2d 833

(1960). Because this constitutional protection prohibits the encumbrance of
one's property absent sufficientjustification,
[w]herefore any thing done by a state or its delegated
agent, as a municipality, which substantially interferes
with the beneficial use of land, depriving the owner of
lawful dominion over it or any part of it, and not within
the general police power of the state, is the taking or damaging of private property without compensation inhibited by the Constitution.
Syl. pt. 2, Fruth, 75 W.Va. 456, 84 S.E. 105. See also. Syl. pt. 2. Lovett v.
West Virginia Cent. Gas Co., 65 W.Va. 739, 65 S.E. 196 (1909) ("The impairment of the utility of one's property by the direct invasion of his private
domain is a taking of his property, within the constitutional meaning, though
the owner has not less of material things than he had before.").
Id.
105

544 S.E.2d 93 (W. Va. 2001).
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[A] twenty-foot right-of-way running from the house trailer site
in a westerly direction to two marble markers which are set on
the boundary line of the Johnson and Ratcliff land to the lands
of William Glenn Ratcliff and Thelma Ratcliff to the AdkinsRatcliff Lane thence
running in a northerly direction to the Toli0 6
sa (sic) Highway.
In holding the description sufficient, the court said:
The easement language articulates a beginning point as the site
which contained a mobile home. The deed further provides for
the direction of the easement. Therefore, we are satisfied that
the description identifies the easement granted in the deed. As
we previously noted, "[t]he main object of a description of land
...in a deed of conveyance.., is not in and of itself to identify
the land sold but to furnish the means of identification, and
when this is done it is sufficient." Consolidation Coal Co. v.
Mineral Coal Co., 147 W.Va. 130, 143, 126 S.E.2d 194, 202
1
(1962). 7
While holding the description sufficient, the case was remanded because
during oral argument it was disclosed that the markers referred to in the deed no
longer existed. 08
C.

Is the Easement Appurtenant or In Gross?

One of the earlier West Virginia cases setting forth the rules to determine whether an easement is appurtenant or in gross is Jones v. Island Creek
Coal Co. 109 As discussed above, the issue in Jones was whether the easement
created in a severance deed of the minerals permitted timber from other tracts of
land to be hauled across the surface of the servient estate. Relying on secondary
authorities and cases from other jurisdictions, the court set forth the following
general principles of construction.
"Whether an easement in a given case is appurtenant or in gross
is to be determined mainly by the nature of the right and the intention of the parties creating it. If it be in its nature an appropriate and useful adjunct of the land conveyed, having in view
the intention of the grantee as to its use, and there being nothing
106

Id. at 96-97.

107

Id.at 97.

108

Id.

'09

91 S.E. 391 (W. Va. 1917).
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to show that the parties intended it to be a mere personal right, it
will be held to be an easement appurtenant to the land, and not
an easement in gross."

"Where the dominant and servient estates are clearly defined in
an easement contract and the easement is beneficial to the dominant estate the easement is appurtenant, and not in gross, and
it is not necessary that the dominant and servient estates be contiguous or that the right of way granted shall terminate on the
dominant estate."

From these decisions it clearly appears that the grant of an
easement will not be construed to be in gross if it can be fairly
construed to be appurtenant to the estate of the grantee. 110
Fourteen years after the Jones case, the construction of language in a
severance deed was again back before the court. In Post v. Bailey,111 the issue
was whether coal could be mined from adjacent tracts through the land of the
plaintiffs (Post) under the provision of the 1900 severance deed. The deed
read:
"It is further expressly understood and agreed by the parties of
the first part that the party of the second part his heirs and assigns shall have the right to enter upon and under said land and
shall have the privilege of ingress and egress under, over and
through said land together with the right to mine and remove all
of said coal, to remove upon and under said land the coal from
and under other lands together with all necessary and convenient rights of ways through and under such land with necessary
drainage, ventilation and ventilating shafts to remove all of said
coal upon or under said land and to remove the coal under
neighboring land without any liability for damage to water,
sur'1 12
face or anything thereon or therein by reason thereof."
The essence of the plaintiffs argument was that coal mined on other
properties - i.e., not coal mined from the lands covered by the severance deed
110

Id.at 393 94.

111 159 S.E. 524 (W. Va. 1931).
112
Id.at 524.
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- could not be moved across the servient tract. 113 In rejecting this argument,
the court stated:
The right to remove other coal over and through the premises
was an element of value entering into the consideration paid by
the grantee to the grantors for the estate granted, and the rights
and privileges covenanted for in the deed. The evident intent of
the parties, as disclosed by the language employed by the grantors in the covenant under discussion, was that the coal granted
was to be operated in connection with coal underlying other
lands. It must be considered that the coal granted was of greater
value with the concomitant right of operating the same along
with coal from other lands, than it would have been without
such right. The right of haulage was appurtenant to the coal
granted, and was to be employed in the operation of said coal in
conjunction with coal from other lands. Principles recognized
and applied by this court in the case of Jones v. Island Creek
Coal Company, 79 W. Va. 532, 91 S.E. 391, are decisive and
controlling of the proposition now, under consideration. Syllabus 1 of that case holds: "If an easement granted be in its nature
an appropriate and useful adjunct of the dominant estate conveyed, having in view the intention of the grantee as to the use
of such estate, and there is nothing to show that the parties intended it as a mere personal right, it will be held to be an easement appurtenant to the dominant estate." Cases cited in that
opinion are pertinent. They sustain the propositions: (a) An
easement may be created by covenant or agreement as well as
by grant; (b) whether an easement is appurtenant or in gross is
to be determined by the intent of the parties as gathered from
the language employed considered in the light of surrounding
circumstances; (c) an easement will not be presumed to be in
gross when it can fairly be construed to be appurtenant. 114
A case which illustrates another way this issue may arise is Mays v. Hogue."' In Mays, an instrument titled "Right-of-Way Agreement" was entered
into on May 11, 1973, between Clara McQuain and her husband, as grantors,
and Franklin D. Ashley and his wife, as grantees. The relevant portion of the
agreement provided "the parties of the first part [The McQuains] do GRANT
and CONVEY, unto the parties of the second part [The Ashleys] a right-of-way

114

See id. at 525.
Id.at 525 26.

115

260 S.E.2d 291 (W. Va. 1979).

113
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over and across their tracts of land .... ,116 The land subject to the right of way
was described in the agreement by location, ("situate near the top of Amona
Hill, Geary District, Roane County"), by the date of the deed in which the McQuains acquired title and by reference to the deed book and page in which the
deed was recorded. The right of way was adequately described as to its location
on the ground and its width was set forth as twelve feet wide." 7 Subsequently,
the McQuains, the owners of the servient estate, conveyed the land to the Mays,
and the Ashleys conveyed the property to the Hogues. The deed from the Ashleys to the Hogues contained the following statement: "The said Grantors do
further grant to the said Grantee all their right, title and interest in and to a certain right of way for the use of the above described premises granted to the said
Franklin D. Ashley by Claire McQuain and her husband by a certain Agreement
...
1,118 The Mays contended the easement was "a personal privilege in the
Ashleys which could not be transferred or assigned [and that] ... [t]he privilege
created was destroyed when the Ashleys attempted to transfer the privilege to
the Hogues."' ' 9 The circuit court held the easement was appurtenant and the
Mays appealed arguing, in part, that the failure to use the words "their heirs and
assigns" in the granting clause of the agreement showed it was intended to be
personal to the granters, i.e., in gross. On appeal the court, citing cases from
sister jurisdictions, rejected this argument stating: It has been widely held that
the omission of such words as "heirs and assigns" ordinarily
does not tend to
20
show that a grant is personal rather than appurtenant.
Relying upon the principles set forth in Jones v. Island Creek Coal
Co.,' 2' the court held:
After examining the records in this case, we conclude that the
easement granted in the "Right of Way Agreement" was clearly
an appropriate and useful adjunct to the estate of the Ashleys.
Under our ruling in Jones, supra, in the absence of a showing
that the conveyance was a merely personal right, then the right
created should be considered an easement appurtenant. There is
in this case no showing that the parties intended that the right be
a merely personal one. Such a conclusion under the authority
cited is not justified by the failure of the parties to use words of
limitation. We, therefore, cannot conclude that the Circuit

116

117
118
119
120
121

Id. at 292.
See id. at 292-93.
Id. at 293.
Id.
Id. at 294.
91 S.E. 391 (W. Va. 1917).
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Court of Roane County erred in ruling that the
"Right of Way
122
Agreement" created an easement appurtenant.
1.

Transferability

As alluded to in the Mays case, "courts in the United States traditionally
have viewed easements in gross as unassignable and noninhertable., 123 "Easements appurtenant adhere to a dominant estate. Unless prevented by the terms
of its creation, an easement appurtenant is transferred with the dominant property even if this is not mentioned in the instrument of transfer."'124 This general
statement is consistent with West Virginia Code § 36-3-10. 125
The argument that the language used in the agreement created an easement in gross was again before the court in Stricklin v. Meadows. 126 The owner
of the servient estate argued the relevant language in the deed was ambiguous
and that extrinsic evidence would show that the easement created was in gross,
128
not appurtenant. 127 After rejecting the argument that the deed was ambiguous
and after briefly quoting the Jones v. Island Creek Coal Co. and Post v. Bailey
cases, the court noted:
In Mays v. Hogue, 163 W. Va. 746, 260 S.E.2d 291 (1979), the
owners of the subservient estate advanced an argument similar
to the Appellees' argument in the present case. The easement in
122

Mays, 260 S.E.2d at 294.

123

BRUCE & ELY. supra note 1, at § 2.2. at 2-5. As to a discussion of easements in gross that

are considered transferable, see Id. at §§ 9.4-9.7. at 9 to 9-14.1.
124
Id. at 9-1. 9-2.
125

W. VA. CODE § 36-3-10 (2010). "Deeds to include buildings, privileges and appurtenances.

Every deed conveying land shall, unless an exception be made therein, be construed to include all
buildings, privileges, and appurtenances of every kind belonging to the lands therein embraced."
Id.
126
544 S.E.2d 87 (W. Va. 2001).
127

The pertinent part of the deed provided:
For the consideration stated above, the parties of the first part further grant
and convey to the parties of the second part, as joint tenants, with rights of
survivorship and not as tenants in common, a second easement and right of
way 15 feet in width for access to said property to be used by the parties of the
second part in common with the parties of the first part in said subdivision
over and across remaining land of the parties of the first part which second
easement and right-of-way shall be adjacent to and along the northerly line of
said Lot No. 19 of Sunnybrook Estates and running from the State road to the
easterly line of the parcel of land herein conveyed.
The words "and other property owners" had been stricken from the deed, as
indicated above.

Id. at 89.
128
"We consequently conclude that the lower court erred by finding that the deed was ambiguous and by permitting the introduction of extrinsic evidence." Id. at 91.
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question had been established by predecessors in title, and the
subservient estate owners contended that the easement should
be considered personal based upon the absence of reference to
the rights of successors, heirs, or assigns. They maintained that
the easement was applicable only to the original property owners and not transferrable to subsequent owners. Id. at 748, 260
S.E.2d at 293. The lower court held, and this Court agreed, that
the conveyance was not merely personal in nature. Mays, 163
W. Va. at 748-49, 260 S.E.2d at 293. Implementing the principles of Jones and Post, this Court concluded that "in the absence of a showing that the conveyance was a merely personal
right, then the right created should be considered an easement
appurtenant." Id. at 750, 260 S.E.2d at 294. This Court discerned no "showing that the parties intended that the right be a
merely personal one" and concluded that the easement was appurtenant rather than in gross. Id.
The deed in the present case did not employ any language indicative of an intent to create a personal easement. The deed
established an easement for the benefit of the property now
owned by the Stricklins and did not indicate that the easement
would be discontinued upon cessation of ownership by the
Keelings. As the Appellants contend, the stricken language
merely clarified that the easement was limited to owners of the
dominant property and did not create a public way for "other
,,129
property owners in said subdivision.
The court, in a footnote within the above quote, made the following observations:
With respect to deeds conveying a fee simple interest in an estate, West Virginia Code § 36-1-11 (1923) (Repl. Vol. 1997)
provides that words of limitation are not necessary to convey
the interest in fee simple and that a conveyance "shall be construed to pass the fee simple.., unless a contrary intention shall
appear ....
" In the somewhat analogous situation of the present
case, the deed neither contained words of limitation nor otherwise demonstrated an intent to create an easement solely for the
benefit of the Keelings. An easement appurtenant was therefore
created. 130

129
130

Id.at 92 n.6.
Id.
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A case in which the court found that an easement in gross was created is
Ratino v. Hart.131 In 1906, the defendant Harts' (appellees) predecessor granted

the plaintiff Ratino's (appellant) predecessor in title a right of way stating:
The said parties of the first part [the appellees' predecessors in
title] grant to the said party of the second part [the appellant's
predecessors in title] a right of ingress and egress from the
Fairmont turnpike through their land by the same route that is
now used to his land. With the understanding that there is to be
no sawmilling or lumbering or hauling for oil wells machinery
or fixtures for gas wells or anything else outside of regular farm
purposes, and the party of the second part is to help keep up
road and bridge from the Fairmont turnpike to said land of
second party; to be used only as a family right of way with the
understanding that hay, straw and coal is to be hauled when the
ground is dry enough to not cut ditches in the field or when it is
frozen hard enough to not cut in. This will no longer hold
13 2 good
if the second party injures any stock of the first parties.
This grant of the right of way was specifically included in each conveyance in the appellants' claim of title. The Harts became the owner of the
property in 1979, and Ratino purchased his property in 1987. The lawsuit was
filed in 1989, after the Harts refused Ratino usage of the alleged right of way.
The trial court held that the 1906 deed's language was unambiguous and conferred only a personal right of way, i.e., in gross.133 After citing the Mays (the
Syllabus from Jones) and Post cases, the Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court stating:
In this case the language of the deed granting the right-of-way
is clear and requires no interpretation. The deed unequivocally
states that it is "to be used only as a family right of way[.]" Mr.
Ratino is clearly not a member of the family of the grantee of
the 1906 deed. Nor does he so assert.
Black's Law Dictionary 510 (6th ed. 1990) defines an "easement in gross" as follows:
An easement in gross is not appurtenant to any estate in
land or does not belong to any person by virtue of ownership of estate in other land but is mere personal interest in
131

424 S.E.2d 753 (W. Va. 1992).

132

Id. at 754.

133

Id. at 754 55.
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or right to use land of another; it is purely personal and
usually ends with death of grantee.
(citation omitted). See also Holland v. Flanagan, 139 W. Va.

884, 81 S.E.2d 908 (1954). Because, on its face, the right-ofway granted in the 1906 deed was clearly an easement in gross,
and did not attach to the land, the trial court did not err in holding that, as a matter 13of
4 law, no right-of-way existed for the benefit of the appellant.
While the court held in the Ratino case that the deed language created
an easement in gross, it also held that an unlawful detainer action is not the appropriate
cause of action to contest the denial or refusal of the use of a right of
135
way.
IV. PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS

A.

Early West Virginia Decisions

The concepts of prescriptive easements have their origin in early English common law and the feudal systems and rested upon the fiction of the "lost
grant." The influence of the English doctrine of "lost grants" on American jurisprudence is summarized by Professors Bruce and Ely as follows:
English law first presumed that a use that had continued "during
time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary"
had a lawful origin. The date of the beginning of this continued
use was arbitrarily set as 1189. Over time, however, it became
increasingly difficult to prove continuous use from that date.
To avoid the inconvenience posed by this evidentiary requirement, English courts developed the fiction of the lost grant. If a
particular use had long existed, it was presumed that a grant authorizing such use had been made, but that the grant itself had
been lost. It was eventually settled that continued use for 20
years was conclusive on the issue of a lost grant. In cases
where this period had run, the jury was directed to find a lost
grant, and even proof that a grant had, in fact, never been made
could not rebut the presumption.

Id. at 756.
After discussing West Virginia statutory provisions and case law, the law from sister jurisdictions and an 1887 United States Supreme Court case, the court stated. "It is abundantly clear
from the foregoing that an action for unlawful detainer may not be brought by one claiming a
mere nonexclusive right-of-way." Id. at 758.
134

135
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American courts generally adopted the lost grant doctrine as
part of the common law. There was a split of opinion as to the
nature of the presumption, but most judges followed the English
rule that the presumption was conclusive. . . .Moreover, the
doctrine is inconsistent with the recording system, which requires that grants of interests in land be recorded.
Courts in this country gradually recognized the weakness of the
lost grant theory. Hence, they generally have abandoned it in
favor of applying by analogy the statute of limitations governing adverse possession. This analogy extends both to the period
of prescription and to the manner of use. Today, most courts
base prescription on the adversity of use and a claimant must
prove virtually the same elements as must be demonstrated for
adverse possession. Nonetheless, the lost grant theory survives
in some jurisdictions and has left a residue of terminology that
often confuses modern analysis of prescriptive easements. It is
not always clear whether judges actually rely on the
lost grant
136
fiction or merely invoke an ancient formula by rote.
In 1907, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals discussed the
"common law rule" in the case of Walton v. Knight'3 7 as follows:
Some confusion may arise from the language used in our decisions as to the time required to establish title to a way by prescription. In Boyd v. Woolwine, supra, it is held to be twenty
years; but in Wooldridge v. Coughlin, supra, ten years. The
natural inquiry is, why this difference, and what is the time essential? It is evident, from the authorities cited, that the court
was referring in the former case to the common-law rule, and in
the latter to our present statute of limitations. "By judicial construction an adverse user of an easement for the period mentioned in the statutes (of limitations), as they were passed from
time to time, became evidence of a prescriptive right." Jones
Easem., 1 section 161; Railroad Co. v. McFarlan, 43 N.J.L.
605, 617. "Such adverse user must have existed for a period
equal at least to that prescribed by the statute of limitations for
acquiring title to land by adverse possession." Jones Easem.
section 164. In Lucas v. Turnpike Co., 36 W. Va. 427, 437, 15
S.E. 182, 185, the Court quotes with apparent approval Goddard
on Easements: "Without minutely stating here the local statutes
136

BRUCE

&

ELY. supra note

1, at § 5.1. at 5-6 to 5-9; see also 2

THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1260
137 58 S.E. 1025 (W. Va. 1907).

RALEIGH COLSTON MINOR,

63 (2d ed., Ribble ed. 1928).
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of limitations as to adverse user, it may be safely asserted that

no less period will suffice, and no greater will be required, in
fixing the requisite length of enjoyment to gain a right to an
easement in land by prescription than to acquire the land itself
by adverse occupation. 38This element of duration is therefore
comparatively simple."

The "residue of terminology that often confuses modern analysis"13 9 is
illustrated by the following excerpt from the Walton discussion:
"[T]hat the use of the easement was adverse and under a claim
of right, in the absence of circumstances indicating the contrary,
and moreover such enjoyment of the right affords a conclusive
presumption of the right."

And, quoting from Railroad Co. v.

McFarlan, Jones says in the same section: "When the fiction of
a lost grant was devised, there arose considerable diversity and
fluctuation in judicial opinions as to whether an uninterrupted
user for the period of limitation conferred a legal right, or raised
merely a presumption of title which would stand good until the
presumption was overcome by evidence which negatived in the
judgment of juries the existence of a grant. This state of the law
produced great insecurity of titles by prescription, and subjected
such rights to the whim and caprice of juries. This evil was remedied by the later English authorities which gave to the presumption of title arising from an uninterrupted enjoyment of
twenty years the most unshaken stability, and made it conclusive evidence of a right ....

In this country the prevailing doc-

trine is, that an exclusive and uninterrupted enjoyment for twenty years creates a presumption juris et dejure, and is conclusive
evidence of title 14whenever,
by possibility, a right may be ac0
quired by grant.,

In the decades that followed the Walton decision, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals decided a number of cases in which a claim of a prescriptive easement was asserted. However, the decisions were usually relatively
short, typically fact specific, and usually only addressed one or two of the elements necessary to establish a prescriptive easement. For example, in Crosierv.
Brown,14 1 the court held that because the use was permissive a prescriptive
easement was not established. The court also noted that the usage had not been
138

Id. at 1026.

139

BRUCE&ELY, supranote 1, at § 5.1, at 5-6 to 5-9.

140

Walton, 58 S.E. at 1027.

141

66 S.E. 326 (W. Va. 1909).
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of a definite, certain, and precise line. In Roberts v. Ward,142 the court found
there was a right of way by prescription noting, in effect, that acquiescence does
not constitute permission. In Stagger v. Hines, 143 the court found there was a
prescriptive right and then added: "It is well settled that a way acquired by prescription has its limitations. If acquired for one purpose, it cannot be broadened
or diverted to another; and its character and extent are ascertainable
and deter44
minable by the use made of it during the period of prescription."'1
4 5
In Perdue v. Ballenger,1
the court concluded that there was no prescriptive easement because there was not a sufficient showing of a period often
years of continuous use. In Foremen v. Greenburg,146 the court explained that
joint use of the right of way by the owners of the servient and dominant estates
does not preclude the establishment of a prescriptive easement. The court also
reaffirmed that mere acquiescence and silence by the owners of the servient
estate does not constitute permission so as to negate a claim that the use was
adverse. 141

In a similar manner, the court in McNeil v. Kennedy 48 stated: "Such
rights of way in the dominant owner is not affected by the fact that others or
even the public may also have similar rights in such way, if his right be exclusive in the sense that no one else may lawfully oppose him in that right., 149 In
so holding, the court did note: "It is true as we have said of our own cases, that
the right50 of plaintiff must exist independently of the rights of others or of the
public. 1
In Hall v. Backus, 51 the court again recognized that it is possible to gain
a private prescriptive easement even though it is enlarged into a public way stating, "If a private way is enlarged into a public way, the private easement is not
merged, and
discontinuance of the way, as a public one, does not destroy the
152
easement.,
In Linger v. Watson, 53 the court rejected the plaintiff's argument that he
had a prescriptive easement to maintain telephone lines across the defendant's
property. The court held that the lines were erected pursuant to a revocable license and were, therefore, permissive not adverse.
142

102 S.E. 96 (W. Va. 1920).

143

104 S.E. 768 (W. Va. 1920).

144

Id. at 770.

145

105 S.E. 767 (W. Va. 1921).
106 S.E. 876 (W. Va. 1921).
Id. at 877.

146
147
148

149
150

107 S.E. 203 (W. Va. 1921).
Id. at 204 (citations omitted).

Id.

151

114 S.E. 449 (W. Va. 1922).

152

Id. at 453.

153

150 S.E. 525 (W. Va. 1929).
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In Post v. Wallace, 15 4 the court found that the plaintiff had proven the
elements necessary to establish a prescriptive easement but remanded the case to
the trial court to "specifically locate upon the ground the right of way which the
'
plaintiff, Claid Post may use."155
The court noted the law requires 5that
"an
6
line."'
definite
particular
a
have
must
land
over
way
private
of
easement
In Allen v. Neff,'5 7 the facts established that Allen had obtained a prescriptive easement for general passage across Neff s land by usage that involved
"regular walking, riding, and logging way"58 and that by 1905 there had been
such usage for over twenty years. In 1905, Allen asked and was given permission to widen the path so that it could accommodate wagons. From 1905 until
1925, Allen used the widened path continuously as a wagon road. However, in
1925, it was obstructed so that Allen could no longer use it. The question presented was: "[D]id Allen lose the easement he had acquired in 1905, by obtaining permission ... to widen and use the path as a wagon road?"'159 In answering
this question, the court stated:
Under our decisions the right which Allen had acquired to the
use of the pathway in 1905 was a vested freehold estate in land.
It is settled law in this state that one cannot lose vested title to
land by oral admission that it is the property of another; disclaimer of a freehold can only be by deed or in a court of
record. This court has never applied that rule to an easement.
But we see no reason why the principle is not just as applicable
to easements as it is to any other freehold interest in land. A
case in point is Tracy v. Atherton, 36 Vt. 508, which holds:
"A right of way having become established by adverse use,
will not be divested by an application for, and obtaining of
a license to use it from the other party." 160
As illustrated by the above cases, there were a number of prescriptive
easement cases decided in the first half of the twentieth century. The decisions
resolved the dispute between the litigants without an extended discussion of the
various elements required to establish prescriptive easements.

154
155
156

192 S.E. 112 (W. Va. 1937).
Id. at 112.
Id. at 115.

157

135 S.E. 2 (W. Va. 1926).

158

Id.at3.

159

Id.

160

Id. (citation omitted).
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Town of Paden City v. Felton

The case of Town of Paden City v. Felton6 ' represents a departure from
the pattern of the previous prescriptive easement decisions. In the Town of Paden City case, the Circuit Court of Wetzel County sustained the demurrer of the
defendant to the Town of Paden City's complaint, and on the joint motion, the
parties certified the circuit court's ruling to the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals. 16 2 At issue was the right of the city to enjoin the defendant from obstructing a drainage ditch for surface water runoff which crossed the defendant's
property. Although the ditch had been continuously and uninterruptedly open to
the drainage of surface water for well in excess often years when the defendant
acquired the title to the property in 1946, after she acquired the title, she obstructed the ditch where it crossed her63 property and refused to permit employees
of the plaintiff to remove the debris. 1
After disposing of the first two grounds cited by the circuit court for
sustaining the demurrer, 164 the Court of Appeals turned its attention to the question of whether the city had acquired an easement by16 prescription or whether
there had been a dedication of the ditch for public use. 1
After a general discussion of the legal attributes of an easement and the
various ways in which an easement can be created,166 the court, citing secondary
sources and decisions from sister jurisdictions, stated:

161

66 S.E.2d 280 (W. Va. 1951).

162

Id. at 282.

The grounds of demurrer embodied in the certificate of the circuit court are:
(1) Though the plaintiff claims the right of drainage through the lot of the defendant, the bill of complaint contains no allegation that there is any deed or
other written instrument which creates the easement which the plaintiff claims
to own.
(2) The right of drainage, claimed by the plaintiff, is within the Statute of
Frauds and the bill of complaint does not allege that such right is based upon
any memorandum in writing signed by the party sought to be charged. or his
agent, which confers upon the plaintiff the right which it claims.
(3) The bill of complaint contains no allegations of fact which establish any
right or easement by prescription to drain water on or through the land of the
defendant.
163

Id.at 285.

164

The court stated: "[T]he holding in the Pifer case [(Pifer v. Brown, 43 W. Va. 412, 27 S.E.

399, 49 LRA 497)] has no application to the facts in the case at bar. In consequence, the grounds
of demurrer that the easement claimed by the plaintiff is within the Statute of Frauds and can be
created or acquired only by deed or other written instrument are not well founded and can not be
sustained." Id. at 286 (citation added).
165
166

Id.
Id.
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A municipal corporation may acquire an easement by prescription to the same extent as any other person; but if a municipality
claims an easement by prescription it must be established
by
167
corporate acts which regulate or exercise control over it.
The court then stated the elements necessary to create an easement as
follows:
As to an easement by prescription, the requisites for its acquisition are continued and uninterrupted, open and visible, use of a
definite right in the land of another which is identical to that
claimed as an easement and has a relation to the use of, and a
direct and apparent connection with, the dominant tenement under an adverse claim of right, for the prescriptive period of time.
The further condition that the user must be exclusive is sometimes added. 17 Am. Jur., Easements, Section 59. "Exclusive
use," however, does not mean that no one has used the way except the claimant of the easement; it means that his right to do
so does not depend upon a similar right in others. In order to
establish an independent prescriptive right, the individual user
must perform some act to the knowledge of the servient owner
which clearly indicates his individual claim of right. 17 Am.
Jur., Easements, Section 64. The rule generally followed is that
use of a right of way in common with the public is regarded as
negativing a presumption of grant to any individual user. 17
Am. Jur., Easements, Section 64. An easement over land will
not arise by prescription simply from permission of the owner
of the servient estate, no matter how long the permissive use
may continue; and when a use by permission has begun, in the
absence of some decisive act by the claimant of the easement,
which indicates an adverse and hostile claim, the use will continue to be regarded as permissive, and this is especially so
when the use of the land is in common with its use by others.
[Citation omitted]. In Linger v. Watson, 108 W. Va. 180, 150
S.E. 525, in point 2 of the syllabus, the requisites for the acquisition of an easement by prescription are stated in this language:
"To establish an easement by prescription there must be: First,
continued and uninterrupted use or enjoyment; second, identity
of the thing enjoyed; and third, a claim of right adverse to the
owner of the soil, known to and acquiesced in by him. If the
use is by the owner's permission, or if he opposes and denies
the right, title to the easement does not come by such use." [Ci-

167

Town of Paden City v. Felton, 66 S.E.2d 280, 286 (W. Va. 1951).
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tation omitted]. In Hall v. Backus, 92 W. Va. 155, 114 S.E.
449, this Court uses this language in point 3 of the syllabus:
"Use of an open way in common with the owner of the land on
which it is and the public in general, is presumptively permissive and not exercised under a claim of right, in the absence of
proof of some act on the part of the person so using it, or circumstance under which he used it, showing a claim of exclusive
or peculiar
right in him, distinct from that of the general pub8
16

lic.",

The court recognized a line of cases in which the public uses a private
way because they have not been denied the right to use it, and that said use is
viewed as permissive and that such use is not considered an implied dedication. 169 The court also recognized a line of cases in which the user of the way
asserts an independent and individual right to use the way which does not depend upon a similar right in other persons.
This Court has frequently decided that the open, continuous and
uninterrupted use of a private way by one landowner over the
land of another person for a period of ten years or more, with
the knowledge of such other person, is presumptive evidence of
the claim of right to an easement and of the adverse character of
the use, and that the presumption will be deemed to be conclusive, unless it is shown that the use was permissive or that the
owner of the land so used protested and objected to such use.
Post v. Wallace, 119 W. Va. 132, 192 S.E. 112; Hall v. Backus,
92 W. Va. 155, 114 S.E. 449; Staggers v. Hines, 87 W. Va. 65,
104 S.E. 768; Hawkins v. Conner, 75 W. Va. 220, 83 S.E. 982;
Walton v. Knight, 62 W. Va. 223, 58 S.E. 1025; Boyd v. Woolwine, 40 W. Va. 282, 21 S.E. 1020; Rogerson v. Shepherd, 33
W. Va. 307, 10 S.E. 632. Those cases involved the right of the
owner of land, who used a way over the land of another owner,
to an easement as a result of open, continuous and uninterrupted
use of such way for a period of ten years or longer under a
claim of right to such use. The language of those cases clearly
implies, however, that the person so using the way and claiming
an easement in it asserted an independent and individual right in
himself to use the way and that the right to do so did not depend
upon a similar right to such use in other persons. 170

169

Id.at 286 87.
See id. at 287 88.

170

Id.at 288.

168
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Following the discussion of distinctions between the permissive common use and the asserted individual and independent right, the court affirmed
the circuit court in sustaining the demurrer concluding the allegations of the
plaintiffs use of the drainage ditch in this case fell into the former category.171
As to the assertion that there had been a dedication to the public use, the
court said that the bill of complaint failed to establish any dedication, express or
implied, of the ditch, as a public drain .... ,,72
C.

The Burden ofProof

In the early case of Crosier v. Brown,'13 the court explained the burden
of proof in prescriptive easement cases as follows: "In this important matter, of
subjecting, without pay, one man's land for the use of another, we must remember that the claimant carries the burden of proof, and he must show a use as of
right, a hostile adversary use, clearly show it.", 174 In Beckley National Exchange
Bank v. Lilly, 175 the court articulated the rule in Syllabus Point 2: "In order to
establish a right-of-way by prescription, all of the elements of prescriptive use,
including the fact that the use relied upon is adverse, must appear by clear and
convincing proof," 176
In Berkeley Development Corp. v. Hutzler,177 one of the important
easement decisions in West Virginia, the court set forth, in Syllabus Point 1, the
burden as follows:
"The burden of proving an easement rests on the party claiming
such right
and must be established by clear and convincing
, 178
proof.

171

Id. The allegations in the complaint

indicate[] clearly that such use of the ditch by the plaintiff was permissive and
not adverse to the defendant or her predecessor in title as to her lot or to the
owners of the other lots affected. The use of the ditch by the plaintiff, being
permissive only, regardless of the duration of the period of its exercise, did
not confer upon the plaintiff any right of drainage or easement in the ditch on
and over the lot of the defendant.
Id. at 289.
172
Id. at 288.
173
66 S.E. 326 (W. Va. 1909).
174
Id. at 328.
175
182 S.E. 767 (W. Va. 1935).
176
Id. at 767.
177
229 S.E.2d 732 (W. Va. 1976).
178
Id. at 733.
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In the recent decision of Newman v. Michel,179 the court cited the
Berkley Development Corp. and Beckley National Exchange Bank decisions as to the burden of proof with approval.
D.

Do "Without the Owners' Permission" and "Adverse" Mean the Same

Thing?
In the recent decision of Newman v. Michel,i"' the plaintiffs sought to
establish an easement by prescription across the adjacent property of the defendants. A simplified version of the facts is that the Newmans' farm had been in
the family since the late 1800s. It had access from an old county road across the
southern part of what is now the Michel tract where it connected to the southern
edge of the Newmans' farm. Access to the farm via this route was occasionally
impossible because of the flooding of Mud River. In 1940, T.M. Newman obtained a written easement from one of the Michels' predecessors in title for a
different access from the county road to the Michels' farm. While T.M. Newman lived on the farm, he did not have an ownership interest in the farm and,
therefore, the circuit court held and the Supreme Court affirmed that the easement to T.M. Newman was in gross not appurtenantto the Newman farm. As
an easement in gross, it ended upon T.M. Newman's death in 1946. The Newmans continued to use the "T.M. Newman right-of-way" after his death with an
alteration in the route in 1963 when a house was built across a portion of the
easement. Following the death of the last Newman living on the farm in 1973,
the Newmans visited the farm seven to fourteen times per year until 2003, when
the easement was barred by the Michels erecting a gate and locking it.
As noted above, the court determined that the 1940 T.M. Newman written agreement was in gross, which terminated with T.M.'s death, so the Newmans' only basis of an easement was the alternative claim of an easement by
prescription.
As to the use of the easement following T.M. Newman's death, the
court noted, "The Newmans' use of this easement and the spur which they later
developed were not objected to by the Fletchers."'' As to the use of the "spur"
after the house was constructed over a portion of the original route of the T.M.
Newman easement the court said, "The Newmans' use of the spur around the
Michels' residence between 1963 and 1975 was sufficient to establish that the
use was continuous for a period of at least 10 years."' 182 As to the use of the
"easement" after the death of T.M. Newman in 1946, the court said: "The
Fletchers' lack of explicit permission in the face of the Newmans' use of their

179

688 S.E.2d 610(W. Va. 2009).

180

Id.

181

Id.at 620.
Id.

182
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'
property is not sufficient to satisfy the adverse requirement."183
Faulkner18 4 and
185
Town of Paden City require one to make a decisive act manifesting an adverse
or hostile claim. The testimony showed no such hostile act occurred during the
time the Fletchers owned the property. "Rather, the Newmans' use of a portion
of the T.M. Newman easement and the spur continued routinely throughout the
time the Fletchers owned the property, and at 18no
time did the Newmans and
6
Fletchers have any disagreement over this use."'
As to the relationship between the Newmans and the Michels after the
Michels acquired the property in 1973, the court said, "While the Newmans'
relationship with the Michels was not as friendly as it had been with the Fletchers... [t]he testimony does not reveal any adverse or hostile acts on the part of
the Newmans since the Michels bought the property in 197318 which
would con7
vert their use from being permissive into being prescriptive.1
Given the fact that the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's grant
of summary judgment to the Michels "and finding that the T.M. Newman easement was in gross and terminated upon T.M. Newman's death in 1946[,] '88 it
follows that the Newmans' use of the right of way after 1946 could no longer be
considered permissive and would, therefore, be hostile as the term is used as an
element of prescriptive easements. For example, as the court in the Syllabus to
Roberts v. Wardl' 9 said: "Open, continuous and notorious use by an owner of
land, of a private way over an adjoining tract owned by another person, known,
acquiesced in, unobjected to and unprotested by the latter, is presumptively adverse to him and enjoyed under a bonafide claim of right."'1 90
Similarly, in Staggers v. Hines,'9' the court set forth the Robert v. Ward
above-quoted Syllabus Point in the decision, and stated: "An obvious corollary
of this [rule] is that mere silence or lack of objection on the part of the owner
does not amount to a192grant of permission to use the way, precluding adverse
character in the user."'
The case of Conley v. Conley1 93 provides a helpful understanding the
meaning of "adverse" as an element of prescriptive easements. During the oral
arguments to the court in Conley, counsel for both parties agreed that "the only
real issue in dispute between the parties relates to whether the easement was
183

Id.

184

9 S.E.2d 140 (W. Va. 1940).
66 S.E.2d 280 (W. Va. 1950).
Newman v. Michel, 688 S.E.2d 610, 620 21 (W. Va. 2009).
Id. at 621.
Id. at 618.
102 S.E. 96 (W. Va. 1920).
Id. at Syllabus.

185
186
187
188
189
190
191

104 S.E. 768 (W. Va. 1920).

192

Id. at 770.

193

285 S.E.2d 140 (W. Va. 1981).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2010

47

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 112, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 4
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 112

claimed adversely, i.e., whether Della Conley used the pipeline in a manner
hostile to Grady Conley." 194 The facts in Conley were not in dispute. In 1957,
Grady Conley gave the Logan County Board of Education permission to use the
gas pipeline when the Board of Education constructed a schoolhouse nearby.
The Board of Education ceased using the pipeline in 1965 and gave Della Conley permission to hook on to the line in exchange for her giving the Board permission to remove the schoolhouse across her property. The Board gave her the
permission to hook onto the pipeline without Grady Conley's approval. Grady
learned of Della's use of the pipeline shortly after she began using the pipeline
in 1965. The use continued until 1978 when there was a dispute between Della
and Grady over title to the land on which the school was formerly located
upon. 195 In Conley, the court quoted with approval the adverse possession decision of Somon v. Murphy Fabrication& Erection Co.196 as follows:
"The person claiming adverse possession must show that his
possession of the property was against the right of the true owner and is inconsistent with the title of the true owner. The word
'hostile' is synonymous with the word 'adverse' and need not
and does not import that the disseisor
must show ill will or ma197
owner."'
true
the
to
levolence
As to the application of the law to the facts of the case, the court in Conley said, "Finally, it is clear from the record that Della Conley claimed use of the
pipeline adverse to the rights of Grady Conley and although he acquiesced, he
did not give her express permission for such use."'1 98 The court affirmed the
circuit court's judgment that Della had established a prescriptive easement.' 99
The law of adverse possession has also proven helpful in understanding
other elements of prescription easements. In Veach v. Day,200 the issue was
whether there was a prescriptive easement with the particular question being
whether the claimants use had been "continued" or "continuous." The court
again looked to the law of adverse possession for guidance as to what the term
meant noting, "There is a similarity between the elements which must be shown
to establish a prescriptive easement and those necessary for adverse possession., 21 1 After quoting Syllabus Point 3 from the Somon case, the court said, "In

194
195
196

197
198
199
200
201

Id.at 142.
See id.
232 S.E.2d 524. 528 (W. Va. 1977).
Conley v. Conley. 285 S.E.2d 140, 142 (W. Va. 1981).
Id.
Id.
304 S.E.2d 860 (W. Va. 1983).
Id. at 863.
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several adverse possession cases we have recognized that an occasional or sporadic adverse use does not constitute 'continuous' use. 20 2
As noted above, the court in Conley had looked to the Somon case for
guidance as to whether the use was "adverse," and the court in Veach also
looked to the same case for guidance because of the similarity between the elements of adverse possession and prescriptive easements. Therefore, the court's
reasoning in Somon as to why it adopted the "objective test" as to what constitutes "adverse" should also be applicable to "easement law." The court in Somon said:
We are not aware of any case in which this Court has been
asked to consider whether, if it is shown that one holds property
under the mistaken belief it is within his deed, this fact destroys
his right to claim that he held it hostilely or adversely. The annotation in 80 A.L.R.2d 1171 collates the various cases and
theories and the case of Norgard v. Bushe, 220 Ore. 297, 349
P.2d 490, 80 A.L.R.2d 1161 (1960), provides a full analysis of
these theories.
It is, perhaps, sufficient to comment briefly on the two major
and opposite views that have evolved in this area. One advances a subjective test; the other an objective one. Those
courts that follow the subjective test reason that the element of
hostile and adverse connotes a mental intent and therefore if one
entertains a belief that he holds the disputed area by virtue of
his title document, he does not possess it with the requisite adverse or hostile intent. The other view looks on the physical
acts and concludes that if physical dominion has been exercised
over the disputed area, this is sufficient to satisfy the adverse or
hostile element. As Holmes, C.J., stated in Bond v. O'Gara,
177 Mass. 139, 58 N.E. 275 (1900), "His claim is not limited by
his belief." We favor this latter theory.
The reasons for such selection may be at best arbitrary, but it
does appear that proof is more certain if limited to objective
evidence. The physical evidence of possession should alert the
true owner that an adverse claim is made, at which point he has
ten years to end the problem. It is also compatible with the
claim of title that must be shown in order to satisfy this element
of the doctrine of adverse possession in this type of case. This
is true since the actual boundaries of the disputed area have
been shown not to lie within the title instrument, thus giving

202

Id.
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rise to the "mistake" in the first instance. The only way the disseisor can hold is by showing actual dominion over the disputed
area, which is the basis for a claim of title.20 3
Therefore, it is submitted that the law set forth as Syllabus Point 2 in the
Faulkner v. Thorn case,20 4 while sound in principle, was not applicable to the
facts presented in the Newman case. In the Faulkner case, the original right of
way "ran 'straight-through' from the Ridge to the Mountain Road, crossing a
steep hill near the latter., 20 5 The predecessor in title of the defendants' farm was
given permission by the predecessor in title for the plaintiff s farm "to shun the
hill" entirely by detouring around the hill and onto his land. The fence setting
forth the lane was moved to accommodate this detour. 2 6 The issue was whether
the easement was rerouted around the hill or was straight across the steep hill.
The court said, "Since the use of the detour was entirely permissive at its inception, and the record discloses no adverse user, we are of opinion that defendant
20 7
and his predecessors in title acquired no prescriptive right to use the detour.1
In Faulkner,the issue was the location on the ground of a portion of the easement, not whether an easement existed. In the Newman case, the permission
granted by the easement in gross ended with the death of T. M. Newman in
1946. After his death, it would not be consistent with the law to consider those
who continued to use the right of way to reach the Newman farm as doing so
with the approval of the grantor of T.M. Newman's in gross agreement. Therefore, the Newman family's use of the easement area from 1946 until the trial in
this case in June of 2007, in the eyes of the law, should have been considered
adverse.
As Professors Bruce & Ely state:
When use of a servient estate is initially permissive, the use will
confer a prescriptive right only if the user subsequently makes a
direct assertion of a claim hostile to the owner. On the other
hand, uses that continue after permission has been revoked or
203

Somon v. Murphy Fabrication & Erection, Co., 232 S.E.2d 524, 530-31 (W. Va. 1977).

204

The use of a way over the land of another, permissive in its inception, will not
create an easement by prescription no matter how long the use may be continued, unless the licensee, to the knowledge of the licensor, renounces the permission and claims the use as his own right, and thereafter uses the way under
his adverse claim openly, continuously and uninterruptedly, for the prescriptive period.
Faulkner v. Thorn, 9 S.E.2d 140, 140 (W. Va. 1940). A case which provides a good illustration of
permissive use is Carrv. Constable, 470 S.E.2d 408 (W. Va. 1996).
205
Faulkner,9 S.E.2d at 141.
206

See id.

207

Id. at 142.
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that differ significantly from that permitted constitute adverse
usage.2 °8
In section 5.10, the authors state:
Most courts employ an objective standard to determine hostility
in easement cases, reasoning that hostile intent is best demonstrated by conduct. The private mental attitude of the claimant
is irrelevant. Thus, use of another's land in the mistaken belief
that such activity only affects the claimant's own land is nonetheless adverse. Similarly, use of land under an invalid grant of
an express easement does not negate its adverse character because such usage does not depend on the landowner's sufferance. Moreover, use of land under a mistaken belief that the
scope of an express easement permitted such activity is deemed
adverse. °9
The authors raise concern as to the Restatement (Third) of Property's
approach taken in section 2.16, stating:
The Restatement (Third) of Property - Servitudes has broken
new ground by taking the problematic position that a prescriptive easement may be grounded either upon adverse use or upon
"a use that is made pursuant to the terms of an intended but imperfectly created servitude, or the enjoyment of the benefit of an
intended but imperfectly created servitude." Drafted to apply
primarily to common driveways, this provision was designed to
give an alternative and allegedly more compelling explanation
for prescriptive easements in these situations, which often arise
from consensual use under the invalid grant of an easement. In
fact, courts have long recognized that use of another's land under an ineffective easement grant is adverse. Consequently, the
Restatement approach may serve to further confuse the adversity requirement.21 0
There should be no disagreement that "revoked" as used by Professors
Bruce and Ely and "terminated" as used in the Newman case have the same legal significances. Therefore, anyone using the easement area other than T.M.
Newman and those permitted to do so by his gross easement agreement would
be traversing the easement without the consent of the landowner.
208
209
210

BRUCE & ELY, supra note 1, at 5-38 to 5-40.
Id. at § 5. 10, at 5-40 to 5-42.
Id. at § 5.11, at 5-42.
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Continued and UninterruptedUse

E.

As the West Virginia Supreme Court said in an early case:
Some confusion may arise from the language used in our decisions as to the time required to establish title to a way by prescription. In Boyd v. Woolwine, supra, it is held to be twenty
years; but in Wooldridge v. Coughlin, supra, ten years. The
natural inquiry is, why this difference, and what is the time essential? It is evident, from the authorities cited, that the court
was referring in the former case to the common-law rule, and in
the latter to our present statute of limitations. "By judicial construction an adverse user of an easement for the period mentioned in the statutes (of limitations), as they were passed
from
211
time to time, became evidence of a prescriptive right.,
The Walton court explained, "[The] fiction of a lost grant seems to have
been originally invented to avoid the rule of pleading requiring profert. '21 2 Initially,
there arose considerable diversity and fluctuation in judicial
opinions as to whether an uninterrupted user for the period of
limitation conferred a legal right, or raised merely a presumption of title which would stand good until the presumption was
overcome by evidence which negatived in the judgment of juries the existence of a grant . 3
After discussing the court's earlier decisions in Virginia and West Virginia, the court concluded:
Whenever therefore there has been such use for a long period,
the bonafides of the claim of right is established, and the owner
of the servient estate must rebut the presumption of right, by
showing leave or license from him, or protest and objection under such circumstances as to repel the presumption.2 14

211

Walton v. Knight, 58 S.E. 1025, 1026 (W. Va. 1907).

212

Id. at 1026. Black's Law Dictionary defines profert as a "Common-law pleading. A decla-

ration on the record stating that a party produces in court the deed or other instrument relied on in

the pleading."

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

213

Walton, 58 S.E. at 1027.

214

Id.

1329 (9th ed. 1999).
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As part of the Walton court's tracing of the evolution from common law
roots of prescriptive easement to the early days of West Virginia's statehood,
the court quoted with approval an 1892 case as follows:
In Lucas v. Turnpike Co., 36 W. Va. 427, 437, 15 S.E. 182, 185,
the court quotes with apparent approval Goddard on Easements:
"Without minutely stating here the local statutes of limitations
as to adverse user, it may be safely asserted that no less period
will suffice, and no greater will be required, in fixing the requisite length of enjoyment to gain a right to an easement in land
by prescription than to acquire the land itself by adverse occupation. 2 This
element of duration is therefore comparatively
15
simple.
The Walton court also relied upon Wooldridge v. Coughlin.216 In Wooiridge,the court said:
Prescription presumes, as defined at common law, that a grant
was once made far back in time. In the past the length of time
of user of the easement must have been so long that evidence of
its commencement has become lost in its lapse. It must have
been from a time "whereof the memory of man runneth not to
the contrary." But that is all changed now; for, if there has been
such actual use of the easement for the time fixed by statue for
the recovery of corporeal property, that statute is applied by
analogy and the right becomes fixed and vested. However, between the old and new rules of prescription there is an important distinction. The flight of the long time requisite to vest the
right under the old law afforded a conclusive presumption that
there had been an express grant of the easement, its evidence
lost by the tooth of time, and no proof that it never existed could
be heard; whereas, under the new rule user for the statutory period raises only a prima facie presumption of a grant, which
may be repelled. This distinction is important in this case. To
establish a right of way under the modern law, it must appear
that it has been exercised for the statutory period with the acquiescence of the owner over whose land the way is claimed.
True, such user without more, is taken to be with his acquiescence and knowledge, and prima facie gives the right; but if it

215

Id.at 1026.

216

33 S.E. 233 (W. Va. 1899).
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appears that the user is against his protest, and that he denied
the right, the right cannot become vested from time of user.217
By 1937, in Post v. Wallace,218 the court stated: "We do not think it necessary to cite authority for the proposition that: 'A private right of way by prescription may be acquired over another's land by visible, continuous and uninterrupted use thereof for ten years, under a bona fide claim of right, with the
acquiescence of the owner.', 219 Syllabus Point 1 of Town of Paden City v. Felton22 is to the same effect and is set forth as Syllabus Point 6 in Newman v.
Michel. 221 The ten-year period referred to in the case is derived from West Virginia Code § 55-2-1.222
223
As to the requirement of 'continuous,' the court in Veach v. Day
wrote: "While we are aware of no West Virginia case which discusses what
constitutes 'continued' or 'continuous' use such as to give rise to a prescriptive
easement, a number of jurisdictions have held that the 'continuous' requirement
224
involves something more than mere infrequent or sporadic use of a road.,
After discussing cases from Texas and New York, the court noted, "There is a
similarity between the elements which must be shown to establish a prescriptive
easement and those necessary for adverse possession. 225 After briefly discussing two West Virginia cases holding that "occasional" or "sporadic" use is not
sufficient for adverse possession, the court held, "Given these authorities, we
are of the view that to support the establishment of a prescriptive easement the
use of a way must be more than occasional or sporadic. 226 In the Veach case,
the testimony was essentially that since 1957, the Days used the contested way
once or twice in the spring to hunt mushrooms and during the deer season two
or three times.227 In reversing the circuit court, the Supreme Court of Appeals
said:

217

Id. at 235 (citations omitted).

218

192 S.E. 112 (W. Va. 1937).

219

Id. at 115.

220

66 S.E.2d 280 (W. Va. 1951).

221

688 S.E.2d 610. Syl. Pt. 6 (W. Va. 2009).

222

W. VA.

CODE

§ 55-2-1 (1923). Entry upon or recovery of lands, "No person shall make an

entry on. or bring an action to recover, any land, but within ten years next after the time at which
the right to make such entry or to bring such action shall have first accrued to himself or to some
person through when he claims." See generally Naab v. Nolan. 327 S.E.2d 151 (W. Va. 1985).
223
304 S.E.2d 860 (W. Va. 1983).
224

Id. at 862 (citation omitted).

225

Id. at 863.

226

Id.
See id. at 862.

227
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We conclude that the evidence of use in the case before us does
not demonstrate sufficiently continuous use to support the establishment of an easement by prescription. We note that the
Days' own testimony was that the road was from time to time
closed and that family only used it a few times a year to hunt
upon the land. 28
F.

Use

As related to prescriptive easements, the "use" of property fulfills several different functions. First, the nature of the use of the way during the prescription period establishes the purposes for which it can be used. In Staggers v.
Hines,229 this aspect of the rule is explained as follows: "It is well settled that a
way acquired by prescription has its limitations. If acquired for one purpose, it
cannot be broadened or diverted to another; and its character and extent are ascertainable and determinable by the use made of it during the period of prescription. 230 In Staggers, the objection to use was the hauling of timber and lumber
over the road in wet weather, but since the record did not accurately define the
character and extent of the use during the prescriptive period, the case was remanded. 3'
In Burns v. Goff 232 it was claimed that during the prescriptive period,

the easement was used for ingress and egress to access a single dwelling and
that, in 1975, a trailer was placed on the property and the occupants of the trailer
began to use the driveway for ingress and egress.233 In response to the argument
that using the way to access the trailer exceeded the use during the prescriptive
period, the court said:
We find this argument to be without merit. The appellants fail
to distinguish between the character or purpose of the use and
the frequency of a use of the same character. During the prescriptive period, the driveway was used for ingress and egress
to a residential dwelling for all those purposes for which a person would use a driveway to their home, e.g. personal access,
access of service and delivery vehicles, and for the visitation of
friends and relatives. The use of the driveway by the trailer's
occupants was of the same character and for the same purpose,
i.e., ingress and egress to a residential dwelling. Although the
228
229
230
231
232
233

Id. at 863.
104 S.E. 768 (W. Va. 1920).
Id. at 770.
See id. at 770 71.
262 S.E.2d 772 (W. Va. 1980).
Id.at 775.
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driveway may now receive more frequent travel of the same
character, this is not controlling. It would be a different matter,
as an example, if the driveway were now intended to be used
for commercial purposes, as this would clearly indicate a
change in the character of the use. 234
In Clain-Stefanelli v. Thompson,235 the court reiterated its holding in
Burns that an increase in frequency of a use of the same character is not the
same as a change in 236
the character of the use. After citing Burns, the court in
Clain-Stefanellisaid:
We find this reasoning to be applicable in the present case, and
hold that where a change in the use of a right-of-way is not a
change of its character or purpose but merely one of degree,
such as a mere increase in frequency of use, the extent of and
the right to use the right-of-way is not affected by such change.
There is evidence that the appellant's property was used at various times as a residence, farm, and for recreational activities
such as hunting and fishing, and the circuit court found that a
right-of-way exists for these purposes. There is no evidence
that the appellant's property was ever used for commercial purposes.
We find, therefore, that the right-of-way at issue may be used
for ingress and egress to additional residential dwellings on the
appellant's property that may result from any development or
subdivision, for such would be in keeping with the historical
character and purpose of the right-of-way. This would merely
result in an increased frequency of residential traffic over the
right-of-way and not a change in its character or purpose. We
emphasize, however, that the right-of-way may not be used to
serve any commercial development of the appellant's property.
Also, we are not declaring that the appellant has the right to develop or subdivide her property for any purpose, because the
question of such a right includes many additional issues which
exceeds the scope of this Court's concern. We merely find that
the right-of-way at issue may be used to serve additional residential traffic.23

235

Id.
486 S.E.2d 330 (W. Va. 1997).

236

Id. at 336 37.

237

Id.; see also Pobro, LLC. v. LaFollette, 618 S.E.2d 434 (W. Va. 2005).

234
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While the Clain-Stefanelli case involved an increase in usage of the
same activities that gave rise to the prescription easement, a usage of a different
kind is illustrated by the next three cases. In Hanshew v. Zickafoose,238 the court
held that although Zickafoose had obtained a prescriptive easement across a lane
which bordered his land for maintenance of a fence, he could not use the lane
for an ingress and egress to a new residence built on his property. 239
In Crane v. Hayes,240 on facts similar to Hanshew v. Zickafoose,24' the
court held: "While the appellees [Cranes] are entitled to continued usage of the
road for the purposes as encompassed within that original ten-year prescriptive
period, [i.e., agricultered related purposes,] they are not entitled to increase the
burden on the land to encompass travel for residential purposes -242
In Grist Lumber, Inc. v. Brown, 243 the issue was whether the prescriptive easement could be used for timber removal. The easement across the servient estate had been in continuous use since 1911.244 In rejecting the appellant's argument as to what constituted the "prescriptive period" for the purpose
of determining the permitted use, the court in footnote four said:
Grist Lumber asserts that the prescriptive period during which
the easement was created was actually from 1911 to the present,
contending that the "prescriptive period" is not legally limited
to any particular ten-year span, but rather includes all years of
usage with a minimum of ten years. The law of this state is in
accord with the conception advanced by Grist Lumber; where
an action seeking designation of a prescriptive easement is
brought, a precise ten-year period within an extensive history of
use does not have to be asserted, as long as the usage has been
conducted continuously for at least ten years. The entire history

238
239

313 S.E.2d 427 (W. Va. 1984).
See generally id. at 429. George Zickafoose had used the lane from 1951 until 1979 to

repair the fence that ran along the northside of the lane. George had conveyed a lot on the north
side of the lane to his son and daughter-in-law on which they built their residence. The court's
holding was, "the easement is limited to the use of a vehicle in connection with fence repairs, and
cannot be expanded to include vehicular use for ingress or egress to the new residence. Zickafoose could convey nothing more." Id.
240
417 S.E.2d 117 (W. Va. 1992).
241
In Crane, "The prescriptive easement is limited to the uses to which the road was put during
that prescriptive period specifically, agricultural, gathering of firewood, checking fences, and the
use of small machinery to clear the roadbed." Id.at 120.
242
Id. Mr. Crane intended to build two residences on his land and access them by the easement
involved in the litigation. See id at 118.
243
550 S.E.2d 66 (W. Va. 2001).
244
Id.at 68.
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of the usage, as presented in evidence, must be evaluated to 245
determine the character and scope of the prescriptive easement.
While recognizing it is the use of the way during "all years of usage
with a minimum often years," on the facts of the instant case, the court stated:
In the present case, the record reflects very infrequent incidents
of use of the road for timbering from 1911 to the placement of
the gate across the easement in 1998. There is no evidence that
the usage of the road for timber removal continued in an uninterrupted fashion for any ten-year period. The only welldocumented instances of usage for timber removal occurred in
1982 and 1985 where express permission by the Appellant's
predecessor in title was granted for timbering use for a limited
period of time.246
An unusual application of this general principle that the use during the
prescriptive period determines the nature of the permitted is the case of Wheeling Stamping Co. v. Warwood Land Co.247 In 1872, the Cowpland executed an
unrecorded "release" in favor of the Pittsburgh, Wheeling, and Kentucky Railroad. Conrail succeeded to the grantee's interest, and Warwood Land Company
succeeded to the Cowpland's interest. Since the original "release" could not be
found, the court held: "Thus, without a recorded document protecting the interests of the railroad, we may only
248 conclude that the railroad acquired a right of
way easement by prescription.,
In the 1980s, when Conrail abandoned the rail service and sold the 19.8
miles section of railroad property, the question arose whether the grantee of
Conrail obtained title to the "prescriptive easement" area or did Warwood Land
Company own it as the successor to the servient estate? In holding that Warwood Land Company owned it, the court said:
[W]here property acquired by prescriptive easement for railroad
purposes is abandoned by the railroad, the property returns to its
prior status as an integral part of the freehold to which it previously belonged and there is a rebuttable presumption that it is
owned in fee simple by the owners of the abutting land, onehalf of the railway easement to each landowner on his respective side of the easement.249

246

Id. at 71 n.4.
Id.

247

412 S.E.2d 253 (W. Va. 1991).

248

Id.at 256.

249

Id.at 254.

245
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Location and Width of Easement

Another aspect of the element of "use" is to determine the location and
width of the easement and its maintenance. In contrast to expressed grants or
reservation of easements which must contain an adequate description, prescriptive easements are created by usage. Therefore, questions concerning width and
the exact location on the ground that prescription easements are not unusual.
In Crosier v. Brown,2 5 1 the complaint asserted ownership of a prescriptive easement across land owned by Brown, and described the easement in the
complaint as "about 500 yards in length, passing from near the western line of
said tract through the western portion of said John M. Brown tract of land to the
public road., 251 The court, in considering the sufficiency of the description,
said:
Is the above description of the way sufficient? It is the only description in the record ....
At what point on the western line of Brown's tract does this
way begin? What line or course does it pursue through
Brown's tract of 51 14 acres? At what point on the public road
does it terminate? What public road? The bill does not answer
these questions. The bill must point out the way by definite
termini and route. The sacred right of property demands that
such serious encumbrance upon a man's estate, if established by
record, shall be clearly defined by the record memorial. The
evidence does not make it definite. According to it I doubt if
one could find this way. It is not fenced. It has no track. You
can only find it by the marks of the wheels of a wagon only occasionally used. Many years hence, when living witnesses of its
present place are dead, it becomes a question as to location.
Recourse is had to this record. It will reflect no light by plat of
delineation or other decisive or significant description. If there
is anything affecting a man's land that should be definitely ascertainable, it is a way. Jones on Easements, § 294, says that a
way by prescription "must be definite in location. The adverse
enjoyment must be in the same place within definite lines for
the whole period of limitation." The proof does not more clearly define it. The decree does not attempt to do so.252

66 S.E. 326 (W. Va. 1909).
Id. at 326.
252
Id. at 326-27. In addition to stating the description was insufficient, the court said Crosier
had failed to establish several elements of a prescriptive easement.
250

251
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The issue of description was back before the court in Post v. Wallace.253
In contrast with Crosier, where the court had held that all of the elements of a
prescriptive easement had not been proven, in Post, the court held that a prescriptive easement was established and remanded the case "to the court below to
take such proceedings as may be necessary to locate on the ground the right-ofway decreed., 25 4 As to the location of the right-of-way, the court said:
We are therefore confronted with the question of whether or not
the plaintiffs bill, the testimony in the case, and the decree of
court unholding the Posts' right to this road are sufficient to establish the particular location of the right of way within the
meaning of the authorities which require such location. The
plaintiffs bill does not specifically locate the right of way on
the ground, but states that it "is well marked by the old road bed
and gates and has been continuously used as a right of way from
the public highway to this plaintiff's land openly, notoriously,
adversely and under claim and color of right," leaving us to
conjecture where the road is located, except for the allegation
that the road is well marked. On the theory that "that is certain
which can be made certain," this allegation may have some
force, but it is uncertain and unsatisfactory, at best. The testimony is slightly more specific in that it refers to the gateway on
the division line between the Wallace land and the Post land,
and to the gateway on the division line between the Wallace
land and the Post land, and to the corner of a meadow fence
and a reference to an old or abandoned road with which the
present right of way runs parallel, the meanderings of the road
passing the residence of the defendants to the property line of
H. B. Newlon and over his property to the public road. The decree of the court in attempting to locate the right of way which
is decreed to Post, describes it as follows: "* * * extending from
a gate in the division line fence between the property of the
plaintiff and the defendants, to a pair of bars south of the Howard Davisson's House located on the defendants' land, and
thence parallel with the old or abandoned road or right of way
running through the meadow to the corner of the meadow west
of the Howard Davisson's House, and thence to the original
road or right of way and with the original road or right of way
over, along and with the meanderings of said road or right of
way, along and by a tenant house and along and by the residence of the defendants on the land owned by the defendant
253
254

192 S.E. 112 (W. Va. 1937).
Id.at 116.
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Stella Wallace to the property line of H.B. Newlon, and extending over the land of H.B. Newlon to the public highway. * * *"
The location of this road has not been made with such certainty
255
as to justify the approval of the decree below on that point.
The case of Faulkner v. Thorn 25 6 involved establishing the location of
the easement on the ground following a remand for that purpose. While the case
illustrates some of the difficulties in locating the easement on the ground, it is
not particularly instructive beyond the facts of the case. Similarly, the case of
Clain-Stefanelli v. Thompson257 illustrates the difficulties of establishing the
location and width of the right-of-way. The court explained:
In the present case the evidence is not entirely clear as to the
exact width of the right-of-way in question at the time it was established, since the right-of-way was established possibly 100
years before the institution of the present action. As previously
indicated, Frank A. Whitacre, a surveyor, testified that the rightof-way is 13.6 feet in width and another surveyor, Kenneth F.
Snyder, testified that it is eleven feet in width. Three witnesses
approximated the width of the right-of-way at 12 to 15 feet.
Another witness testified that the right-of-way is approximately
12 feet wide. Given this testimony, this Court cannot conclude
that the circuit court erred in holding that the right-of-way is 11
feet wide with a one and one-half foot overhang on each side.
Clearly, the 11 foot width is supported by the testimony of surveyor Snyder and the finding of the overhang on each side is
reasonably within the parameters established by surveyor Whitacre and the estimations of the other witnesses.258
Since prescriptive easements arise from the use of another's land, issues
such as the duty to maintain or the erection of gates are not resolved by agreement between the parties. In Moran v. Edman,259 among the issues addressed by
the court on appeal was the trial court's order requiring the owner of the servient
estate to contribute to the upkeep of the easement. Earlier in the decision, the
court had affirmed the circuit court's ruling that Moran had established a prescriptive easement across Edman's property. 60 In overruling the portion of the

255
256
257
258
259
260

Id. at 115.
9 S.E.2d 140 (W. Va. 1940).
486 S.E.2d 330 (W. Va. 1997).
Id.at 334 35.
460 S.E.2d 477 (W. Va. 1995).
Id.at 483.
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circuit court's ruling requiring the owner of the servient estate to contribute to
the upkeep of the road, the court stated:
In syllabus point 2 of Carson v. Jackson Land and Mining
Company, 90 W. Va. 781, 111 S.E. 846 (1922), the Court rather
plainly indicated that in an easement situation the duty to maintain an easement is ordinarily upon those entitled to use the
easement and not upon the landowner. The Court said:
The duty to maintain an easement in such condition that it
may be enjoyed is upon those entitled to its use, in the absence of some contractual or prescriptive obligation
upon
26 1
the owner of the servient estate to so maintain it.
The issue of whether the owner of the servient estate can erect a gate
across the right-of-way gained through prescriptive use is often an important
262
practical question. The court, in Clain-Stefanelli v. Thompson,
provided a
helpful discussion of this issue as follows:
The second issue raised by the appellant is that the circuit court
erred in holding that the appellees may legally erect and maintain a gate across the right-of-way in question, and denying the
appellant the right to install a cattle crossing in lieu of a gate.
The appellant contends that the right-of-way at issue remained
open and unobstructed for a period of over 100 years and, therefore, the appellant has a right to continue to use the right-of-way
in its unobstructed condition. For the reasons set forth below,
we agree with the appellant.
As previously indicated, the fundamental law on prescriptive
rights-of-way in this state indicates that the character and purpose of a right-of-way acquired by prescription are determined
by the use made of it during the prescriptive period. In determining whether the owner of the servient estate can erect a gate
across a prescriptive right-of-way, this Court has historically
looked at the facts of each case to ascertain the reasonableness
of such action. In Rogerson v. Shepherd, 33 W. Va. 307, 317318, 10 S.E. 632, 636 (1889), this court stated:
[I]f the way acquired by use, although well marked and defined, is restricted, during the time required for the estab261

Id.

262

486 S.E.2d 330.
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lishment of the right, to a use and enjoyment thereof with
bars or gates across it, the right acquired will be restricted
to the same extent; and if, on the other hand, the way be
well defined and fenced, and used as an open and unobstructed way of during the period necessary to confer the
right, the party acquiring this right of way has the right to
continue to use the same in its unobstructed condition, and
the owner of the servient estate has no right to change said
way to another and different locality over his land, and obstruct the new way with gates.
The court in Rogerson noted, however, that in holding that the
owner of the servient estate could not obstruct the prescriptive
right-of-way with gates, it was deviating from the general proposition that "the owner of a servient estate, over which there is a
private way, may maintain gates or bars across the way provided it do (sic) not materially interfere with the use of it." Rogerson, 33 W. Va. at 316, 10 S.E. at 636. The court in Rogerson explained that the case presented some peculiar features
which took it out of the general rule governing such cases.
These peculiar features included the existence of a parol agreement between the parties' predecessors in title that the right-ofway would be kept open, and the fact that when the right-ofway was first opened, fences were constructed along both sides
of it separating it from the servient estate. The Court also noted
that the right-of-way had been unobstructed by gates for about
32 years. In Mitchell v. Bowman, 74 W. Va. 498, 82 S.E. 330
(1914), this Court distinguished Rogerson based on the peculiar
facts noted above, and stated in Syllabus Point 2 that:
A way of passage from a public road to a farm, over intervening agricultural lands, acquired by prescriptive use
while the servient lands were unenclosed and unimproved,
may be properly subjected to gates not unreasonably established and maintained, whenever the owners of the servient
lands find it desirable to enclose the same for proper and
ordinary use.
Considering the facts of this case in light of the general rule, we
find that obstructing the right-of-way with a gate at this late
date is simply unreasonable. As noted above, our inquiry on this
issue is a fact-specific one. Among the factors that this Court
considers in determining whether an owner of a servient estate
may erect a gate across a prescriptive right-of-way are the history of the right-of-way and the history of the land it crosses. In
the absence of an agreement to the contrary or other special cir-
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cumstances, if the right-of-way has been in existence for a short
period of time, and the servient estate has historically been unimproved or used as agricultural land, the owner of the servient
estate may erect a gate across it for agricultural purposes. If,
however, the right-of-way has been in existence for a lengthy
time, and a gate has never been placed across it, the owner of
the servient estate may not change the character of such a long
established right-of-way by obstructing it with a gate. Here,
there is evidence that the right-of-way, established in the early
1900's according to the uncontradicted testimony of one witness, was open until the appellee erected a gate across it in
1993. The character of the right-of-way over its approximate
90 to 100 year existence is that of an unobstructed, ungated
right-of-way. Given this evidence, and the rule of law that the
character and purpose of a right-of-way acquired by prescription are determined by the use made of it during the prescriptive
period, we believe that the right-of-way cannot now be gated.
Here, the free and unfettered use of the right-of-way over its
long history is controlling.26 3
G.

Miscellaneous Issues RegardingPrescriptiveEasements
1.

Use by a Tenant

In Keller v. Hartman,264 the defendant Hartman began to lease commercial property from the Byrd's beginning in 1953. In 1956, the Byrd property
was partitioned with Maurice, the owner of a 2/3 undivided interest, getting two
of the three commercial properties including the property rented to Hartman,
and Wayne, the owner of the remaining 1/3 undivided interest, getting the other
commercial property. The property owned by the Byrds between the commercial buildings and a street some distance behind the commercial buildings was
not partitioned. Hartman traveled across this property to get deliveries to the
rear of the building he rented. This property was owned 2/3 by Maurice and 1/3
by Wayne, respectfully, as tenants in common. When Maurice died in 1968, his
interest passed to his wife, Elsie, and in 1978 Elsie sold the commercial property
the Hartmans had been renting to them.265
The deed of transfer for the commercial building also provided:
The party of the first part [Elsie Byrd] also grants and conveys
to the party of the second part [Hartmans] a right-of-way thirty
263

Id. at 335-36.

264

333 S.E.2d 89 (W. Va. 1985).

265

Id. at 92.
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(30) feet in width across her undivided two-thirds (2/3) interest
in the real estate owned by her and located East of and between
South Branch Street, the location of said right-of-way shall be
the same entrance which the parties of the second part now use
for the purpose of ingress and egress to the real estate herein
conveyed.266
The instant litigation was to determine whether the Hartmans had an
easement across the undivided interest of the Byrds between the rear of his store
and the street some distance from the rear of the store. From 1953 until 1956,
Hartman had been the tenant of the Byrds; from 1956 following the partition
until 1978, he had been the tenant of Maurice and then his widow, and from
1978 he had been the owner of the store and also the 30 foot right of way contained in the 1978 deed across Elsie's 2/3 undivided interest. One of Hartman's
grounds for the easement was by prescription.26 7 As to the prescriptive easement claim, the court said:
It is fundamental that "no person can have an easement on his
own property. The essence of an adverse use is that such use be
made of the land of another. (Citation omitted)
For the first three years of the claimed prescriptive period, the
leased buildings and the driveway were parts of a single tract of
land. The landlords and the owners of the way were identical.
Subsequent to the partition in 1956, the appellees' landlords in
the furniture store-first Maurice and later Elsie-continued to
have a 2/3 undivided interest in the "L"-shaped tract. Any use
of the driveway by the appellees could not inure to the benefit
of their lessors because the lessors could not acquire the right to
use the driveway adverse to themselves.268
In addition to the above discussion, the court stated:
The appellant contends that the appellees could not acquire an
easement because they were merely lessees during the alleged
period of prescription. The general rule with respect to acquisition by a lessee of an easement by prescription is that "[o]ne in
possession of land as a tenant at will or for years cannot acquire
for himself an easement of way over the lands of another." 25

266
267

268

Id.at 92 93.
Id.
Id.at 95.
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Am.Jur.2d, Easements and Licenses § 40, see also 28 C.J.S.
Easements § 8.
The appellees concede the general rule, but they contend that
their adverse use inured to the benefit of their landlord. In the
leading case of Deregibus v. Silberman Furniture Co., 121

Conn. 633, 186 A.553, 105 A.L.R. 1183 (1936), it was held that
adverse use by a lessee of a way appurtenant to the leasehold
premises inures to the benefit of the lessor only where the way
is included, expressly or impliedly in the lease.
In the present case, there was no written lease, and the record is
devoid of evidence that the claimed easement was included in
the oral lease of the furniture store or of the storage building.

Therefore, any use by the Hartmans would not benefit their landlords.269
As discussed later in this Article, the Hartmans were held to have an
easement as a result of the 1978 deed from Elsie and the subsequent ratification
of the easement by Wayne Byrd. 27' However, the court's reliance on the Deregibus case, as quoted in the Harman decision, results in what would seem to be
an illogical result in Jamison v. Waldeck United Methodist Church.71 In that

case, the question was whether the Jamisons had obtained a prescriptive easement across the church's property to their house located on an acre of land adjacent to the church property. On March 2, 1982, Earl and Nora Lea Jamison
conveyed one acre out of a larger tract to their son Michael Jamison. Michael
and Mary, his wife, built a house on this one-acre parcel and moved in during
November 1982. Michael and Mary lived in the house until they moved in
1989. Thereafter, they rented the house to tenants. During the time the Jamison's lived in the house, and after their departure, their tenants relied exclusively upon the roadway across the church's property as their access to the public
road.272 On appeal, the court said it was error for the trial court to have granted
the Jameson's a prescriptive easement "because they did not present evidence
that they satisfied the required ten-year period. 273 In reversing the circuit
court's verdict in favor of the Jamisons, the court explained:
Here, the suit against the church to establish the plaintiffs'
rights to a prescriptive easement was filed in the Circuit Court
269

Id.

270

See Keller v. Hartman, 333 S.E.2d 89, 96 (W. Va. 1985).

271 445 S.E.2d 229 (W. Va. 1994).
272
273

Id.at 231.
Id.at 232.
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of Lewis County on November 13, 1992. However, the facts
indicate that the Jamisons only lived on the property from 1982
until 1989, and then they began renting the property. In Keller,
175 W.Va. at 424, 333 S.E.2d at 95, we cited "the leading case
of Deregibus v. Silberman Furniture Co., 121 Conn. 633, 186
A. 553, 105 A.L.R. 1183 (1936),... [which] held that adverse
use by a lessee of a way appurtenant to the leasehold premises
inures to the benefit of the lessor only where the way is included, expressly or impliedly in the lease."
We do not find any indication in the record that the Jamisons
provided in their lease of the property the right to use the
Church's roadway. Likewise, we do not find any argument in
their brief that the lease was sufficient to allow a tacking of the
period the property was rented to the approximately seven years
that they lived on the property. Thus, we conclude that the Jamisons did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that they
accrued the ten years necessary to establish the prescriptive
easement. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court
as to its entering a verdict in favor of the Jamisons. 2 74
Given the privity that exists between landlord and tenant, it is doubtful
that the Deregibus case represents the general rule. Bruce and Ely, in their treatise, state:
Further, successive uses under one title, such as by a landlord
and a tenant, satisfy the privity requirement and may be tacked.
Some jurisdictions, however, adhere to the view that adverse
use by a tenant inures to the benefit of the landlord only when
the asserted easement is within the express or implied terms of
the lease.275
Even if one accepts the Deregibus case as a correct statement of the law,
it defies logic to reason that if the "exclusive" access to the Jamison house was
across the church's property that a lease of the house would not "impliedly"
include the access the landlord had used for three years and was the only access
to the property.
274

Id.

275

BRUCE & ELY, supra note 1. at § 5.19, at 5-72. "Prescriptive uses need not be made perso-

nally by the owner of the claimed prescriptive servitude, but may be made by tenants, customers,

guests, and visitors of the claimant." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY, § 2.16 Comment e,
227-28; see also Tenant's Adverse Possession or Use of Third Person's Land not Within the
Description in the Lease as Inuring to Landlord'sBenefit so as to Support Latter's Title or Right
by Adverse Possession or Prescription,105 A.L.R. 1187 (1936).
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Application of the Recording Acts to Prescriptive Easement

The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Fanti v. Welsh,276 in
dicta said:
that James A. Welsh was a purchaser for value without actual or
constructive notice and that, therefore, even if a prescriptive
right to an easement had been acquired by the plaintiffs as
against the railroad company as owner of the land, such right
was extinguished and that Welsh, as a purchaser for value without notice, took the land free and clear of any such easement
right.2

In Clain-Stefanelli v. Thompson,7 8 the court, again in dicta, followed
the reasoning in Fanti setting forth the principle in Syllabus Point 2 as follows:
When a servient estate is sold, a prescriptive right-of-way over
that estate is extinguished unless the purchaser of the servient
estate has either actual or constructive notice of its existence.
Where the prescriptive right-of-way is open and visible so that a
reasonably careful inspection of the servient estate would disclose the existence of the right-of-way, the purchaser has constructive notice.2 9
In Wolfe v. Alpizar,28 ° the court applied the principle set forth as dicta in
the Fanti and Clain-Stefanelli cases holding that when Mrs. Alpizar purchased
the property that was asserted to be the servient estate; she was protected as a
bonafide purchaser. In the language of the court:
At that point in time, Ms. Alpizar became a bonafide purchaser
for value without notice. Ms. Alpizar, in essence, was an innocent purchaser and Mr. Wolfe's and Mr. Ellison's claims, even
if valid, were extinguished by an innocent purchaser's i.e. Ms.
Alpizer's acquisition of the land. The appellants have asserted
no documentation of which Ms. Alpizar could have or should
have been aware that would have alerted her to the appellants'
claims to the bridge. All parties agree that the easement recorded in the deed transferring property title is not the location of
276

161 S.E.2d 501 (W. Va. 1968).

277

Id. at 506.

278

486 S.E.2d 330 (W. Va. 1997).

279

Id.at 331, Syl. Pt. 2.

280

637 S.E.2d 623 (W. Va. 2006).
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the bridge, as the bridge is far north of the actual easement.
Furthermore, all parties concede that the alleged easement at the
bridge location was not recorded. Thus, there is no documentation that would have alerted Ms. Alpizar to the appellants'
claims to the bridge. 8 '
The application of the recording acts to prescriptive easements and the
fundamental soundness of the dicta in Fanti, which the court followed in ClainStefanelli and Wolfe v. Alpizar, are discussed at length in Fisher, The Scope of
Title Examination in West Virginia Revisited.82 As more extensively discussed
in that article, it is submitted that since prescriptive easements are created by the
application of principles of law to a particular set of facts and not by a written
agreement, they are not subject to the provision of the recording acts.
V. WAY OF NECESSITY
"Easements of necessity, also called easements by necessity or ways 2of
83
necessity, are typically implied to provide access to a landlocked parcel.,
The traditional requirements for its creation are (1) common ownership, (2) severance, i.e. a transfer of a part of the land, (3) necessity at severance for an
easement to benefit either the parcel transferred or the parcel retained, and (4)
continuing necessity for an easement.284
While the way of necessity was recognized as a method of acquiring an
easement in Rogerson v. Shepherdz85 and Boyd v. Woolwine, 86 the first case in
West Virginia in which it provided the legal basis for the recognition of an
easement was Wooldridge v. Coughlin.287 In Wooldridge, the dominant and
servient tracts were once a part of a common tract, 288 and at the time of Cabell's
conveyance to Hurley, a way of necessity existed across Cabell's land to the
public road. 89

281

282
283
284
285
286
287
288

Id. at 628.
111 W. VA. L. REv. 641, 654-67 (2009).
BRUCE & ELY. supra note 1. at § 4.2. at 4-3.4.
Id. at § 4.2, at 4-4, 5.
10 S.E. 632 (W. Va. 1889).
21 S.E. 1020 (W. Va. 1895).
33 S.E. 233 (W. Va. 1899).
"Thus Wooldridge and Coughlin derived title from a common source (Cabell). the Wool-

dridge title emanating from Cabell first in time." Id. at 234.
"1think there can be no doubt that, the instant Cabell conveyed to Hurley, Hurley had, under

289

the law, a way of necessity to the old state road, because between Hurley's land and that road
Cabell owned the land, and on the other side, back of the Hurley land, rises a high mountain, and
except the land then yet owned by Cabell. the Hurley land was cut off from access to the outer
world by lands of other parties." Id.
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Upon these facts, the court said:
the way of necessity vested in Wooldridge existing by reason
of the conveyance by Cabell to Hurley, and the necessity of a
way over Cabell's remaining land in favor of Hurley. This right
of way was appurtenant to Hurley's estate in the land, if it existed, and is appurtenant to Wooldridge's estate in his land as
alienee of Hurley. I think such way of necessity exists. "A way
of necessity exists where the land granted is completely environed by land of the grantor or partially by his land and the land
of strangers. The law implies from these facts that a right of
way over the grantor's
land was granted to the grantee as appur290
tenant to the estate.,
In response to Coughlin's claim that Wooldridge had lost the way of
necessity to Coughlin through adverse possession, i.e., the ten years statute of
limitation, the court said:
that mere nonuser of a way appurtenant to wild land would not
destroy the right of way. The fact that Coughlin had possession
of his land is not a material element, and would not affect the
right of way, as Coughlin's possession was a matter of course,
and it could co-exist with right of way, and would not be in antagonism per se with that right of way. In almost every case of
conceded right of way, whether by grant or necessity, there is
actual possession of the land subject to such right of way. Arnold v. Stevens, 35 Am. Dec. 305; Gray v. Bartlett, 32 Am.
Dec. 208, note. The statute limiting actions for recovery of actual possession of land does not, in terms, apply to incorporeal
hereditaments, such as mere easements. If the owner of the servient land deny the easement, and his denial is known to the
owner of the dominant land, and there were nonuser thereafter
of the way for the statutory period of 10 years, it would defeat
the right of way; but I do not see that such private right of way,
once brought
into being, could be defeated by simple non1
user.

29

Over the next several decades, the court decided several important issues relevant to ways of necessity.
In Proudjootv. Saffle, 292 there was common ownership of a tract of 198
acres and an 80-acre tract, with the only access from a public road to the 198290
291
292

Id.(citations omitted).
Id.
57 S.E. 256 (W. Va. 1907).
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acre tract being across the 80-acre tract. In a judicial proceeding to enforce liens
against the owner of these tracts, the 198 acres was sold.293 In holding that the
owner of the 198 acres had a way of necessity, the court said:
A way of necessity is not established by the mere fact that one's
land is surrounded by the lands of others cutting him off from
public ways. "When there is a conveyance of a tract of land,
and there is not means of access thereto or egress therefrom, except over the remaining land of the grantor, a way of necessity
over such land is granted by implication of law, whether the
transfer be voluntary or by sale under execution." (citation
omitted).
"The right of way of necessity passes with each successive
transfer of the title, whether voluntary or involuntary." It is further held: "A way, having been created by necessity for its uses
cannot be extinguished so long as the necessity continues to exist.,,294

In Crotty v. New River and Pocahontas Consol. Coal Co.,295 the issue
was "[w]hether an owner of land can go back beyond the deed of the immediate
grantee to the common source of title, however remote it may be, and claim a
way by necessity, as appurtenant to the land ....
In answer, the court held
that the common source of title can be in a remote grantor. The discussion of
this question in the decision is concisely summarized in the Syllabus as follows:
Such a way is appurtenant to the granted land, and passes to
subsequent grantees thereof, and a subsequent grantee of land
not used at the time of the severance of the larger tract by the
common owner may, when the use of such way becomes necessary to the enjoyment of the land, claim it under the remote
deed of severance.297
The Crotty court also discussed the "degree" of necessity required to
acquire a way of necessity stating:
As to whether physical obstruction to access to land, such as the
insurmountable cliff standing between the plaintiff s lot and the
293

See generally id. at 256.

294

Id.
78 S.E. 233 (W. Va. 1913).
Id. at 234.
Id. at 233.

295
296
297
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public road on the table land within the boundary of lot No. 15,
will sustain an implication of a grant of a way of necessity, the
authorities are in conflict, some saying the grantee cannot have
a right of way out over the adjacent land of the grantor, if, by
any means, no matter at what cost, he can get out over his own
land, while others say necessity within the meaning of the terms
as it is used in the law of contracts suffices. 98
In answer to the question of the degree of necessity, the court said:
In cases like this the courts have said there need not be an absolute physical obstruction. The following text from Jones on
Easements, § 316, is well sustained by authority: "The word is
to have a reasonable and liberal interpretation. The way must
be reasonably necessary. If it were limited to an absolute physical necessity, a way could not be implied if another way could
be made by any amount of labor and expense, or by any possibility. If, for example, the property conveyed were worth but
one thousand dollars, it would follow from this construction
that the purchaser would not have a right of way over the intervening piece as appurtenant to the land, provided he could make
another way at an expense of one hundred thousand dollars."
See Pettingill v. Porter et al. 8 Allen (Mass.) 1, 85 am. Dec.
671 .299
In Dorsey v. Dorsey,00 the court noted two limitations as to ways of necessity. These points are concisely stated in the Syllabus. An owner of a dominant estate who has an "easement of passage by virtue of necessity as to one
tract could not as matter of right extend such easement to his other lands. '' 30 ' In
Dorsey, the dominant estate consisted of a 95-acre tract which had a way of
necessity across tracts of 65 acres and 45 acres. These three tracts had a common source of title. The owner of the dominant estate acquired title to an adjoining 31 12 acre tract that was never owned by the common grantor. The instant
case was to enjoin the owner of the dominant estate from hauling timber cut on
the 31
acres and a 35-acre tract across the servient estate.30 2
The Dorsey court also explained, "[I]f one has a reasonable outlet over
his own property, he cannot exact a more convenient way as of necessity over

298

Id. at 234-35.

299

Id. at 235 (some citations omitted).

300

153 S.E. 146 (W. Va. 1930).

301

Id. at 146.
Id. at 147.

302

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol112/iss3/4

72

Fisher: A Survey of the Law of Easements in West Virginia
2010]

A SURVEY OF THE LAW OF EASEMENTS IN WEST VIRGINIA

709

the premises of another."3 3 In response to the argument that hauling the timber
over the 35-acre tract "would entail expense disproportionate to the value of the
timber, 30 4 the court said, "[C]onvenience is not the basis of a right to an easement. 'A party cannot have a way of necessity through the land of another (ordinarily) when the necessary way to the highway can be obtained
3 0 5 through his
own land, however convenient and useful another way might be."
In Derifield v. Maynard,3"6the court held that since there was no evidence that the purported dominant estate and servient estate 30were
ever a part of
7
the same tract of land, there could not be a way by necessity.
In addition, the Derifield court said that there had been no showing of a
"real necessity., 30 8 As to the degree of necessity, the court said, "[T]he more
modern rule seems to be that '[T]he rule of strict necessity applicable to an implied reservation or grant of an easement is not limited to one of absolute 3neces09
sity, but to reasonable necessity as distinguished from mere convenience.
The issue of "reasonable necessity" was before the court again in the
two Justus v. Dotson decisions. 3 The first time the case was before the Supreme Court of Appeals, the court reversed a summary judgment in favor of the
owner of the property over which the way of necessity was sought holding there
was a genuine issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff had a "reasonable means
of access.

3 11

Following the remand and the circuit court's decision that the "old"
lumber road "is so bad as to be deemed an unreasonable means of access to the
plaintiff's property,, 312 the case was back before the court again. This time the
court reversed the circuit court's decision that there was a way of necessity stating:
Although the circuit court applied the proper principles of law,
we do not believe that the evidence supports the court's conclusion that the existing road was an unreasonable means of access
to the appellees' property.
303 Id.at 146. While the 35 acre tract was at one time part of the land from the common grantor,
there was evidence that coal and walnut logs had been hauled from this 35 acres to the public
road.
304 Id. at 147.
305 Id. (citations omitted).
306
30 S.E.2d 10 (W. Va. 1944).
307
Id.at 12 13.
308
Id.at 13.
309

Id.(citation omitted).

285 S.E.2d 129 (W. Va. 1981) [hereinafter Justus 11];
242 S.E.2d 575 (W. Va. 1978) [hereinafter Justus 1].
311
Justus 1,242 S.E.2d at 578.
312
Justus I, 285 S.E.2d at 130.
310
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The appellant, Troy Dotson, testified that: (1) it was only three
or four times a year that water would prohibit the residents from
using the road; (2) some sort of drain pipe would probably eliminate the problem of flooding; and (3) until approximately six
years prior to institution of this suit by appellees, he used the
same roadway as the other residents of the hollow. At that time
he constructed a vehicular bridge across Bull Creek onto his
property.

It is clear from the record that the evidence relating to the condition of the existing road was conflicting. We recognize that
what is reasonable access in a rural county of this State may be
unreasonable to one living in a more urbanized area. It appears
that the appellees found the existing road to be adequate for
their needs for a number of years and that this action arose only
after the appellants decided to build a "better" way of access to
their property.
Viewing the record as a whole, we find that there was no substantial evidence that the existing roadway to the appellees'
property was an unreasonable means of access. Accordingly,
the judgment of the circuit court is reversed.3" 3
One of the more frequently cited easement cases is Berkeley Development Corp. v. Hutzler.3 14 The case is frequently cited for the burden of proof of
an easement as "clear and convincing, 315 and316for the distinction between easements by prescription and a way of necessity.

313

Id.at 130 31.

229 S.E.2d 732 (W. Va. 1976).
Id. at 733. Syllabus Point 1 states: "The burden of proving an easement rests on the part
claiming such right and must be established by clear and convincing proof."
316 Id. Syllabus Points 2, 3 and 4 read:
314
315

2. An easement by prescription and a way of necessity are distinguished one
from the other since they arise by virtue of different and mutually exclusive
conditions.
3. "The open. continuous and uninterrupted use of a road over the land of
another, under bona fide claim of right, and without objection from the owner.
for a period of ten years, creates in the user of such road a right by prescription to the continued use thereof." Syllabus pt. 2. Post v. Wallace, 119 W.Va.
182, 192 S.E. 112 (1937).
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Factually, the case involves Hutzler's efforts to secure an easement
from his 105 acres across the 550 acres owned by the Berkeley Development
Corporation. The stipulated facts were that the two tracts share a common
source of title, Moses S. Grantham, and that there were no expressed easements
in the claim of title of either parcel.31 7 There was evidence of an "old road,"
perhaps an old logging road from the Hutzler tract across the 550 acres to a public road and that there were no alternative routes from the Hutzler tract to a public road except over lands of others. The court noted that, but for the fact that a
prescriptive easement and a way of necessity are mutually exclusive, Hutzler
had established both.318
As to between the two possible easements that could be appurtenant to
the 105-acre tract, the court said:
Having determined that the record of the trial court below sustains the conclusion that the appellant demonstrated an easement, either by prescription or by necessity, and that the appel-

317
318

4. Where one owns and conveys a portion of his land which is completely
surrounded by the retained land or partially by the land of the grantor and the
land of others, without expressly providing a means of ingress and egress, and
where there is no other reasonable means of access to the granted land, the
law implies an easement in favor of the grantee over the retained portion of
the original land of the grantor.
Id. at 734.
Id. at 735.

It is abundantly clear that the appellant established, by the requisite degree of
proof in this case, an easement over the land of the appellee. This conclusion
is supported by the evidence presented by both the appellant and the appellee.
First, there is no doubt about the existence of the roadway in question. While
the parties have used different terms to characterize this road, the basic facts
of its presence and location were confirmed by the statements of all witnesses,
including the appellee's president and its surveyor, as well as the appellant
and his corroborating witnesses. In addition, Hutzler. his son and others familiar with the tracts involved, testified, without contradiction, to the continuous
use of the road for more than seventy years. Finally, it was virtually stipulated
that the private way connected with a public road and the appellee offered
nothing to rebut the appellant's unequivocal proof that there was no other reasonable means of ingress and egress to the 105 acre tract. These circumstances patently establish the essential elements of both an easement by prescription and a way of necessity. However, the general rule is that these two
easements are distinguished one from the other since they arise by virtue of
different and mutually exclusive conditions. Thus, the existence of a prescriptive easement negates the requisite necessity for a way of necessity. Similarly. if a way of necessity exists, its use is not adverse so as to confer a prescriptive right.
Id. (citations omitted). In DeWitt v. Elmore, 166 S.E. 271 (W. Va. 1932), the Court also found
that the Plaintiff. DeWitt. had established a way of necessity with the Court also stating "[w]e
think the evidence warrants a finding of a prescriptive right of the plaintiff to this passageway."
Id. at 273.
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lee acquired its land with actual notice of the easement, it remains only to determine, as between the two possibilities,
which easement is most consonant with the evidence. We are
of the opinion that the proof, taken as a whole, more directly
supports the implied easement than the prescriptive right.
Therefore, we hold that the appellant is entitled to use the roadway across the appellee's land as a way of necessity to and from
his 105 acre tract.319
V1.ESTOPPEL
One of the earliest cases in West Virginia discussing estoppel in the
context of the use of another's property is Cautley v. Morgan.320 The case involved a party wall built by Cautley which encroached upon the adjoining lot of
Morgan and Huling six inches more than that permitted by a written agreement.
The written agreement permitted the party wall to extend ten inches onto Morgan and Huling's lot. Cautley, with the assistance of the city engineer had determined the property line. Morgan and Huling had not been consulted as to the
location of the property line. Morgan and Huling asserted they first learned of
the encroachment six years after the party wall was completed when they started
to build a temporary building on their property. On appeal, the court held that
Cautley had to remove the six inches of the wall located on Morgan and Huling's property. As to the claim Morgan and Huling were estopped, the court
said:
To create an estoppel in pais, there must be some conduct of the
party against whom the estoppel is alleged, amounting to a representation or concealment of material facts; and when everything is equally known to both parties, although they are mistaken as to their legal rights, no estoppel arises.321
In applying the general principle of estoppel to the facts of the case, the
court said:
Under the circumstances of the case the defendants had no duty
in the matter, unless they had knowledge that the wall was being constructed on an improper location; and it is not alleged
that they had such knowledge, and they aver that they never
discovered it until they came to use the wall in the fall of 1899.
While it was plainly the duty of the plaintiff, having undertaken
319

Id. at 736.

320

41 S.E. 201 (W. Va. 1902).

321

Id. at 202.
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to build the wall, and assuming the responsibility of fixing the
location herself with the assistance of the city engineer, it was
manifestly her duty to see that it was properly located. She had
the data at hand, by a careful use of the same, to have made no
mistake, and, with the facts before her and in her possession or
of record, the presumption was, and the defendants had a right
to believe, that plaintiff had located the line at the proper place,
and the defendants were not called upon to make the investigation in order to save plaintiff from the mistake that proper care
and watchfulness on her part would have prevented. It seems to
be one of those cases where there was no intentional fault on the
part of either, but by the improper action, though unintentional,
of one of the parties a mistake was made, whereby one party or
the other must suffer a hardship. This being the case, it is held
that that party upon whom a duty devolves and by whom the
mistake was made should suffer the hardship, rather than he
who had no duty to perform, and was no party to the mistake.322
A year after the Cautley case, the court again considered the estoppel
assertion in PocahontasLight & Water v. Browning.323 In PocahontasLight &
Water Co., W.H.H. Witten conveyed a right of way to the water company's
predecessor in title. When constructed the water line passed through 874 feet of
land not owned by Mr. Witten, but owned by St. Clair. St. Clair conveyed the
tract of land over which the water line was built to Browning, and seven years
after the pipe was laid and operating, Browning started to remove the part of the
water line that crossed his land. The water company sought to enjoin Browning
from removing the water lines, claiming estoppel.324
The court stated the essence of the plaintiff's claim as "the whole claim
is that he [St. Clair] knew 325
of the laying of the pipe line, and made no objection
- in short, he was silent.,
322

Id. at 204.

323

44 S.E. 267 (W. Va. 1903).

324

Id. at 267. "Itis not questioned that the pipe line is in part on land of Browning. nor is it

claimed that St. Clair ever gave right of way through his land. The whole claim of the water com-

pany is that it has title by estoppel in pais from conduct of St. Clair." Id.
325
Id.
The utmost that can be said to support this contention is that St. Clair passed
along by where the ditch for the pipe line was made, and while it was open,
and saw some of the iron pipes lying on his land, and thus knew of the construction of the work, and made no protest, and that in the town of Pocahontas, while the work was going on in the country, he talked with the superintendent, asking him when the work would be completed so as to be used in the
town, and expressed interest in its completion. and said he had suffered loss as
a property owner in the town from fire, and that the waterworks would be a
great benefit to the town. Whilst I do not think that, even if this is true, it

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2010

77

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 112, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 4
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 112

In holding that St. Clair's silence did not provide a basis for estoppel,
the court said:
The doctrine "that one who stands by and sees another laying
out money on property to which he has claim, and does not give
notice of it, cannot afterwards, in equity and good conscience,
set up such claim, does not apply to an act of encroachment on
lands the title to which is equally well known or equally open to
the notice of both parties. 326
Later in the opinion, the court explains:
The idea that one man can get title to another man's land, or
title to an easement upon it, by improvement upon it, or making
a road upon it, or a sewer, because he is silent, just as if he had
given a grant, is absurd. No estoppel to work that grave result
can exist except in the clearest case. The statute of frauds says
it takes a deed to do this, but here it is sought to pass an ease-

would devest St. Clair of his land, it is a very important element, for the company to sustain its position of estoppel against St. Clair, that he should have
known before the pipe line was laid that it was to be laid through his land, for
then it might be said that he allowed the company to expend money without
obligation. "A representation. admission, or act after the party's position has
been changed will not avail as grounds for estoppel, because it cannot have
been acted on." 4 Am. & Eng. Dec. in Eq. 286, editing McCall v. Powell, 64
Ala. 254, and many other cases. But he says he did not know that the line
passed through his land until after it had been laid. It is not proven that he did
know until later. The witness who says he passed by where the ditch was, and
the pipes were being unloaded, leaves us to think that St. Clair was engrossed
with business thought and did not observe. He says he paid no attention to the
ditch, but passed on to Pocahontas. He says the line passed through a rocky,
wooded corner of St. Clair's land. St. Clair lived 10 miles away from the line.
St. Clair says the only work he ever saw in cutting the ditch was at a different
point on the line. St. Clair seems to be fair; certainly not partial to Browning
in his evidence
rather otherwise.
There is no evidence at all that the company constructing the water line was in
the least influenced by his remarks or silence, because it did not then have the
faintest idea that any of the right of way passed through his land. How can the
company say it was misled by what he said, or did not say, when no one
thought of the line running on land of St. Clair? To make it an estoppel, the
company must be able to say that it was led thereby to make outlay of money.
(citation omitted).
Id. at 267-68.
326
Id. at 268.
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ment in fee not even by word of mouth, but by mere silence. 27If
this proposition prevails, what tenure lies a man of his lands?
The court noted the relevance that St. Clair was not aware the water line
was being laid across his land as follows:
Another vital requisite of estoppel is that the person to be bound
by it must know that his own right in the matter is being prejudiced by the act of another. Since fraud is the gist of estoppel,
unless the person is fully acquainted with the true state of affairs and with his rights in the matter, he will not be estopped;
and therefore one who makes statements or does acts in bona
fide ignorance of the facts and his rights will not be estopped,
unless his ignorance was the result of gross negligence. 4 Am.
& Eng. Dec. in Eq. 269; Bigelow, Estop. 519; Bower v.
McCormick, 23 Grat. 321. St. Clair did not know that the pipe
line would
be on his land, or that it was, until after it had been
3 28
laid.
The court's assessment of the plaintiffs argument is summed up by the
following statement:
The truth is, St. Clair neither did nor said anything to mislead or
that did mislead, but he was simply silent when he did not even
know his rights were being invaded. Of course, this excludes
all elements of estoppels. The company simply made a mistake
in using St. Clair's land, and now wish to make their own mistake St. Clair's mistake, and charge it to the burden of the land
of his alienee. It practically says or shows nothing but that it
believed that its title was good. Therein, it shut its eyes to
deeds, line fence, and open means of knowledge.329
Judge Haymond, who authored the majority opinion in Town of Paden
City v. Felton,330 also wrote the majority opinions in two other important easement decisions - Cottrell v. Nurnberger33' and Stuart v. Lake Washington
Realty Corp. 332 Collectively, these three opinions are helpful in understanding
many aspects of easement law in West Virginia. Cottrell involves the develop327

Id.

328

Id. at 268-69.
PocahontasLight & Water, 44 S.E. at 269.
66 S.E.2d 289 (W. Va. 1951).

329
330

331
332

47 S.E.2d 454 (W. Va. 1948).
92 S.E.2d 891 (W. Va. 1956).
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ment by Nurnberger of 6.2 acres of land on the Coal River in Kanawha County.
The subdivision was planned and laid out "to provide suitable building lots for
'
substantial summer homes."333
Part of the oral representations made to purchasers of lots were that "Lot No. 45, was reserved solely and exclusively for playground, recreational and other community purposes for the use and benefit of
the purchasers, and that he would constitute a well and a well house on that lot
for their common use and benefit. 334 The plaintiffs sued when they learned the
lot was to be sold to individuals who planned to construct a hotel on it. In Cottrell, the rights the plaintiffs sought to assert included easements (the right to go
onto lot 45), to enforce the oral restrictions as to how lot 45 would be used, and
the affirmative duty to construct a well on lot 45. The case was before the court
on certified questions,33 5 with only two of the four questions being discussed by
the court: (1) whether the statute of frauds applied to the oral promises, and (2)
whether the defendants were estopped.336
As part of its discussion in Cottrell, the court distinguished an easement
from a license;337 decided that the rights the plaintiffs sought to enforce were
easements, not licenses;338 and held that the Statute of Frauds was applicable to
the parol promises made by the defendants.33 9
333

Cottrell.47 S.E.2d at 455.

334

Id. at 455.

335

Id. at 456. ("The questions certified to this Court are: (1) May an easement in land be

created by parol; (2) may a license to use land by the licensee be revoked at will by the licensor;

(3) are the defendants estopped to assert the defense of the Statute of Frauds; and (4) do the plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law?").
336
See id. at 461.
337
Id. at 456 ("An easement creates an interest in land; a license does not, but is a mere permission or personal and revocable privilege which does not give the licensee any estate in land.")
338

It is obvious that the right claimed and sought to be enforced by the plaintiffs,
if it in fact exists, is created by and arises from an easement and not by virtue

of a license, and as the decisive questions in this case involve the method of
creating a valid easement and the availability to the defendants of the defense
of the Statute of Frauds in connection with a verbal agreement or arrange-

ment, it is unnecessary to discuss or answer the second and fourth questions
presented by the certificate.

Id.
339

From these authorities, and many others that could be cited, it is clear that the

restriction which the plaintiffs seek to impose upon the lot owned by the defendant Nurnberger. if valid and effective, is an easement; that it is within the
provisions of Section 3, Article 1. Chapter 36. Code. 1931, which require a
contract for the sale of land, or a note or memorandum of such contract, to be
in writing and signed by the party to be charged, or his agent, and of Section
1, Article 1. Chapter 36, Code. 1931, which declare that no estate of inherit-

ance or freehold, or for a term of more than five years, in lands, shall be
created or conveyed except by deed or will; and that such easement can not be

created or acquired merely by parol.
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As to whether the plaintiffs were estopped, the court said:
To determine whether the defendants are estopped to set up the
Statute of Frauds as a defense to a contract which is within the
statute it is important to consider the material difference between a representation and a promise. The one relates to some
past or existing fact; the other deals with a declaration in the nature of an agreement by which one person obligates himself to
do or to refrain from doing some act. "Strictly speaking a
promise is not a representation." Cunyus v. Guenther, 96 Ala.
564, 11 So. 649, quoted in Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd Ed.,
1443. In the law of contracts a representation is "a statement
express or implied made by one of two contracting parties to the
other, before or at the time of making the contract, in regard to
some past or existing fact, circumstance, or state of facts pertinent to the contract, which is influential in bringing about the
agreement." Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd Ed., 1534. A promise is "a declaration, verbal or written, made by one person to
another for a good or valuable consideration, in the nature of a
convenant by which the promisor binds himself to do or forbear
some act, and gives to the promisee a legal right to demand and
enforce a fulfillment." Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd Ed., 1433.
340

Applying these definitions, the court concluded that Nurnberger's statements
were promises and not representations.3 4'
Cottrell v. Nurberger, 47 S.E.2d 454, 458. (W. Va. 1948).
340
Id.at 461. See also Bennett v. Charles Corp., 226 S.E.2d 559. 564 (W. Va. 1976).
341

Tested by the foregoing definitions or standards, the statements laid to the defendant Nurnberger constitutes a promise instead of a representation. The
statement that Lot No. 45 was reserved has to do with an existing fact or situation, but that statement. without more. is meaningless. The reservation, in existence at the time, is of no purpose or effect unless it is to be continued. The
statement of the purpose for which it was reserved, which is essential to impart any meaning to the complete statements, has to do with the use to which
the lot will be devoted and involves acts to be done or not to be done in the future. In substance the statements amount to a promise that Lot No. 45, which
was reserved for playground, recreational and other community purposes for
the use and the benefit of the purchasers. will be used in the future for those
purposes. and that the defendant Nurnberger will construct a well and a well
house on the lot for their common use and benefit. The statements, as a
whole, are of the type which, though sometimes characterized as representations. were regarded merely as oral promises within the Statute of Frauds, and
therefore ineffective to create a valid easement or restriction.
Cottrell,47 S.E.2d at 461.
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The court concluded its discussions of estoppels stating:
Treating the statements of the defendant Nurnberger as an oral
promise instead of a representation, its nonperformance or its
violation does not amount to fraud or create an equitable estoppel, or estoppel in pais, which removes the promise from the
operation of the Statute of Frauds. With respect to restrictions
which constitute an easement, estoppel does not apply when the
restrictions involve a promise for the future rather than a representation of a past or existing fact. 1 Minor on Real Property,
Second Edition, Section 105. The mere failure or refusal of the
vendor in an oral agreement, which is within the Statute of
Frauds and for that reason unenforceable, to recognize it as
binding or to comply with it does not in itself amount to fraud
or inequitable conduct upon which to base estoppel, when, as
here, it does not appear that
he intended to violate the oral
3 42
agreement when it was made.
Eight years after the court's decision in Cottrell,the doctrine of estoppel
3 43
was again considered by the court in Stuart v. Lake Washington Realty Corp.
The case involved the flooding of the plaintiff's property caused, or at least contributed to, by a dam across Hurricane Creek in Putnam County.
In 1937, C.W. Stuart (the plaintiff married C.W. Stuart in 1944) organized Stuart Lake, Inc. to develop land on both sides of Hurricane Creek. The
development plan involved a dam across Hurricane Creek to create a lake of
about 60 acres to be surrounded by about 700 lots. Stuart Lake, Inc. acquired
title to 450 acres for the purpose of this subdivision which acreage included the
tract of 2.9 acres involved in the instant litigation which was not included as a
part of the subdivision. Plans were developed and approved to build a concrete
dam sixteen feet in height. However, approval to erect "flashboards" on top of
the concrete dam to increase the dam's height of twenty feet was withheld until
a road across a tributary to Hurricane Creek was raised above what would be the
level of the water impounded by a dam twenty feet in height. Construction of
the dam to a height of sixteen feet was completed in 1938, and lots were offered
for sale to the public with the understanding the lake level would be raised upon
the completion of the dam to the twenty feet height. 344 In 1938, the 2.9 acre
parcel was conveyed by Stuart Lake, Inc. to Doctor Henderson who was "familiar with the plan for its development, and knew, as did Stuart, that the completion of the dam to the proposed height of twenty feet would cause water from
the lake permanently to encroach and remain upon a portion of the tract of land
342

Id.

343

92 S.E.2d 891 (W. Va. 1956).

344

Id. at 895 96.
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of 2.9 acres. 3 45 "The deed made by Stuart Lakes, Inc., to Henderson, however,
contained no express reservation of any right or easement in the grantor to place
or impound water upon the land conveyed and when the deed was made no
overflow of water from the lake had occurred upon the tract of 2.9 acres
', 346 and the
purpose.
that
for
land
the
of
part
any
used
previously
not
had
grantor
Due to financial difficulties, sometime prior to 1943, Stuart Lake, Inc.
lost title to the subdivision property and Stuart lost control and management of
the project. In 1943, Lake Washington Realty Corporation became the owner of
the subdivision, and, in 1945, it resumed the work of developing the project.
The Lake Washington Realty Corporation asked Stuart to assist in the further
development of the project with both the engineering and sale of lots. In March
of 1946, Stuart's wife, purchased the 2.9 acre parcel with her own funds and in
August of 1946, they moved onto the property.347
The court noted that:
At the time the plaintiff purchased the property she was familiar
with the proposed development of the subdivision including the
elevation of the dam to the height of twenty feet and knew that
when the dam was completed to that elevation it would cause
the water from the lake to inundate her land.
Stuart continued in the employment of the defendant until the
summer of 1946 and while so employed he assisted in locating
a line of stakes to show the level of the lake when the dam was
completed to the elevation of twenty feet as originally planned
by Stuart Lakes, Inc., and as the agent of the company he negotiated and concluded the sale of twenty nine lots which were
sold to various purchasers ...

upon the representation that the

level of the lake would be raised to twenty feet by the completion of the dam to that height. The plaintiff assisted her husband in making these sales to the extent of showing lots to some
of the purchasers during his absence and in assisting them to
meet with him, but she did not at any time act as agent for the
defendant or negotiate or conclude for it the sale of any lot in
the subdivision.348
Between 1946 and June 1949 when the law suit was filed, with the
knowledge of the plaintiff and her husband and without protest, the defendant

345
346

347
348

Id. at 896.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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sold 258 lots upon the representation that the level of the lake when the dam3 49
was
completed would be raised to and maintained at an elevation of twenty feet.
On June 8, 1947, after the iron pipes were attached to the dam
but before the flashboards were installed, a flood occurred in
Hurricane Creek after a heavy rain and the land of the plaintiff
was temporarily inundated to a point within approximately six
inches below the front porch of the dwelling; and between that
date and September 22, 1950, similar floods occurred periodically which temporarily inundated the property of the plaintiff.
During each of these floods the overflow of water from the lake
interrupted the ordinary and usual access to the property of the
plaintiff from the former location of United States Route 60 in
front of the dwelling and caused damage to the
surface of the
35
tract of 2.9 acres of land owned by the plaintiff.
By February 8, 1948, the flashboards on the dam were installed and the
height of the dam and the elevation of the lake was raised to the originally
planned elevation of twenty feet. As a result, a portion of plaintiffs 2.9 acres
"
was permanently inundated with water from the lake.35
'
After the flood of June 8, 1947, the plaintiff, by letter sent by
registered mail dated June 24, 1947, notified the defendant that
its construction of the dam to the height of twenty feet would
impound water on her property. By this letter she also notified
the defendant to desist from any construction of the dam that
would impound water on her property or that would subject it to
overflow and warned the defendant that it had no right or permission to accomplish those
results or to subject her property
352
"to wash or other damage."
After the flashboards were installed on February 8, 1948, "by letter
dated March 25, 1949, also sent by registered mail the plaintiff notified the defendant," 'to abate impounding of water' on her property caused by the height
of the dam and warned the defendant that its failure to do so would render it
necessary for her to take proper action to protect her property against the overflow of water from the lake.353

349

Stuart v. Lake Washington Realty Corp., 92 S.E.2d 891, 897 (W. Va. 1956).

350

Id.

351

Id.

352

Id.

353

Id.at 897 98.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol112/iss3/4

84

Fisher: A Survey of the Law of Easements in West Virginia
2010]

A SURVEY OF THE LAW OF EASEMENTS IN WEST VIRGINIA

721

The court recognized the consequence of reducing the lakes level stating:
It is not disputed that if the present elevation of the dam is lowered as much as 1.9 feet the lots which front on the lake will
be rendered practically inaccessible from the lake, the value of
all the lots in the subdivision will be greatly and permanently
depreciated and impaired, and the defendants and the owners of
the lots who, without objection by the plaintiff to the added
height of the dam, purchased them upon the representation by
the agents of the defendant that the level of the lake would be
raised and maintained at an elevation of twenty
feet at the dam
35 4
will suffer heavy financial loss and injury.
Among the defenses asserted by the defendant was (1) an implied easement to flood the land (2) that the plaintiff is barred by laches (3) and the plaintiff was estopped.
As he had done five years earlier in Town of Paden City v. Felton355 in
discussing easements by prescription, Judge Haymond, in Stuart, summarized
the relevant prior case law in West Virginia and discussed secondary authorities
in deciding the case. As to the argument that there was an implied easement,
Judge Haymond, writing for the majority, said:
As no servitude or burden to impound water permanently upon
the land of the plaintiff or any part of it existed when the land
was conveyed by Stuart Lakes, Inc., by the deed to Doctor Henderson in 1938, an easement of that character for the benefit of
the land retained by the grantor in the land now owned by the
plaintiff was not created by an implied reservation in that deed
and no such easement exists in favor of the defendants as its
successors in title to the subdivision.356
As to the assertion the plaintiff was barred by laches, the majority said:
The contention of the defendants that the right of the plaintiff to
injunctive relief which she seeks in this suit is barred by laches
is devoid of merit. The general rule in equity is that mere lapse
of time, unaccompanied by circumstances which create a pre-

354

Id. at 898.

355

66 S.E.2d 289 (W. Va. 1951).
Stuart v. Lake Washington Realty Corp., 92 S.E.2d 891, 900-01 (W. Va. 1956).

356

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2010

85

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 112, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 4
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 112

sumption that the right has been abandoned does not constitute
laches.35 7
As to whether laches applied to the facts before it, the majority said:
The permanent encroachment of the water from the lake upon
the land of the plaintiff did not occur until the completion of the
dam to a height of twenty feet on February 8, 1948. Before the
dam was so completed, on June 24, 1947, shortly after the first
flood, the plaintiff notified the defendant not to construct it to
the height and warned the defendant that if it did so water
would be impounded upon her land and that the defendant had
no right or permission to subject her property "to wash or other
damage." Subsequently on March 25, 1949, the plaintiff notified the defendant "to abate impounding of water" on her property caused by the height of the dam and warned the defendant
that its failure to do so would render it necessary for her to take
proper action to protect
her property against the overflow of wa3 58
ter from the lake.
Since the suit was filed in June 1949 approximately three months after
the March 25, 1949, letter, the court concluded:
In the foregoing circumstances neither of the defendants was
prejudiced or adversely affected by any delay of the plaintiff in
instituting this suit after the completion of the dam, and the
equitable doctrine
of laches does not apply to or bar her right to
359
injunctive relief.
As to the claim the plaintiff was estopped, the majority noted the evidence established: that the plaintiff knew of the plans to raise the elevation of
the dam to twenty feet, that she assisted her husband in the sale of lots as agent
of the defendant, and that she remained silent and did not protest until June 24,
1947. However,
the court also noted she did not act as agent of the defendant in
3 60
the sale of lots.
As to the elements of estoppel the court said:
The general rule governing the doctrine of equitable estoppel is
that in order to constitute equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais

358

Id. at 90 1.
Id. at 902.

359

Id.

360

Id. at 902 03.

357
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there must exist a false representation or a concealment of material facts; it must have been made with knowledge, actual or
constructive of the facts; the party to whom it was made must
have been without knowledge or the means of knowledge of the
real facts; it must have been made with the intention that it
should be acted on; and the party to whom it was made must
have relied on or acted on it to his prejudice. To raise equitable
estoppel there must be conduct, acts, language or silence
amounting to a representation or a concealment of material
facts. Mere silence will not raise an estoppel; to be effective it
must appear that the person to be estopped has full knowledge
of all facts and of his rights, and intended to mislead or at least
was willing that the other party might be misled by his attitude.36 '
In concluding that the plaintiff was not estopped, the majority said;
In the light of the established facts and circumstances disclosed
by the record relating to the knowledge and the conduct of both
the plaintiff and the defendant there can be no estoppel in favor

361

Id. at 904 (citations omitted). As part of the discussion of the law of estoppel, the court said:
In the leading case of Norfolk and Western Railway Company v. Perdue. 40
W.Va. 442, 21 S.E. 755, this Court has stated the essential elements of equitable estoppel or, as it is frequently called. estoppel in pais. in these words:
"First.There must be conduct, acts, language or silence amounting to a representation of a concealment of material facts. Second. These facts must be
known to the party estopped at the time of said conduct, or at least the circumstance must be such that knowledge of them is necessarily imputed to
him. Third. The truth concerning these facts must be unknown to the other
party claiming the benefit of the estoppel at the time when such conduct was
done, and at the time it was acted upon by him. Fourth. The conduct must be
done with the expectation that it will be acted upon by the other party, or under such circumstances that it is both natural and probable that it will be so
acted upon. There are several familiar species in which it is simply impossible to ascribe any intention or even expectation to the party estopped that his
conduct will be acted upon by the one who afterwards claims the benefit of
the estoppel. Fifth. The conduct must be relied upon by the other party, and,
thus relying. he must be led to act upon it. Sixth. He must in fact act upon it in
such a manner as to change his position for the worse. In other words, he
must so act that he would suffer a loss if he were compelled to surrender or forego or alter what he has done by reason of the first party being permitted to
repudiate his conduct, and to assert rights inconsistent with it.

Id. at 903.
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of the defendants and against the plaintiff of her
right to the re36 2
lief for which she prays in the bill of complaint.
Over three decades after the court's decision in the Stuart case, the court
was presented a set of facts to which estoppel did apply. In Shrewsbury v.
Humphrey,3 63 the Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed a circuit court's decision
holding that the respective plaintiffs had established a prescriptive easement and
an easement by equitable estoppel over the same roadway across property
owned by Davis. Factually, the case has its origin when Shrewsbury purchased
81 acres of land in Mercer County in 1976. In 1978, Shrewsbury conveyed 5.05
acres of the 81 acres to plaintiff Roger Sexton, Mrs. Shrewsbury's son by a previous marriage.364
In 1987, Shrewsbury sold about 12 acres to the plaintiff, Bowlings, and
sometime thereafter, Davis constructed a barrier across the roadway the plaintiffs used to access their respective properties. In the litigation which ensued,
the circuit court held the Shrewsburys were entitled to a prescriptive easement,
that Roger Sexton was entitled to an easement by equitable estoppel, and that
the Bowlings acquired the right of usage to the roadway through their predecessor in title, the Shrewsburys.365 On appeal, the court affirmed the circuit court's
holding that the Shrewsburys were entitled to a prescriptive easement.366 As to
Mr. Sexton's easement gained by equitable estoppel, the court summarized prior
West Virginia cases by saying: "Thus, there must be a showing that a representation was made and that the party relied upon that representation before an
easement by estoppel can be established. 3 67 As to the facts in the instant case,
the court said:
There was evidence before the circuit court that Mr. Sexton had
agreed to purchase a tract of land located a greater distance
from Wright Mountain Road so that the Wright Mountain
362

Stuart v. Lake Washington Realty Corp., 92 S.E.2d 891. 904 (W. Va. 1956). The court also

rejected the defendant's argument that the equitable doctrine of the balance of conveniences
should prevent the plaintiff from obtaining injunctive relief. The court, quoting County Court of
HarrisonCounty v. West Virginia Air Services, Inc., 132 W. Va. 1,54 S.E.2d 1, said:
So we are of opinion that the instant case, involving as it does. tortious. continuous acts on the part of the defendant to the irreparable damage of the plaintiff, and in contravention of plaintiff s clear legal right of control of the airport
as provide by statute, the doctrine of the balance of conveniences should not
be applied.
Id. at 905.
363
395 S.E.2d 535 (W. Va. 1990).
364

Id. at 536.

365

Id.at 536 37.
Id.at 537.
Id.at 538.

366
367
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Community Church could purchase a tract of land originally offered to Mr. Sexton. Two of the appellants, Mr. Davis and Mr.
Humphrey, were trustees of the church. Mr. Sexton testified
that he accepted the property on the representation of Mr. Davis
that he could use the roadway. Mr. Sexton further testified that
he believed he had a right to use the roadway and that the right
of way had served this property for several years. Finally, Mr.
Sexton testified that he maintained the roadway in the winter
and improved it with gravel. Mr. Sexton used the roadway
from 1979 until 1987.368
The testimony of Mr.3 69
Humphrey, also a trustee of the church, collaborated Mr. Sexton's testimony.
In affirming the circuit court's holding of an easement by equitable estoppel, the court said "we conclude that the37evidence does not preponderate
against the trial court's finding on this issue." 1
The question of an easement by equitable estoppel was again before the
371
court in the recent case of Folio v. City of Clarksburg.
The litigation in Folio
grows out of a sale of property by Grandeotto, Inc., a closely-held corporation
owned primarily by Mr. Folio and his children, to the City of Clarksburg. The
City indicated that it was interested in acquiring the property for the purpose of
building a parking garage. Before the property was sold to the City, Grandeotto
executed two agreements to create rights of way across the property for pedestrian and sewer access to other commercial properties that Grandeotto owned
nearby. These "right-of-way[s]
were expressly mentioned in the sales agree372
ment and the deed.,
After the conveyance of the parcel to the City, the validity of these
easements became the subject of litigation summarized by the court as follows:
The conveyance of the property was made subject to all exceptions, covenants, restrictions, and easements and the aforesaid
rights-of-way were expressly mentioned in the sales agreement
and the deed. After the conveyance was completed, the city of
Id.
Shrewsbury v. Humphrey, 395 S.E.2d 535, 538 n.4 (W. Va. 1990).
370 Id. at 539. As to the Bowlings' right of way, the court said: "Since Mr. and Mrs. Shrews368

369

bury established a prescriptive easement over the roadway, that prescriptive easement became
appurtenant to their land and thus may pass with the conveyance of that land." However, the
Bowlings, "had no right to remove Mr. Davis fence, which was maintained during the prescriptive
period to gain access to the roadway. The rights of Mr. & Mrs. Bowling are limited to the use of
the roadway for ingress or egress to their property by the same access used by their predecessor in
title." Id.
at 539-40.
371 655 S.E.2d 143 (W. Va. 2007).
372
Id.at 146.
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Clarksburg never demolished the commercial building on the
property. On December 7, 2004, Grandeotto filed suit against
the City of Clarksburg seeking specific performance and enforcement with respect to the rights-of-way. On March 1, 2006,
the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the City
of Clarksburg finding that Grandeotto had no valid rights-ofway in the property. The Court determined that the language in
the right-of-way agreements was ambiguous and the doctrine of
merger applied. Thereafter, Grandeotto filed a second suit
against the City of Clarksburg alleging fraudulent and/or negligent misrepresentation. The City filed a motion to dismiss
which was converted to a motion for summary judgment by the
circuit court and granted3 73in favor of the City on May 25, 2006.
These appeals followed.
The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court as to the inadequacy of the description3 74 and concluded "that the rights-of-way, even if
they were valid, were
automatically extinguished upon creation because of the
3 75
doctrine of merger. ,
373
374

Id.
The court stated:

The agreements did not establish a beginning point but, rather, indicated that
the rights-of-way would "be located in the discretion of said Grantee to Pike
Street over a reasonable route as necessary .... " Clearly, the language in the
agreements is insufficient to serve as a guide to identify the location of the
right-of-way. Accordingly, we do not believe that the circuit court erred by
finding the agreements were ambiguous and inadequate to convey the rightsof-way.
Id. at 148.
375
The court explained the merger as follows:
Likewise, we cannot say that the circuit court erred in concluding that the
rights-of-way, even if they were valid, were automatically extinguished upon
creation because of the doctrine of merger. It seems to be firmly established
that where the owner of land over which an easement is claimed as appurtenant to another tract of land becomes also the owner of such other tract, the
easement is merged in his superior estate. No one can use part of his own estate adversely to another part. and the proposition. therefore, must be true that
if the owner of one of the estates, whether the dominant or servient one, becomes the owner of the other, the servitude which one owes to the other is
merged in such ownership. and thereby extinguished.
Pingley v. Pinley, 82 W.Va. 228, 229, 95 S.E.860, 861 (1918): See also 25
Am.Jur.2d Easements and Licenses in Real Property § 1 (2004) ("A person
may not have an easement in his or her own land because an easement merges
with the title, and while both are under the same ownership the easement does
not constitute a separate estate."). Here, Grandeotto clearly owned both the
dominant estate and the servient estate at the time the right-of-way agreements
were executed. Both agreements were signed by Mr. Folio as Chairman of the
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However, as to the possibility of an easement by equitable estoppel, the
court stated:
While we find no error with the circuit court's conclusions, we,
nonetheless, believe that the circuit court prematurely granted
summary judgment in favor of the City. In that regard, we believe that genuine issues of material fact exist concerning
whether an easement was created by equitable estoppel as a result of representations made by the City at the time of the conveyance.376
VII. EASEMENTS IMPLIED FROM QUASI-EASEMENTS

"Easements implied from quasi-easements are often simply called implied easements or easements by implication. However, these labels can create
confusion, because easements are implied in several circumstances not involving prior use. ,377 Therefore, to avoid confusion a definition of the term as used
herein will be helpful.
Easements implied from quasi-easements are based on the inferred intention of the parties involved in the transfer of the quasi-servient tenement or the quasi-dominant tenement. The
grantor and the grantee are presumed to have intended to include in the transaction any easement necessary for the beneficial enjoyment of either the parcel transferred or the parcel retained. Courts focus on the nature of the grantor's prior use and
the reasonable expectations of the claimant.3 8
Professors Bruce & Ely note the elements of easement implied from quasi-easements as follows:
Courts recognize the grant or reservation of an easement implied from a quasi-easement when the claimant establishes the
following elements:
1. Prior common ownership of the dominant and the servient estates.

Board of Grandeotto, as grantor and grantee, and were executed and recorded
prior to the sale and conveyance of the property to the City.
Id.
376

Id.

377

BRUCE& ELY, supra note 1, at § 4.15, at 4-57.
Id.at § 4.15, at 4-58 (citations omitted).

378
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2. The common owner's apparent and continuous use of
part of the land to benefit another part (quasi-easement)
3. Transfer of one of the parcels (severance)
4. Necessity at severance for the preexisting use to continue.
In some jurisdictions, the claimant must prove these elements by clear and convincing evidence rather than by the
usual preponderance of the evidence.379
An early case in which the court applied the principle of quasi easement
was Johnson v. Gould38 ° in which the litigation arose out of a partition of real
estate between heirs. In Johnson, the court held there was a "quasi easement" of
water from a spring on a parcel assigned to one heir for the benefit of a parcel
assigned to another heir. The court's Syllabus explains the relevant law as follows:
Upon partition of real estate descended, between heirs, each
heir takes his share of land subject to any apparent, permanent,
continuous, and reasonably necessary quasi easement which existed thereon, for the benefit of another part of such real estate,
at the death of the ancestor, unless the existence of such quasi
easement has been discontinued by the heirs before partition, or
" '
provision is made by the partition for its discontinuance.38
Five years later, it what is the first substantive discussion of its elements, the court again recognized a "quasi easement" as defined above, in
Hoffman v. Shoemaker.382 The somewhat involved set of facts is simplified as
follows. Hoffman sought to enjoin Shoemaker from using a right of way across
his land. The right of way in question had been used for access to the Shoemaker land for 40 to 50 years. The lands involved, i.e., the dominant and servient
estate, were at one time owned by the same person, James B. Rees. The predecessor in title to the Shoemaker tract was Leatherman. Leatherman acquired
title to eighteen acres over which the right of way passed from Rees in 1889, but
was unable to pay for the eighteen acres, and therefore sold the eighteen acres
back to Rees in 1895 without reserving a right of way across it. Rees sold the
eighteen acres to Hoffman in 1900. After Rees reacquired the eighteen acres,
379
380
381
382

Id. at § 4.16, at 4-60 to -61 (citations omitted).
53 S.E. 798 (W. Va. 1906).
Id. at 798.
71 S.E. 198 (W. Va. 1911).
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Leatherman and then Shoemaker continued to use the road until Hoffman built a
fence across it in 1903. Apparently from 1903 until 1908 when the litigation
was commenced, Shoemaker used the road with Hoffman's permission."'
While the case is not an easy read, it provides insight into the development of
the elements of easements implied from quasi-easements as adopted in West
Virginia. The court noted: "The all-important question remaining to be considered is the effect of the deed made by Williams S. Leatherman to S. S. Rees,
384
conveying land on which a part of the road is without a reservation thereof.
The court explained the law as follows:
Ordinarily a grantor is not permitted to set up by parol any reservation against his deed purporting on its face to grant all of
his right, title, and interest in a tract or parcel of land. Of
course, he cannot claim any of the land against his deed. Such a
construction of a deed would render it nugatory and defeat its
purpose in whole or in part. Under a well-settled rule, it must
be so constructed as to give it effect to the extent of its entire
subject-matter. It is nevertheless possible for a grantor to claim,
under exceptional and peculiar circumstances, an easement over
the land granted as appurtenant to other lands retained by him.
This easement is not the land itself, and the retention thereof
does not wholly defeat the deed as to any part of it. It is a mere
right of use, not title. In such cases the question is one of intention, but the circumstances must be such as to disclose the existence of that intent beyond any reasonable doubt and such intent
must arise from room necessity, else the doubt is not excluded
and the reservation cannot be maintained.385
As to the elements of quasi-easements, the court explained:
In the text-books and decided cases we are told that the easement to pass to the grantee, or be retained by the grantor by implication only, must be apparent, continuous, and necessary.
Naturally the use of these terms is sometimes confusing, for the
reason that they are employed in the long course of discussion,
and not always defined. Each has its own definition with which
the reader is supposed to be familiar. An apparent easement
need not be actually visible. It is enough that the facts and circumstances fairly construed will disclose it, as in the case of a
drainpipe under the surface into which the water is conducted
383

See id. at 198 99.

384

Id.at 199.
Id.

385
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from a roof. There are different kinds of necessity. A thing
may be necessary in the physical sense or in a practical or legal
sense. So the word "continuous" has its different meanings. In
a practical sense a road is continuous as long as it is maintained
and used, although the use is unautomatic, and from necessity
intermittent. But it is not continuous within the meaning of the
technical law of easements.38 6
After discussing the use of "apparent" and continuous" in cases involv38 7
ing "drainage," the court noted that as to rights of way it added "necessary,,
concluding its discussion by noting:
".. . I take it that the rule of implication is founded upon the
mere necessity of the case, and the impossibility of admitting
that the contract and the intention of the parties to it would be
complete without the implication. The subject of the implication is held to have been involved in the terms of the contract,
and the justice and honesty of the transaction require that the
law should supply that, the expression of which by the inadvertence of the parties has not been expressed in words. Upon this
principle every one of the cases referred to is founded, and all
are reconcilable; and no case has been cited, nor, as I believe,
can any be found, in which an implication has been made not
based upon necessity and the justice which that necessity imperatively calls into active operation." This is a broad and liberal
view, stripped of all fanciful, narrow, and technical considerations, not applicable to any particular kind of easements, but universally reducing the whole question
to one of intent, deter38
minable by the rule of necessity.
As to the facts before it, the court stated:
These authorities amply justify the view that Leatherman impliedly reserved the right of way over the land he granted by his
deed of December 11, 1895, if such right of way was strictly
necessary to the enjoyment of his property. He clearly has a
right of way by prescription over the Parish and Burkhiser lands
down to the public road. He had formerly enjoyed the use of a
road over the Rees-Leatherman 18 acres, down to the terminus
of the old road at the northern Parish line. The reservation of
386

Id. at 200.

387

See id. at 200 01.
Hoffman v. Shoemaker, 71 S.E. 198, 201 (W. Va. 1911).

388
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this, if sustainable, completed his outlet to the public road. Was
such reservation necessary to the enjoyment of his land in the
strict and extreme sense of the term? On this question the evidence is not as complete as it might have been made.38 9
After discussing the testimony of various witnesses, including that of
Hoffman, the court said, "On the whole, we think it sufficiently appears that
neither the defendant nor his predecessor could get out over his own land to any
public road or had any right of way over any lands, other than those in question
here."3 90

A year after the court's decision in Hoffman v. Shoemaker, the court decided Bennett v. Booth 391 involving the flooding of the plaintiffs property by a
milldam on the defendant's property. The facts reveal that both the plaintiffs
and defendant's properties were previously owned by a common grantor, that
the common grantor sold 102 acres to his son in 1887, and that this land was
sold by judicial sale to the plaintiff in 1906. In about 1901, a part of the dam
was washed away and not repaired for six or seven years. When it was repaired,
some of the plaintiff's land was flooded and the instant litigation ensued.
Without citing Hoffman v. Shoemaker, the court held:
When a landowner has created a servitude upon one portion of
his land for the benefit of another portion, and conveys the servient part, there is an implied reservation of the easement, if it is
essential to the use and enjoyment of the land reserved, and
such right passes with the dominant estate, as appurtenant thereto. Nor does the existence of such an easement constitute a
breach of the covenant of general warranty, if the easement is so
open and apparent that the contracting parties must have known
of it. In such case the parties are presumed to have contracted
with reference to the condition in which the land then was, and
it is not to be supposed that the purchaser agreed to pay any
more for the land than he thought it was worth with the burden
on it. Such a burden has been held not to constitute a breach of
covenant against incumbrances.392
As to the facts before it, the court held:
A milldam is essential to a water power gristmill. Without it
the mill, which is a part of the realty on which it stands, would
389
390

391
392

Id. at 202.
Id.
73 S.E. 909 (W. Va. 1912).
Id.at 909 (citation omitted).
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be useless. Plaintiffs' predecessor in title knew that it backed
the water upon his land. It had done so for many years before
he bought it, and he is presumed to have taken the land subject
to a continuation of that condition. Plaintiffs, his privies in estate, took the land subject to the burden upon it as appurtenant
to the other tract of land with the mill on it, and the mill, together with the appurtenant easement, passed to defendant.
The fact that the mill and dam were in a dilapidated condition at
the time plaintiffs purchased does not affect the case. Defendant's right was appurtenant to the dominant land and passed
with it. It was such a right as could be lost only by adverse possession by the owner of the servient land, for such length of
time as would bar an action of ejectment.3 93
The issue of an implied easement was again before the court in Miller v.
Skaggs. 394 In contrast with the Bennett v. Booth case, which did not cite the
Hoffman v. Shoemaker case or apply the elements as discussed therein, the court
in Miller did cite and apply Hoffman. In Miller v. Skaggs, the issue involved a

sanitary and storm sewer which crossed the defendant's lot in a natural drainage
channel for surface water. The defendant had blocked the private sewer line
causing the water and sewage to back up into the plaintiffs house. The facts
established the common ownership of both plaintiffs and defendant's properties, and that there were no express grants or reservation of any easements over
the defendant's lot in the chain of title. After citing Hoffman v. Shoemaker for
the elements of an "implied easement," the court added:
And there seems to be no material distinction in the application
of this principle between an implied reservation and implied
grant of such an easement, except that in a grant the terms of the
grant according to the general rule is to be construed most
strongly against the grantor in favor of the grantee.3 95
The Miller v. Skaggs court also observed:

That an underground pipe or conduit, such as a sewer, constitutes a servitude within the meaning of the authorities needs no
further elaboration. The distinction between a way or road and
an easement for a pipe line or sewer is noted in Hoffman v.
Shoemaker, supra. Its continuous character is determined by
393

Id. at 910 (citation omitted).

394

91 S.E. 536 (W. Va. 1917).
Id. at 537 (citation omitted).

395
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the fact that it needs no intervention of other 3agency
to keep it
96
alive, and because in its nature it is continuous.
In response to the defendant's assertion that the alleged easement was
neither apparent nor strictly necessary, the court responded:
We said in Hoffman v. Shoemaker, supra, 69 W. Va. page 238,
71 S. E. 200, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 632, in accordance with the
great weight of authority, that "an apparent easement need not
be actually visible. It is enough that the facts and circumstances, fairly construed, will disclose it, as in the case of a drain
pipe under the surface into which the water is conducted form a
roof." In 10 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, 405, apparent easements
are defined as "Those the existence of which appears from the
construction or condition of one of the tenements, so as to be
capable of being seen or known on inspection." And in Larsen
v. Peterson, 53 N. J. Eq. 88, 30 Atl. 1094, it was said that the
mere fact that a drain or aqueduct may be concealed form casual vision will not prevent it from being apparent in the sense
in which that word is used.
In the case in hand the general lay of the land, the natural drainage, all tending from both sides of the sewer to that point; the
knowledge which defendant must have had from the connections therewith form plaintiffs property, and from his own and
other properties; the absolute necessity for some drainage and
sewerage for the reasonable use of these properties, we think
were sufficient, and must have rendered the existence of the
sewer through his property reasonably apparent, and so as to
charge him with notice thereof. The authorities cited and many
that might be cited support this conclusion.
But was easement claimed one of strict necessity within the
meaning of the authorities referred to? The rule of strict necessity has not been uniformly defined by the courts. But the
greater number in weight and reason hold this rule not to be limited to one of absolute necessity, but to reasonable necessity,
as distinguished from mere convenience. 3
In Sharp v. Kline,398 the court was presented with "facts [that] are
somewhat unusual."3 99 In summary, James Gibson, Jr. was the owner of ap396

Id.

397 Id. at 537-38 (citations omitted).
398

95 S.E. 441 (W. Va. 1918).
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proximately 154 acres, which he divided into five tracts (51 acres, 33 acres, 27
acres, 29 acres, and 9 2 acres), and sold the five tracts to four different individuals by deeds all dated April 6, 1898. (The 51 acres and the 33-acre parcels
were conveyed to the same person). 400 The question the court posed was could
it imply an easement by quasi easement where the grantor had not retained any
of the land? The court answered in the affirmative stating:
If Gibson had retained the 33-acre tract, the facts and circumstances would have sustained a claim of right of ingress and
egress over the other tracts, under principles declared in Hoffman v. Shoemaker, 69 W. Va. 233, 71 S.E. 198, 34 L.R.A. (N.
S.) 632. The existence of the old road might not of itself suffice
to give such way by implied reservation, but that, together with
the lack of any other outlet, would make the unexpressed intention clear. Though he did not retain it, the same facts and circumstances were known to all of the grantees. They saw the
old road and the situation of the 33-acre tract, and took their
conveyances with full knowledge of facts raising a presumption
of intent so strong that the contrary thereof cannot be supposed.
In claiming against them, Mrs. Sharp does not claim against the
words of her own deed, as Gibson would have been compelled
to do, if he had retained this tract, wherefore it is easier to justify her claim than it would have been to justify his, in the case
supposed. Her situation is similar to that of a grantee taking
land with an apparent easement over the remaining lands of the
grantor. If the fiction of priority of the grants of the other tracts
could be indulged, her right would be that of a grantor holding
an impliedly reserved way over them, for Gibson had it and she
took such right as he had. If it could be said she took her conveyance first, she had the way by implied grant. The case
seems, however, to fall more clearly within the principles announced in Johnson v. Gould, 60 W. Va. 84, 53 S.E. 798.
Though the grantees were not all cotenants, they all took conveyances by which an entire tract of land was divided among
them, and the old road was an apparent easement necessary to
complete enjoyment of all the parts into which the tract was divided, particularly the 9 1/2, 29, 27, and 33 acre tracts, none of
which had any outlet otherwise than by this road. The two circumstances, an apparent easement and lack of outlet by any
other way, sustain Mrs. Sharp's claim under any of these theories. Even if the latter element did not exist, principles an399

Id. at 441.

400

Id.
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nounced in Scott v. Moore, 98 Va. 668,
37 S.E. 342, 81
40 1
Am.St.Rep. 749, would justify her claim.
In Stuart v. Lake Washington Realty Corp.,40 2 one of the defenses raised
by the defendant was an "implied easement." The majority, after discussing
secondary authorities and Miller v. Skaggs, Bennett v. Booth, and Hoffman v.
Shoemaker, concluded:
As no servitude or burden to impound water permanently upon
the land of the plaintiff or any part of it existed when the land
was conveyed by Stuart Lakes, Inc., by the deed to Doctor Henderson in 1938, an easement of that character for the benefit of
the land retained by the grantor in the land now owned by the
plaintiff was not created by an implied reservation in that deed
and no such easement exists in favor of the defendants as its
successors in title to the subdivision.
Because the facts in the cases of Miller v. Skaggs, 79 W.Va.
645, 91 S.E. 536, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 929; Bennett v. Booth, 70
W.Va. 264, 73 S.E. 909, 39 L.R.A., N.S, 618, and Hoffman v.
Shoemaker, 69 W.Va. 233, 71 S.E.198, 34 L.R.A.,N.S., 632, in
each of which this Court held that an easement by implied reservation existed, are entirely different from the facts in this suit
those cases are readily distinguishable from the case at bar. In
each of them an apparent, continuous and necessary servitude
existed upon the land conveyed by the grantor for the benefit of
other land retained by him when the deed was made for the land
conveyed to the grantee. 403
In Myers v. Stickley,40 4 a ten-acre tract was subdivided in seven lots. At
the time of the subdivision, the ten-acre tract had two "roads," an old logging
road and a dirt farm road. In order to achieve lots of more equal acreage, the
surveyor used the old logging road as the right of access for the lots. The owner
of the property sold the lots identifying their location in relation to the farm
road. Some of the purchasers built on these lots according to incorrect information provided to them at the time they purchased. The lawsuit was instituted to
reform the deed description by redrawing the plat based upon the farm road as
the access for the lots.
401

Id. at 442.

402

92 S.E.2d 891 (W. Va. 1956).
Id. at 900-01. The dissent believed that since Doctor Henderson was an active associate in

403

the affairs of Stuart Lake, Inc. and since he had full knowledge that at the 20 feet level the 2.9
acres would be partially flooded, that an implied flowage easement was created. See id. at 906 08.
404
375 S.E.2d 595 (W. Va. 1988).
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The trial court reformed the lots to conform to the dirt road being used
for access and the plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the trial
court's decision holding that the plaintiffs were bona fide purchasers and therefore their deed was not subject to reformation.40 5 In resolving the case, the court
also addressed the trial court's conclusion that the existing farm road was an
"easement by necessity., 40 6 After quoting Syllabus Point 1 of the Miller v.
Skaggs case, which set forth the elements necessary for an implied easement,
the court said:
In the present case, the evidence presented by the appellees is
not clear and convincing that at the time of the deed dated October 26, 1977, to the Days, the dirt farm road constituted an
apparent, continuous and necessary reservation. The record
does not show that the reservation was apparent because the
tract, according to the plat attached to each deed, had a right-ofway in the old logging road. The record does not show that the
reservation was strictly necessary, although there was testimony
that in 1985 the farm road was in better condition and more
convenient than the logging road right-of-way. In Syllabus
Point 4, Miller v. Skaggs, 79 W.Va. 645, 91 S.E. 536 (1917),
we stated:
The rule of strict necessity applicable to an implied reservation or grant of an easement is not limited to one of absolute
necessity, but to reasonable necessity, as distinguished from
mere convenience.
We believe that the appellees failed to establish that the existing
farm road constituted an apparent and necessary easement at the
time of the deed.40 7
In Robertson v. B.A. Mullican Lumber & Manufacturing Co., L.P., 408
the court upheld a lower court finding that an easement by implication had been
created and that its use for timbering purposes was supported by the evidence.
The court concluded its opinion with the following observation:
Finally, it is significant to note that the lower court ruled that
"the easement consists only of this roadway, which cannot be
expanded or widened." Moreover, the trial court opined that the
405

See id. at 596 98.

406

Id. at 598. Although the trial court used the term "easement by necessity," the Court of

Appeals resolved it on the bases of Miller v. Skaggs.
407

Id.

408

537 S.E.2d 317 (W. Va. 2000).
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Appellee "has no right to modify the existing easement or create
an unreasonable burden on the . . .[Appellants'] servient estate." Accordingly, if the Appellee abuses these limitations of
the implied easement or if the Appellee "create[s] an unreasonable burden" on the Appellants' property, nothing precludes the
Appellants from seeking damages from the Appellee. 0 9
VIII. MISCELLANEOUS
A.

Man-Made Lakes

Several cases tangentially related to "easement law" are discussed in
this section. Ours v. Grace Property,Inc.41 is a case of first impression in West
Virginia that answers the question of who has control over the use of surface
waters above a man-made lake bed owned by two or more adjoining land owners. 411 Shook's Run Lake is a man-made lake flood control impoundment constructed on land owned by the litigants. Ours, the plaintiff, owns approximately
ninety-eight percent of the land, and Grace Property, Inc., the defendant, owns
about two percent, which is comprised of a narrow strip of land located in the
southeastern corner of the lake. Grace Property, who has 400 shareholders,
owns about 12,000 acres, which 412
are used for hunting and recreational purposes
for its members and their guests.
As to Shook's Run Lake, the shareholders of the corporation were told:
that "[a] small section of the shoreline of the Shook[']s Run
Lake is on the [corporation's] property," and that
"[s]hareholders, family members and guests may fish from the
shoreline owned by the corporation or from boats that are
launched from the shoreline owned by the corporation. (Please
remember3 that the other owners of the shoreline have the same
4 1
rights).
A dispute over access to, and use of, the lake lead to litigation, in which
the circuit court granted a permanent injunction against the Corporation. Grace
Property appealed the adverse decision in the circuit court to the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals.
409

Id. at 319. In addition to the majority opinion, there was a concurring in part and dissenting

in part opinion by Justice McGraw which concurred with the majority that an easement by implication was created but dissented from the portion of the opinion that held it could be used for
timbering. See id. at 319-20.
410
412 S.E.2d 490 (W. Va. 1991).
411
Id.at 493.
412
See id. at 492.
413
Id.
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As to the issue of the owner of the land controlling the surface water
above, the court noted that there is a split of authority among our sister jurisdictions stating:
The majority of courts have followed the common-law rule.
Under the common-law rule, the owner of a portion of the land
underlying surface waters has the exclusive right to control the
water above that property.
Other jurisdictions have adopted a civil-law rule. Utilizing this
rule, the owner of part of the land underlying a lake has the
right to the reasonable use and enjoyment of the entire lake.
The states which have adopted the civil-law rule have been concerned with promoting the recreational use and enjoyment of

lakes, have an extensive number of lakes with recreational value, or have been concerned with attempts to establish and obey
definite property lines where several adjoining owners are involved.414

The court noted that Virginia, in a similar case, 415 had followed the
common law rule holding:
"[T]he complainants [Swifts] have exclusive control and use of
the waters above their portion of the bed of the pond, and...
they have the right to erect a fence on their boundary line across
the pond to prohibit
others from boating, fishing and trapping
416
property.,
their
on
As to the case before it, the court said:
Similarly, the facts of this case quite clearly demonstrate that
the appellees own the majority of the land beneath Shook's Run
Lake. Moreover, a clear harm will be inflicted upon the appellees' use and enjoyment of their property if the appellant is
permitted to have control over the entire lake based upon a mere
2% ownership of the lake. This harm arises from the appellant's disproportionate amount of potential users of the lake in
relation to the appellant's ownership. Finally, there is nothing
in the record which would indicate that when the appellees
granted the easement which allowed for the construction of the
414

Id. at 493 (citations omitted).

415

Wickouski v. Swift, 124 S.E.2d 892 (Va. 1962).

416

Ours v. Grace Property, Inc., 412 S.E.2d 490, 493 (W. Va. 1991) (citation omitted).
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dam, that the lake was going to bring a substantial number of
recreational users onto their land.
Based upon these facts, we also choose to follow the commonlaw rule in holding that where ownership of the land underlying
a man-made lake is clear and distinct, the owner of a portion of
the lake bed has the exclusive control and use of the water
above the portion of the lake bed which he owns. Further, the
owner has a right to exclude others, including other adjoining
owners of the lake bed, by erecting a fence or other barrier to
prohibit
others from utilizing the water which overlies his property. 417
In affirming the circuit court's decision, the court also rejected Grace
Property's arguments based on the easement language granted to the Potomac
Valley Soil Conservation District for the construction, operation, and maintenance of the dam on riparian rights. As to the easement argument, 418 the court
said:
It is evident from the easement granted to Potomac Valley by
the appellees that nothing more than the right to construct, operate and maintain a dam located on the appellees' and the appellant's property was acquired by Potomac Valley. The appellant's attempt to persuade this Court to find anything419
more than
best.
at
tenuous
is
Valley
Potomac
by
acquisition
this
The court also noted that in addition to the easement language relied
upon by the Grace Property, Ours had specifically restricted the grant of this
easement in the following provision:
There is reserved to the Grantor, his heirs and assigns, the right
and privilege to use the above described land of the Grantor at
417
418

Id. at 493 94.
The language granting the easement specifically stated that the appellees as grantor

do[ ] hereby grant, bargain, sell, convey and release unto Potomac Valley Soil
Conservation District... an easement in, over and upon a portion of the following described land ... for the purposes of: For or in connection with the
construction, operation, maintenance, and inspection of a floodwater retarding
structure, designated as site [No.] or #1 in the plans for South Fork ... Watershed, to be located on the above described land; for the flowage of any waters in, over, upon, or through such structure; and for the permanent storage
and temporary detention, either or both, of any waters that are impounded,
stored or detained by such structure.
Id. at 494.
419
Id.
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any time, in any manner and for any purpose not inconsistent
with the full use and enjoyment by the Grantee, its successors
and assigns, of the rights and privileges herein granted.
Consequently, when these provisions are read together, it is obvious that the appellees did not grant to Potomac Valley any
right to convey to any other person or entity the right to use the
appellees' property for anything other than constructing, maintaining and operating the dam.420
The court, also, rejected the corporation argument based on riparian
rights. In essence, the corporation riparian rights argument was that, as the
owner of a portion of the shoreline of the lake, it had the right to use all of the
waters of the lake. 4 21 The court, after noting that "the general rule is that riparian rights do not ordinarily attach to artificial bodies of water which necessarily
includes a man-made lake,, 422 stated:
It is clear from the facts before this Court that riparian rights are
not involved since the lake is man-made and since claim to
ownership in the lake is based upon deeds acquired by each of
the parties which granted the respective parties a portion of the
lake bed.
Therefore, we adhere to the general rule that
'[iln cases where various parts of the soil under a private lake
are owned by different persons, and in which it does not appear
that ownership was based on riparian rights, it has generally
been held that each owner has exclusive rights to the use of the
surface of the water over his land, or at least that the owner of a
larger portion can exclude from it the owner of a small portion.'
Wickouski, 124 S.E.2d at 894 (quoting Annotation, Rights of
Fishing, Boating, Bathing, or the Like in Inland Lakes, 57
A.L.R.2d 569, 592 §10 (1958)).423
B.

Lateral Support

The court, in Noone v. Price,424 provides a good discussion of lateral
support. While the issue on appeal was whether it was error for the circuit court

421

Id. at 494-95.
See id. at 495.

422

Ours v. Grace Property, Inc., 412 S.E.2d 490, 495 (W. Va. 1991).

423

Id.

420
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to have granted a partial summary judgment, the court said: "This case provides
an opportunity that we have not had for many years to address the obligations
of
425
adjoining land owners to provide lateral support to each other's land.,
The plaintiff was the owner of a house "located on the side of a mountain in the Glen Ferris, West Virginia ' 426 directly above the property of the defendant. Located on the property of the defendant was a wall 100 to 125 feet
long, approximately four feet high and of varying thicknesses. This wall was
entirely on the defendant's property and was located ten to twelve feet from the
property line between the plaintiff's and defendant's properties.4 27
The plaintiff's suit alleges damage to their property and house because
the defendant's failure to properly maintain the wall. In reversing the grant of
the partial summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the court stated:
While an adjacent landowner has an obligation only to support
his neighbor's property in its raw or natural condition, if the
support for land in its raw, natural condition is insufficient and
the land slips, the adjacent landowner is liable for both the damage to the land and the damage to any buildings that might be
on the land.428
The court begins its discussion by explaining:
As a general rule, "[a] landowner is entitled, exjure naturae, to
lateral support in the adjacent land for his soil." Point 2, syllabus, McCabe v. City ofParkersburg,138 W. Va. 830, 79 S.E.2d
87 (1953). Therefore, as we said in syllabus point 2 of Walker,
supra:
"An excavation, made by an adjacent owner, so as to take
away the lateral support, afforded to his neighbor's ground,
by the earth so removed, and cause it, of its own weight, to
fall, slide or break away, makes the former liable for the injury, no matter how carefully he may have excavated. Such
right of support is a property right and absolute."
An adjacent landowner is strictly liable for acts of commission
and omission on his part that result in the withdrawal of lateral
support to his neighbor's property. This strict liability, howev424
425
426
427
428

298 S.E.2d 218 (W. Va. 1982).
Id. at 221.
Id. at 220.
Id.
Id. at 221.
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er, is limited to land in its natural state; there is no obligation to
support the added weight of buildings or other structures that
land cannot naturally support. However, the majority of American jurisdictions hold that if land in its natural state would be
capable of supporting the weight of a building or other structure, and such building or other structure is damaged because of
the subsidence of the land itself, then the owner of the land on
which the building or structure is constructed can recover damages for both the injury to his land and the injury to his building
or structure. The West Virginia cases are largely consistent with
this position, although none has expressly so held.429
The court continued its discussion stating:
The converse of the preceding rule is also the law: where an
adjacent landowner provides sufficient support to sustain the
weight of land in its natural state, but the land slips as a direct
result of the additional weight of a building or other structure,
then in the absence of negligence on the part of the adjoining
landowner, there is no cause of action against such adjoining
landowner for damage either to the land, the building, or other
structure.430
As to whether the obligation of support "runs with the land," the court
noted:
The weight of authority appears to be that where an actor,
whether he be an owner, possessor, lessee, or third-party stranger, removes necessary support he is liable, and an owner cannot avoid this liability by transferring the land to another. Nevertheless, when an actor who removes natural lateral support
substitutes artificial support to replace it, such as a retaining
wall, the wall then becomes an incident to and a burden on the
land upon which it is constructed, and subsequent
owners and
43
possessors have an obligation to maintain it. '
As to the allegation of negligence, the court said:
In general, it has been held that while an adjoining landowner
has no obligation to support the buildings and other structures
on his neighbor's land, nonetheless, if those structures are ac429
430
431

Id.
Noone v. Price, 298 S.E.2d 218, 222 (W. Va. 1982).
Id.
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tually being supported, a neighbor who withdraws such support
must do it in a non-negligent way. In an action predicated on
strict liability for removing support for the land in its natural
state, the kind of lateral support withdrawn is material, but the
quality of the actor's conduct is immaterial; however, in a proceeding based upon negligence, the kind of lateral support
withdrawn is immaterial, and the quality of the actor's conduct
is material. Comment e, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 819
succinctly explains the nature of liability for negligence.
"The owner of land may be unreasonable in withdrawing
lateral support needed by his neighbor for artificial conditions on the neighbor's land in either of two respects. First,
he may make an unnecessary excavation, believing correctly that it will cause his neighbor's land to subside because
of the pressure of artificial structures on the neighbor's
land. If his conduct is unreasonable either in the digging or
in the intentional failure to warn his neighbor of it, he is
subject to liability to the neighbor for the harm caused by it.
The high regard that the law has by long tradition shown for
the interest of the owner in the improvement and utilization
of his land weighs heavily in his favor in determining what
constitutes unreasonable conduct on his part in such a case.
Normally the owner of the supporting land may withdraw
lateral support that is not naturally necessary, for any purpose that he regards as useful provided that the manner in
which it is done is reasonable. But all the factors that enter
into the determination of the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the actor's conduct must be considered, and in a
particular case the withdrawal itself may be unreasonable.
"Secondly, the owner of land may be negligent in failing to
provide against the risk of harm to his neighbor's structures.
This negligence may occur either when the actor does not
realize that any harm will occur to his neighbor's structures
or when the actor realizes that there is a substantial risk to
his neighbor's land and fails to take adequate provisions to
prevent subsidence, either by himself taking precautions or
by giving his neighbor an opportunity to take precautions.
Although the law accords the owner of the supporting land
great freedom in withdrawing from another's land support
that is not naturally necessary in respect to the withdrawal
itself, it does not excuse withdrawal in a manner that involves an unreasonable risk of harm to the land of another.
The owner in making the excavation is therefore required to
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take reasonable precautions to minimize the risk of causing
subsidence of his neighbor's land. In determining whether
a particular precaution is reasonably required, the extent of
the burden that the taking of it will impose upon the actor is
a factor of great importance."
In the case of Walker v. Strosnider, supra, Judge Poffenbarger,
speaking for a unanimous court, explained the law of West Virginia in2 a way completely in accord with the modern Restate43

ment.

In applying the law of lateral support to the instant case, the court concluded:
It would appear that the case before us either stands or falls on a
question of strict liability. It is admitted that the retaining wall
on the defendant's property was constructed at least sixty years
ago, before the construction of the plaintiffs' house, and that all
parties to this action were aware of the condition of the wall.
Furthermore, there is no allegation that the defendant did anything to cause the collapse of the wall, but rather only failed to
keep it in repair. Therefore, if the plaintiffs can recover, they
must do so by proving that the disrepair of the retaining wall
would have led ineluctably to the subsidence of their land in its
natural condition. If, on the other hand, the land would not
have subsided but for the weight of the plaintiffs' house, then
they can recover nothing.433
C.

"Ancient Lights"

The West Virginia Code, in § 2-1-2 entitled "Ancient lights," provides:
"The common law of England in regard to Ancient Lights is not in force in this
state., 43 4 This section was added to the Code in 1868. Although the statute
leaves no doubt as to its purpose and became effective April 1, 1869,411 the
court failed to discuss the statute in Powell v. Sims, 43 6 a case decided in the July
1871 term of the court. The court in Powell began its opinion by discussing
whether West Virginia was bound by the common law of England, and concluded that "[t]he common law of England is in force in this State only so far as
432

Id. at 223-24.

Id. at 225.
434 W. VA. CODE § 2-1-2 (1923).
435 See Nomar v. Ballard, 60 S.E.2d 710, 719 (W. Va. 1950).
436
5 W. Va. 1 (1871).
433
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it is in harmony with its institutions, and its principles applicable to the state of
the country and the condition of society., 43 7 Following an analysis of the relevant cases, the court noted that in this country "[t]he English common law doctrine of Ancient Lights is disapproved,, 438 and summarized its holding in Syllabus Point 3 as follows:
An implied grant of an easement of light will be sustained only
in cases of real necessity; and will be denied or rejected in cases
when it appears that the owner claiming the easement can, at a
reasonable cost, have or substitute other lights to his building.439
Nearly seven decades after the court's decision in Powell, the issue of
the right to light and air through windows on the side of a building in South
Charleston was before the court in Nomar v.Ballard.440 The case was before
the court following the circuit court's overruling of defendant's demurrer to
plaintiff's amended complaint, and the circuit court's certifying its ruling to the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.
The court noted:
It is admitted by all parties that the common law doctrine of ancient lights no longer prevails in West Virginia. Code, 2-1-2. It
is conceded by plaintiffs that an easement of light and air cannot, under the laws of this State, be acquired by prescription.
The sole contention of plaintiffs is that some character of servitude in respect to light and air was imposed on Lot No. 27, by
implications arising from the very nature of the situation as it
existed at the time Lot No. 27 was conveyed by the
deed of
44
January 25, 1935, to defendants' predecessors in title. '
The court recognized that:
The questions presented to the Court in the case at bar grow out
of the abolition in this State of the common law doctrine of ancient lights, as that doctrine was established in England before
the American Revolution, and as recognized by some of the
States subsequent to that event.442

437

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

438

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

439

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
60 S.E.2d 710 (W. Va. 1950).
Id.at714.
Id.

440

441
442
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After an extensive discussion of earlier West Virginia cases and the decision in sister jurisdictions, the court noted:
The case of Powell v. Sims has not been overruled or departed
from since it was decided in the year 1871, and has, we think,
become a rule of property entitled to be maintained and enforced for the protection of persons who have acquired property
in the light of the ruling there made.443
In affirming, the circuit court's decision overruling the demurrer, the
court explained:
The rule laid down in Powell v. Sims, should not be applied except in a case where there is a clear showing of necessity therefor, and we are not foreclosing the view that even in such a situation it should not be allowed to impede progress by prohibiting
improvements to property necessary to keep in line with the development of the community in which the same is located. We
know that in the development of our towns and cities, the first
step is the erection of buildings of one and two stories, which
are later replaced by more substantial buildings of greater
height. It would be dangerous to establish a rule by which
progress of a community would be hampered by implied restrictions, or for the mere convenience of people who may elect to
keep their property in its original state . . . . As the matter
stands, we can only accept as true the allegations of plaintiffs'
bill. Accepting these allegations as true, it may be questioned
whether they present a situation where, as a matter of law, we
can say they are entitled to the relief prayed for; but, on the other hand, we feel that the allegations are sufficient to call for further development of the case, and justify us in refusing to sustain the demurrer, the effect of which, in the absence of an
amendment, would be to call for the dismissal of plaintiffs'
444
bill.
The dissent of two Justices began:
The deed from Downey to Sims, considered in Powell v. Sims,
5 W.Va. 1, 13 Am.Rep. 629, relied upon by the majority, was
dated March 29, 1869. The provision of the 1868 Code, now
Code, 2-1-2, providing that 'It is hereby declared that the common law of England, touching ancient lights, is not and never
443
444

Id.at 718.
Id.at 719.
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has been, in force in this State', did not become effective until
April 1, 1869. The Powell case was not decided until the July
term, 1871, and does not mention the statute, but clearly bases
its authority upon the common law rule relating to implied
grants of easements for light, and very materially limits that rule
by declaring: 'The common law of England is in force in this
State only so far as it is in harmony with its institutions, and its
principles applicable to the state of the country and the condition of society.' Since the statute above quoted declared the
common law rule relating to ancient lights not to be the law of
this State, and since the effective date of the statute was subsequent to the date of the deed, I am of the view that the Powell
case can not be considered authority for the position of the majority in the instant case. The common law rule permitted an
easement for air and light only upon the presumption of an implied grant. When the rule was abrogated by the statute the
right to imply such a grant was necessarily destroyed.445
The dissent continued:
Assuming, however, that the rule of the Powell case remains the
law of this State, I can not believe it was intended to be given
the broad meaning attributed to it by the majority in the instant
case.... I think that the rule intended to be laid down in the
Powell case was that the necessity for the easement must be absolute and also obvious ....
Since it is admitted in this case that
light and air can be obtained otherwise than by virtue of the
claimed easement, and there is no absolute and obvious necessity for 4 the
easement, I would reverse the rulings of the lower
6
4

court.

The dissent further noted:
If forced to the conclusion of the majority, I would not hesitate
to overrule the Powell case. Less harm would result, I believe,
by doing so than to permit to stand such a plainly erroneous decision, one almost universally condemned.44

445

Id. at 719 20.

446

Nomar v. Ballard, 60 S.E.2d 710, 720 (W. Va. 1950).

447

Id.
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While a discussion of Article VIII, section 13 of the Constitution of
West Virginia, 44' and of West Virginia Code, Chapter 2, Article 1, section 1449 is
beyond the scope of this Article, 450 it is submitted that the failure of the court in
Powell in 1871 to acknowledge enactment of West Virginia Code § 2-1-2 just
three years earlier in 1868, 4 11 or to discuss its relevance or application to the
case before the court, raises legitimate questions as to how much deference
should be given to the Powell decision. It is submitted that a "fair" reading of
the Powell case suggests that the court, apparently unaware of the passage of
West Virginia Code § 2-2-2, was attempting to limit the English common law
rule under the then wording of the45 2West Virginia Constitutional provision stating the common law was in effect.
Following a discussion of the English decisions, and after noting "[t]he
question of easement of light does not appear ever to have been before the court
of appeals of Virginia,, 453 and after discussing the American authorities, the
court concluded:
[T]hat an implied grant of an easement of light will be sustained
only in cases of real and obvious necessity, and will be denied
or rejected in cases when it appears that the owner of the dominant estate can, at a reasonable cost and expenditure, have or
substitute other lights to his building, so that he may continue
and have the reasonable enjoyment of the same; leaving the
448

"Except as otherwise provided in this article, such parts of the common law, and of the laws

of this state as are in force on the effective date of this article and are not repugnant thereto, shall
be and continue the law of this state until altered or repeated by the Legislature."
449
W. VA. CODE § 2-1-1 (1923) provides:

450

Common Law - The common law of England. so far as it is not repugnant to
the principles of the constitution of this state, shall continue in force within the
same, except in those respects wherein it was altered by the general assembly
of Virginia before the twentieth day of June. eighteen hundred and sixty-three,
or has been, or shall be. altered by the Legislature of this state.
See Professor James Audley McLaughlin. The Idea of the Common Law in West Virginia

Jurisprudential History: Morningstar v. Black & Decker Revisited, 103 W. VA. L. REv. 125
(2000).
451
W. VA. CODE § 2-1-2 provides: "Ancient Lights. The common law of England in regard to
ancient lights is not in force in this State."
452

To what extent, then, is the Common Law of England in force in this State?
By section 8 of Article II of the Constitution. it is provided that "such parts of
the common law and the laws of the State of Virginia as are in force within
the boundaries of the State of West Virginia, when this Constitution goes into
operation, and not repugnant thereto, shall be and continue the law of this
State until altered or repealed by the Legislature."
Powell v. Sims, 5 W. Va. 1, 3 (1871).

Id. at I.
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owner of the serviant estate also to the enjoyment of his own
property free from the restriction
and burden that would other54

wise be imposed upon

4

it.

In dissolving the injunction granted by the circuit court prohibiting
Powell from erecting a porch which block Sim's windows, the court said: "Applying this principle to the case before us, it is easily settled, it being clear from
the testimony in the record, that the appellee, for a very moderate and reasonable expenditure, can obtain other lights and air sufficient for the useful and reasonable enjoyment of the property in controversy ....
As evidenced by the above discussion, the majority of the court in Nomar is, in essence, viewing the Powell decision as intending to create an "exception" to the statute which unambiguously states "the45 6common law of England in
regards to ancient lights is not in force in the state.,
The court in Nomar does not attempt to explain the "legal basis" of the
"exception" it believes that Powell created. The majority simply said, "In our
opinion, the situation presented in the case at bar would not justify us in overruling Powell v. Sims, and, until we do so, we are of the opinion that plaintiffs
cause of action, as
set up in their bill, comes within the general principles enun' 457
,
therein.
ciated
The fact that it has been sixty years since the court decided Nomar and
there have been no reported cases relying upon the Nomar majority's reading of
Powell is some evidence of its questionable precedential value.
IX. TERMINATION
A.

Abandonment

One of the earliest cases in West Virginia in which there was significant
discussion of abandonment of an easement is Scott v. Black.458 In Scott, there
was an easement by grant which was used for fifteen or twenty years. After a
bridge across a creek washed out, a portion of the right of way was relocated by
parol agreement of the owners of the dominant and servient estates. Because of

455

Id.at4 5.
Id.at 5.

456

W. VA. CODE §2-1-2 (1923).

454

457 Nomar v. Ballard, 60 S.E.2d 710, 718 (W. Va. 1950).
458

120 S.E. 167 (W. Va. 1923). In the 1874 case of Warren v. Syme, 7 W. Va. 474 (1874). the

court's Syllabus Point 15 deals with abandonment of an easement, and the principle of abandonment is discussed in the opinion at page 17. As the Scott court notes, the Warren case was not
decided "on the issue ofwhether or not the right had been abandoned, but on the fact that plaintiffs
had neither proved their title to the dominant tenement, nor defendant's alleged obstruction of the
easement, which obstruction was denied in the answer of the defendant." See Scott, 120 S.E. at
170.
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a change in the creek bed, this relocated portion of the right of way was used for
another fifteen or sixteen years. After a change in ownership of the servient
estate, the new owner obstructed the relocated portion of the road and tried to
make the owner of the dominant estate use the entire length of the original right
of way as opposed to the relocated portion of the right of way. The owner of the
servient estate, the defendant, argued he could bar use of the relocated portion of
the right of way because the owners of the dominant estate, the plaintiffs, had
not abandoned the original right of way, and, therefore, he should be required to
use the original right of way.
The court, citing cases from other jurisdictions and secondary authorities, stated that an easement held "under a grant," is not lost by mere nonuse and
"that in proving a case of abandonment it is not only necessary to prove a physical nonuse of the easement, but that nothing short of proof of intention to abandon the right will suffice. ' ,45 9 After discussing similar cases from other jurisdictions, the court concluded that the facts before it proved:
[N]ot only plaintiffs abandonment of the old right of way, but
their right to the unobstructed enjoyment of the new, not by reason of any prescriptive use of the new road, but by virtue of the
agreement of exchange, executed by the subsequent acts of the
plaintiffs
in using it, and of the defendant in acquiescing in that
60
4

use.

In Moyer v. Martin,461 an easement was created by grant as part of the
partition of land. In rejecting the argument that the owners of the dominant estate had lost the easement by nonuse, the court noted that abandonment does not
result from mere nonuse, but that an intention to abandon is also necessary. The
court in Moyer explained, "The use of the brickyard route over the lands of
another by plaintiffs and their predecessors, whether that easement was acquired
by purchase or by prescription, is not an extinguishment
of the easement
462
through the farm granted by the partition decree.,
The most significant abandonment decision in West Virginia is the relatively recent decision in Strahin v. Lantz. 463 The issue in the Strahin case was
whether the prescriptive easement was extinguished by abandonment. 464 After
noting that "[t]his Court has never directly addressed the factors necessary to

459 Id.at 169 (citation omitted).
460
461

Id. at 170.
131 S.E. 859 (W. Va. 1926).

462

Id. at 861 (citation omitted).

463

456 S.E.2d 12 (W. Va. 1995).

464

Id. at 14. Earlier in the decision, the court stated, "The evidence isundisputed that a pre-

scriptive easement was created across Miner Road." Id.
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show termination of a prescriptive easement by abandonment,,
footnote five, said:

465

751

the court, in

We find the criteria listed in Moyer persuasive because it has
been argued that prescriptive easements should be treated the
same as easements created by deed:
"An easement established by prescription is just as well established as one originating in the most formal deed. The methods
of extinguishment of prescriptive easements and easements
created by deed should be identical. Either nonuser should be
effective as to both, or as to neither. The Restatement of Property takes the position that nonuser alone is never sufficient to
prove abandonment as to any variety of easement, but constitutes relevant evidence which, with other
accompanying facts,
' 466
can justify a finding of abandonment. ,
After briefly quoting from secondary authorities, the court stated in its
holding that the easement was not extinguished:
We hereby adopt the foregoing rule and hold that abandonment
of an easement by prescription is a question of intention that
may be proved by nonuse combined with circumstances which
evidence an intent to abandon the right. It is the burden of the
party asserting the absence of an easement by prescription to
prove abandonment by clear and convincing evidence. 6B Michie's Jurisprudence Easements § 18 at 167.
What particular actions would constitute proof of intent to abandon an easement by prescription would necessarily depend on
the unique facts of each case.467

In Walls v. DeNoone,468 the court applied the law relating to abandonment as set forth in Strahin in reversing the judgment of the circuit court on the
application of the law to the facts of that case stating:
As indicated in Strahin v. Lantz, supra, for an abandonment of a
right-of-way to occur, there must be a clear showing that the
owner does not intend to exercise his rights in the future.

465
466
467
468

Id. at 15.
Id.at n.5 (citation omitted).
Id.at 15.
550 S.E.2d 653 (W. Va. 2001).
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In the present case, the Court believes that the facts do not
clearly show that the various owners of the DeNoone property
intended to give up their rights, and consequently the Court
concludes that the circuit court erred in holding that there was
an abandonment. Clearly, the right-of-way was used for both
pedestrian property and vehicular traffic after the gate was
erected. The only dispute is whether there was vehicular passage over the final few feet of the easement into what became
the DeNoone
property, and the evidence on that point is con46 9
flicting.

B.

Adverse Possession

The difficulty of establishing the termination of an easement by adverse
possession is illustrated by a comment made by the court in Wooldridge v.
Coughlin.47 ° In Wooldridge, Coughlin argued that if a way of necessity existed
(the court found there was a way of necessity):
[1]t was lost by the statute of limitations, because it was not used
from its birth on the conveyance from Cabell to Hurley, September 2, 1871, until after June 27, 1882, when Wooldridge moved
upon the land, - a period of more than 10 years; and it is
claimed that this period barred the easement, as Coughlin was in
actual possession of his land during that period, and the right of
way was not exercised.471
In response to this argument, the court explained:
It seems to me that mere nonuser of a way appurtenant to wild
land would not destroy the right of way. The fact that Coughlin
had possession of his land is not a material element, and would
not affect the right of way, as Coughlin's possession was a matter of course, and it could co-exist with right of way, and would
469

Id. at 658. A claim of extinguishing the easement by adverse possession was also raised and

rejected by the court, stating:
[T]here is conclusive evidence that whoever erected the gate at the edge of
what became the DeNoone property did not take exclusive possession of the
right-of-way at the time of the erection of the gate or at any time thereafter.
A review of the evidence also shows conclusively that the right-of-way was
used at least to provide some pedestrian access to what became the DeNoone
property even after a gate was erected.

Id.
470
471

33 S.E. 233 (W. Va. 1899).
Id. at 234.
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not be in antagonism per se with that right of way. In almost
every case of conceded right of way, whether by grant or necessity, there is actual possession of the land subject to such right
of way. Arnold v. Stevens, 35 Am. Dec. 305; Gray v. Bartlett,
32 Am. Dec. 208, note. The statute limiting actions for recovery of actual possession of land does not, in terms, apply to incorporeal hereditaments, such as mere easements. If the owner
of the servient land deny the easement, and his denial is known
to the owner of the dominant land, and there were nonuser thereafter of the way for the statutory period of 10 years, it would
defeat the right of way; but I do not see that such private right
of way, 4once
brought into being, could be defeated by simple
72
nonuser.

In Rudolph v. Glendale Improvement Co.,473 the litigation arose from an
effort to replat the land in a subdivision including the relocation of streets. One
of the arguments of the defendants was that if the plaintiff had gained private
easements to roadways and the planned park, they had lost those easements
474
through abandonment and adverse possession.
In rejecting the adverse possession argument, the court said:
Nor can we see much strength in the contention of adverse possession of Erskine and defendant. The adverse possession necessary to extinguish an easement of right of way by express
grant must be wholly inconsistent with the right to enjoy the
easement and amount to a disseisin or ouster. Parker v. Swett,
40 Cal. App.68, 180 P.351; Perry v. Wiley, 285 IIl. 25, 120 N.
E. 455; Seymour Water Co. v. Lebline, 105 Ind. 481, 144 N.E.
30, 145 N.E.704, where it is said that in order to effect an extinguishment of such right of way there must be an absolute denial
of the right to the easement, and the occupancy by the servient
owner must be so adverse and hostile that the owner of the
easement could have maintained an action for obstructing his
enjoyment of it. And in Marshall v. Pfeiffer, 314 Il1. 286, 145
N.E. 411, it was held that to constitute adverse possession of
platted streets the possession must have been hostile in inception, adverse, actual, visible, open, notorious, exclusive, and
continuous, and under claim of ownership, and that the doctrine
of estoppel in pais held not to apply as against town lot owners
suing to enjoin obstruction of platted streets by adjoining own472

Id. (citation omitted).

473

137 S.E. 349 (W. Va. 1927).
See id. at 352.

474
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ers, where the possession and use of the latter, though long continued, was suffered by plaintiffs only until changing conditions
required opening of streets. In the instant case Erskine, trustee,
continued in possession of the lots, streets, alleys, and parks at
the time the map and dedication were filed. There was no
change in the physical aspect of the property, except that trees
were planted by him around the circular park. It remained as
when dedicated - an open field. His possession was not adverse, and was consistent with his dedication.475
In Bauer Enterprises,Inc. v. City of Elkins,476 the court noted the difference between private easements and public ways by explaining:
Private easements differ from public ways in two regards. First,
private easements can be used by their owners only for the purpose of reasonable ingress and egress to their property, whereas
public ways can be used by the general public without reference
to their destination. Second, public authorities have no obligation to maintain private easements whereas they do have an obligation to maintain public ways. Rose v. Fisher, 130 W.Va. at
57, 42 S.E.2d at 252. In addition, there can be no adverse possession of a public way, Huddleston v. Deans, supra, but if the
elements of adverse possession are present a private easement
may be extinguished. Rudolph v. Glendale Improvement Co.,
103 W.Va. 81, 137 S.E. 349 (1927). 477

In Higgins v. Suburban Improvement Co.,478 the court was again presented a case involving platted but unopened streets. In Higgins, there was a
platted street fifty feet in width extending along the rear of lots 12 through 24 in
a north to south direction. From the northeast corner of lot 15 in a southerly
direction, "The terrain rose so steeply to the east from the National Road and
was so precipitous ... as to make it impossible for vehicular traffic to use the
platted street in traveling from lots 12, 13, and 14 southwardly to the other lots
of the addition., 479 The unopen road was usable behind lots 12, 13, and 14 and
was used, in part, by the owner of lot 12 to access a stable on the rear of her lot.
Mrs. Howard, the successor to the person who originally platted the subdivision,
began placing valuable improvements on the fifty foot platted right of way
Id. The fourth paragraph of the court Syllabus reads: "Adverse possession of such easement must be hostile at its inception, adverse, actual, visible, open, notorious, exclusive, under
claim of ownership, and continuous for the statutory period." Id. at 349.
476
317 S.E.2d 798 (W. Va. 1984).
475

477

Id.at 801.

478

151 S.E. 842 (W. Va. 1930).

479

Id.at 842-43.
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shortly after she acquired her title in 1903. The improvements were in the portion of the right of way south of lot 15. In 1928, the defendant company, owned
by Mrs. Howard and her husband, started to construct a stable in the fifty foot
right of way behind lot 12, which was owned by the plaintiff. The instant litigation was to enjoin the construction of that stable. The court stated the issue as
whether the principle that "adverse possession of a part of a tract by one holding
under color of title extends to all the land comprehended in his title papers" applies to this case. 480 The court applied the law of the Rudolph case as set forth
above in the quoted Syllabus to hold that Mrs. Howard had gained title to the
easements area except for the easements behind lots 12, 13, and 14, and a twenty foot easement along the northern boundary of lot 13 leading from the National Road to the fifty foot easement.481
The holding as to the portion of the fifty foot easement behind lots 12,
13 and 14, and the twenty foot easement, is summarized in the court's Syllabus
as follows:
Where the owner of the servient estate over which has been
granted by deed a right of way obstructs a portion thereof which
before the obstruction could not used by the owner of the easement because of natural barriers, such obstruction will not be
deemed to extinguish by acquiescence other portions of the
right of
way necessary to and in use by the owner of the ease48 2
ment.
In White v. Lambert,4 3 the issue on appeal was "(1) whether property
can be acquired through adverse possession where no 'color of title' exists; and
(2) whether a right-of-way granted by deed can be extinguished by non-use of a
portion of the easement for a continuous period of more than ten years., 414 The
court, relying upon the Higgins decision, said, "The law is clear that a claim of
adverse possession can be made on an express easement," 4"5 and cited Somon v.
Murphy Fabrication& Erection Co. 486 as holding, "The sixth element of the
Somon formulation can be48satisfied
by showing possession under either 'claim
7
of title' or 'color of title.'",

481

Id. at 844.
See id.at 845.

482

Id. at 842.

483

332 S.E.2d 266 (W. Va. 1985).
Id.at 268.
Id.at 268 (citation omitted).
232 S.E.2d 524 (W. Va. 1977).

480

484
485
486

White, 332 S.E.2d at 268. The Somon court cited earlier West Virginia case law defining
the terms as follows:
487

"A claim of title has generally been held to mean nothing more than the disseisor enters upon the land with the intent to claim it as his own. Heavner v.
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As to the second issue, the court had identified as presented by the appeal, the per curiam decision stated:
In this case, the evidence of the Lamberts' adverse use of a portion of the deeded right-of-way for more than ten years is sufficient to establish a "claim of title." Although the trial court in
his letter opinion and order used the phrase "color of title" rather than "claim of title," we believe this was done inadvertently since the relief granted by the court was limited to the physical area over which the Lamberts exercised actual dominion.488
In Norman v. Belcher,4' 9 after concluding that the defendants, the
Belchers, had failed to meet their burden of proof to establish a prescriptive
easement, the court in dictum noted:
A private easement may be extinguished by adverse possession
wholly inconsistent with the use of the easement.4 90
By way of explanation, the court, after summarizing the elements of adverse possession, said,
Here, Kinniman Belcher's use of the 62.5-acre tract as an enclosed garden during the 1920's and 1930's satisfies these requirements. His use of the property in such a manner was
wholly inconsistent with the use of the roadway as a means of
ingress and egress to the 15-acre tract. He expressly refused to
allow others to use the roadway for vehicular access during that
period. Indeed, there is no evidence that the roadway was used
for any vehicular traffic after 1918 or 1919. We believe the
evidence here clearly justified the conclusion that any easement
acquired by the defendant's predecessors in title had been extinguished by the adverse possession of Kinniman Belcher.49'

Morgan [41 W.Va. 428, 23 S.E. 874 (1895)]. Whereas, 'color of title' imports

there is an instrument giving the appearance of title, but which instrument in
point of law does not. In other words, the title paper is found to be defective
in conveying the legal title. Stover v. Stover, 60 W.Va. 285, 54 S.E. 350
(1906)." 160 W.Va. at 91-92. 232 S.E.2d at 529.
Id. at 268-69.
488

489
490

491

Id. at 269.
378 S.E.2d 446 (W. Va. 1989).
Id.at 448 (citation omitted).

Id.at 449.
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Merger

Both the principle of law and the explanation of the principle of merger
are succinctly stated in Pingley v. Pingley492 as follows:
It seems to be firmly established that where the owner of land
over which an easement is claimed as appurtenant to another
tract of land becomes also the owner of such other tract, the
easement is merged in his superior estate. No one can use part
of his own estate adversely to another part, and the proposition,
therefore, must be true that, if the owner of one of the estates,
whether the dominant or servient one, becomes the owner of the
other, the servitude which one owes to the other is merged in
such ownership, and thereby extinguished.493
In Pingley, while the case was pending, the owner of the servient estate
acquired4 title to the dominant estate. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed as
49
moot.
In Perdue v. Ballengee,495 when a party obtained three tracts of land that
had at one time been a part of the same tract of land, an easement that had been
appurtenant to one of those tracts merged, and was extinguished and, therefore,
no longer existed when that tract was reconveyed.496

492

95 S.E. 860 (W. Va. 1918).

493

Id. at 861 (citation omitted).

"Both the dominant and servient estate having become vested in the defendant, the easement
claimed is thereby extinguished, and leaves nothing upon which any judgment rendered by this
Court could operate.
It therefore follows that the appeal must be dismissed as presenting only a moot question."
Id.
495
105 S.E. 767 (W. Va. 1921).
496
In the words of the court:
It is clearly established that, when the owner of a tract of land to which an
easement is appurtenant acquires the tract upon which the easement is a burden, the subservient and dominant estates become merged. and thereafter there
exists but one estate. The easement ceases to exist. See Pingley v. Pingley,
82 W.Va. 228, 95 S.E. 860, and authorities there cited. It is quite clear that
during the time that Mrs. Ballengee was the owner of this land there was in
existence no easement over any part of it as appurtenant to any other part.
The easement that had been theretofore appurtenant to the 37 z2-acre tract became merged in the other estates owned by her in the land, and passed out of
existence.
Id. at 769.
494

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2010

121

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 112, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 4
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 112

Similarly, in Henline v. Miller,497 when the title of the dominant and
servient estates were united in the same owner, the merger extinguished the
right of way. 498
While the court in Highway Propertiesv. Dollar Savings Bank499 recognized that the law supported the trial court's conclusion that the easement had
been extinguished by merger,500 it affirmed the decision on the basis of an inadequate description of the easement."'
However, after citing the above discussed West Virginia cases and quoting from Henline and Pingley, the Highway Properties court added in footnote
four the following:
There are limitations to the concept of merger, as summarized
in 28 C.J.S. Easements § 57(b) (1941):
"In order to extinguish an easement by merger, there must be
unity of title and, according to some decisions, of possession
and enjoyment of the dominant and servient estates, coextensive
in validity, quality, and all other circumstances of right. Ways
of necessity and natural easements are, strictly speaking, not
subject to the doctrine of merger."

497

185 S.E. 852 (W. Va. 1936).

498

The conveyance by which H. W. Karickhoff became the owner of the tract of
13 9/10 acres was made at a time when he was also the owner of the tract of 1
acre, 2 4/10 poles. This common ownership of both the dominant and the servient estate had the effect of extinguishing the right of way. Pingley v. Pingley, 82 W.Va. 228, 95 S.E. 860; Perdue v. Ballengee, 87 W.Va. 618, 105 S.E.
767. The user of the roadway during this period of ownership of both of the
tracts of land by H. W. Karickhoff did not operate to perpetuate or preserve
the right of way. An owner of land cannot claim adversely to himself, and
undoubtedly he cannot own a right of way over his own land.
Id. at 854.
499
431 S.E.2d 95 (W. Va. 1993).
500

At the urging of Dollar Savings and New Market, the court below decided that
a merger between the dominant and servient estates occurred in the 1983 deed
and the easements were extinguished. Merger occurred in spite of the fact the
deed contained easement language. reciting reciprocal rights-of-way for ingress and egress and parking on the five tracts, because Fayette Square received fee simple title to the five parcels.
Id. at 98.
501
"From the foregoing law and aside from the merger question, it is our conclusion that the
easement sought to be created in this case in the 1983 deed to Fayette Square was insufficient as a
matter of law as to its description." Id. at 99.
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See McNeil v. Kennedy, 88 W. Va. 524, 529, 107 S.E. 203, 205

(1921) (Merger "would not debar him from his right of way acquired50 by
prescription through the lands of other servient own2
ers.").

In the recent case Folio v. City of Clarksburg,"3 the court again found

the lower court was correct in concluding there had been merger but reversed
the grant of summary judgment on other grounds.0 4 As to the merger, the court
said, after quoting from Pingley:
"Here, Grandeotto clearly owned both the dominent estate and
the servient estate at the time the right-of-way agreements were
executed. Both agreements were signed by Mr. Folio as Chairman of the Board of Grandeotto, as grantor and grantee, and
were executed and recorded
prior to the sale and conveyance of
' 50 5
the property to the City. X. CONCLUSION

It is fair to speculate that Judge Frank C. Haymond °6 believed the court
needed seminal opinions relating to the law of servitudes in West Virginia. The
earlier opinions in this area of the law had been relatively short, tended to focus
on the specific element or legal principle relevant to the case before the court,
and resolved the issue. In contrast, Judge Haymond's opinions in Cottrell v.
Nurnberger,50 7 Town of Paden City v. Felton,50 8 and Stuart v. Lake Washington

Realty Corp. 0 9 summarized prior West Virginia decisions and discussed secondary authorities and cases from other sister jurisdictions. As noted above,
these three decisions have provided comprehensive discussions of servitudes in
West Virginia.
From the vantage point provided by the passage of over a half century,
the three cases have proved instructive in a way that it is doubtful that Judge
Haymond would have anticipated. Each of the three opinions was decided by
votes of three to two. In all three, the main thrust of the dissents was not a disa502
503
504

Id. at 98 n.4.
655 S.E.2d 143 (W. Va. 2007).
"[W]e believe that genuine issues of material fact exist concerning whether an easement was

created by equitable estoppel as a result of representation made by the City at the time of the
conveyance." Id.
at 148.
505

Id.

506

Judge Haymond served on the West Virginia Court of Appeals from July 1, 1945, until June

10, 1972.
47 S.E.2d 454 (W. Va. 1948).
508
66 S.E.2d 280 (W. Va. 1951).
509
92 S.E.2d 891 (W. Va. 1956).
507
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greement as to the law as articulated by the majority, but rather its application to
the facts of each case. In Hock v. City ofMorgantown,5 1 ° Justice Richard Neely
in writing for the court said:
Predictability is at the heart of the doctrine of Stare decisis, and
regardless of what we think of the merits of this case, we must
be true to a reasonable interpretation of prior law in the area of
property where certainty above all else is the preeminent compelling public policy to be served. 11
In the area of easement law, the court in West Virginia has provided us
with sets of principles which it has adhered to over the years, and while there
may be occasions to disagree with the application of the various elements of the
law of easements to a particular set of facts, the principles have remained con-

sistent and, therefore, predictable.

510

511

253 S.E.2d 386 (W. Va. 1979).
Id. at 388.
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